MAYDAY.US

MAYDAY.US Report on 2014 Elections

From raising over $10 million from over 50,000 people, to backing reform candidates in eight races, we've come a long way since May 1, 2014.

This report attempts to document exactly how far.

By Karina Qian, MPP `14

with foreword by Lawrence Lessig

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FOREWORD

When we launched MAYDAY.US, our aim in part was to persuade skeptics that Americans cared enough about the corruption of their government to vote for candidates committed to ending it. Our hope was that by running campaigns in a diverse mix of targeted districts — and winning — we would shake a conventional view, as one consultant put it, that ours is "a zero issue."

"Zero" — not in the sense that it isn't important. "Zero" in the sense that voters could not be motivated on the basis of this issue. The accounting system of the federal government is a "zero issue" in this sense — certainly important, but not the sort of issue that is likely to motivate the vote of anyone. Our view is that the corrupting influence of money in American politics is not, in this sense, a zero issue. Building on the work of John R. Hibbing, and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse,[1] and recognizing the incredibly high "importance" ranking that polls have recently found for issues of corruption relative to other issues, our view is that a campaign can motivate a significant number of voters, based on its position on this issue.

In this project, we are continuing the work of others. In 2012, Friends of Democracy engaged in a similar effort, by entering 8 races with a complementing reform message. Seven of the candidates that they supported in that election prevailed. Reformers (including I) took those victories as a clear signal of the salience of this issue to voters. We were encouraged by the apparent impact of an elegant message with only a modest investment.

But some were skeptical that it was the money in politics message that was moving voters in those districts. So in this round, we upped the ante, picking a range of races in which the odds of winning were low, though the race was still

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[1] Stealth Democracy (2002).

plausible. Our bet was that if we prevailed despite the odds, it would be easier to convince the skeptics that this issue mattered to voters. And thus easier to mount an even larger campaign to win a Congress committed to reform in the next cycle.

We lost that bet. Of the 8 races that we entered, we won just two. Only one of those two (AZ-07) was genuinely contested.[2] In the remaining 6, our candidates were defeated.

Many have noted the obvious about these defeats: Five of the defeated candidates were Democrats. The sixth, Greg Orman of Kansas, though an Independent, was effectively painted as a Democrat by his Republican opponent. The partisan wave against the President in this election cycle was enormous, and rose even higher in the last days before the election. Vulnerable Democrats across the board were defeated. It's therefore no surprise that our bets in difficult races would fail as well.

All that is true, but it doesn't cure the fact that we didn't succeed in our primary objective. Indeed, so clear was it to at least some in the press that our experiment was a failure that our issue was declared "a zero issue" even before the actual polling data about how and why people voted as they did was published.

This report is Plan B. The committed skeptics are entitled to their skepticism; we didn't do enough to entitle us to challenge it. But for those with a less committed mind, we offer these data to help answer the question that in part motivated this whole project: is the corruption of our government really "a zero issue"? Or more precisely: Is reforming

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[2] We entered the second, supporting Republican Walter Jones, to test the salience of our message among Republicans in an effectively uncontested race.

that corruption important to voters? Are the votes of a significant proportion of voters influenced by this issue? Do a significant proportion of voters make this issue, relative to other issues, determinative of their vote?

We believe the data presented here supports the view that this issue is among the most important issues to voters, and that, relative to any other issue, a significant proportion will determine their vote on the basis of this issue. Other factors can dominate — partisanship most prominently. But when those other factors can be neutralized — in a primary, for example, at least in a safe seat — or when this issue is tied to other issues, the corrupting influence of money becomes a powerful force within an election.

We believe this — but of course we would. MAYDAY.US has rallied over 50,000 people to contribute to this cause. Our commitment to this belief and this cause is, in a sense, constitutional. So our assertions alone are not likely to persuade anyone not already committed to our view. And thus, if this Plan B is to have any real effect, we need to execute on it differently. It's not enough to simply present a report with numbers purporting to support a conclusion. If we're to advance understanding, we must do it in the way any scientific project would: openly and transparently.

So accompanying this report are most of the data that support it. Those data include the polling we did in the races we ran, the media buys we made, and the actual ads we produced. In some cases our campaigns relied on data we can't release here — because partners in those races shared polling data without authorizing us to share it publicly. But one partner, Every Voice, has agreed to permit us to release the data from their poll. (Evincing yet another value that we share with Every Voice.) And thus, in this report, we have relied primarily upon the data that we can provide to others – though, in some cases, we could only work with the data we had.

This type of transparency is not done in politics. It's obvious why: there are a million decisions in any campaign, and thus a million judgments for others to second guess. And in the ferociously nasty world of political journalism, why would anyone voluntarily arm the critics?

That's a fair question. But the fact is that these data don't fairly reflect the factors that led to the strategic decisions that were made within our campaigns. Many other factors — such as the timing of fundraising, the actual response of opponents, the timing of the race, the constraints of media buys — mattered fundamentally, but are not included here. And hence any judgment about those strategic decisions based on these data alone would be obviously incomplete.

The consultants and allies who ran our campaigns were incredible. I have never seen a more professional set of teams (there were three) execute as well on anything under such pressure anywhere. But our purpose in this release is not to provide the basis on which to praise or critique them.

Instead, this release is an invitation. It is meant to get others to evaluate independently the salience of this issue, and to make their own analysis of the conditions under which voters might or might not respond.

Nothing will be proven on the basis of what we offer here. Had Plan B been Plan A — had we focused only on creating the data necessary to convince — we would have prepared the data underlying this report differently. And better. Though I had always expected we would present these data regardless of the outcome, it was my fault not to invest more in laying the foundations in advance. There were experiments that could have been run; there is a deeper level of

analysis that we could have tried. But our first objective — to win elections — consumed 250% of our cycles, leaving way too few for the scientists.

In the end, I hope these data encourage more campaigns to take up the issue. They have taught us a great deal about how to push this issue in the future. They have shown us the limits to this cause — at least when so many are so deeply skeptical about any prospect for reform, especially in the middle of such a ferociously partisan election.

I also hope these data will convince others to follow our lead. There is endless energy in the academy to understand this issue. Some of that is partisan; most of it is not. More than 50,000 people invested in our cause. When so many have done so much for a cause this fundamental, we should be willing to bear the heat of criticism, fair or not, at least if it might help to shed light.

I am grateful to Karina Qian for her careful work compiling these data, and to the Mayday.US team for pulling together the supporting material.

And I am endlessly grateful to the thousands who continue to support our cause. As an "egghead" might say: Venimus, didicimus, vincemus. (We came. We learned. We will conquer.) (And no, I can't speak Latin. But The Google thinks it can.)

Lawrence Lessig

Brookline, MA
9 December 2014

OUR COMMUNITY

# Value of donations

Bar chart — Value of donations:

Donation	Value
$10	$148,501
$20	$71,247
$40	$410,456
$80	$656,245
$150	$1,352,466
$300	$670,365
$500	$493,078
$1,000	$568,186
$2,000	$62,596
$3,000	$172,909
$5,000	$243,400
$50,000	$812,833
$100,000	$1,000,000
$250,000	$1,985,665
$500,000	$2,300,000

Number of donations

Bar chart — Number of donations:

Donation	Number
$10	16,762
$20	3,778
$40	15,991
$80	12,973
$150	13,336
$300	2,902
$500	1,003
$1,000	577
$2,000	36
$3,000	69
$5,000	50
$50,000	46
$100,000	10
$250,000	10
$500,000	4

91% targeted to "whatever helps" or blank

$162.08 average donation

63,988 donations under $200

67, 547 donations for a total of over **$10,947,947** raised. Our donors came from more than **10,934 zip codes** - and every state - across the US.

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WHAT WE DID

56.5 million digital impressions targeted to hundreds of thousands of persuadable voters

27,835 gross rating points of TV ads reaching 5.5 million viewers in key districts

$10,000,000 in special interest money and congressional perks have changed Fred Upton.

He put himself ahead of Michigan families when he:
> Voted to protect special congressional perks, like the House Gym, Barber Shop and Dining Hall.
> Voted to keep first-class air travel at taxpayer expense
> Voted to allow congressmen to lease private jets at taxpayer expense
> Voted to protect taxpayer-funded health care for life for Congress

Fred Upton: Selling out Michigan, one vote at a time.

Paid for by Mayday PAC
Not authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee
www.mayday.us

Big Oil gave Fred Upton $646,950 in campaign cash and the investment paid off. Fred Upton:

☑ Voted to give Big Oil $4 billion in taxpayer-funded subsidies
☑ Voted to allow oil companies to escape accountability for cleanup costs for major oil spills

And Fred Upton benefits personally. He owns up to $250,000 in BP and ExxonMobil stock.

We can't afford Fred Upton ANYMORE.

On Tuesday, November 4, vote NO on Fred Upton

FRED UPTON VOTED TO LET OIL COMPANIES OFF THE HOOK FOR CLEANING UP THEIR MESS.

Fred Upton took $646,950 from Big Oil special interests, and then he:

☑ Voted to give Big Oil $4 billion in taxpayer-funded subsidies
☑ Voted to allow oil companies to escape accountability for cleanup costs for major oil spills

SPECIAL INTERESTS CAN AFFORD HIM... BUT WE CAN'T AFFORD FRED UPTON ANYMORE.

Paid for by Mayday PAC
Not authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee

Big drug companies gave Congressman Upton more than $1,000,000 and Upton repeatedly voted to block Medicare from negotiating lower prescription drug prices.

The cost to America's seniors: $230 billion.

The Washington Post
"Republicans Block Medicare Drug Price Bill."

Special Interests can afford him...but we can't afford Fred Upton anymore.

On Tuesday, November 4, vote NO on Fred Upton

THE CORRUPT SYSTEM FOR FUNDING CAMPAIGNS:

BILLIONAIRES & CORPORATIONS BUYING ELECTIONS.

They get the tax breaks and the giveaways.

DON'T PLAY THEIR GAME.

CHANGE IT: GO TO MAYDAY.US TO LEARN MORE ABOUT TAKING BACK OUR DEMOCRACY

RUBEN GALLEGO IS FIGHTING AGAINST A CORRUPT CAMPAIGN FUNDING SYSTEM.

HE'S FIGHTING FOR US.

RUBEN DOESN'T PLAY THEIR GAME. **JOIN HIM.**

GO TO MAYDAY.US TO LEARN MORE ABOUT TAKING BACK OUR DEMOCRACY

Paid for by Mayday PAC. Not authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee. www.Mayday.us

BIG MONEY IS DROWNING OUR DEMOCRACY.

Frank Guinta then voted against letting Medicare negotiate with drug companies for lower drug prices – driving up the cost of prescriptions.

He voted to cut Medicare so seniors could end up paying thousands more every year.

He voted to let insurance companies deny coverage for children with preexisting conditions.

But Guinta voted to keep his taxpayer funded health benefits for life – even after he leaves office.

Frank Guinta. Taking care of himself. Taking us BACKWARDS.

Big money will buy our elections. Until you vote to get big money out.

Frank Guinta then voted for tax breaks for companies that ship jobs overseas to countries like China and India.

And to give Wall Street millionaires and billionaires more tax cuts and protect their "golden parachute" bonuses.

He even voted to keep himself getting paid when Congress shut down.

Frank Guinta. Taking care of himself. Taking us BACKWARDS.

Big money will buy our elections. Until you vote to get big money out.

Frank Guinta then voted to allow insurance companies to charge women more than men.

He co-sponsored a bill that would allow employers to deny contraceptive coverage and refuse to cover mammograms and other preventive care.

He voted to let insurance companies deny coverage for children with preexisting conditions.

He even voted to allow hospitals to deny lifesaving health care for pregnant women, and to restrict a woman's right to use her own private insurance to pay for hospital procedures.

Frank Guinta. Taking care of himself. Taking us BACKWARDS.

Big money will buy our elections. Until you vote to get big money out.

770,000 pieces of mail sent to over 500,000 individuals and households

25,202 doors knocked on by 800 volunteers, canvassers and organizers

4,603 gross rating points of radio ads reaching 800K+ listeners

555,708 calls made to likely voters on or just before Election Day

WHAT IMPACT WE HAD

| District	Candidate Poll (INITIAL)	TV GRP	Web impressions	Mailers	Radio GRP	Calls	Candidate Vote (FINAL)
AZ-07 (DEM primary)	41%		3.9 million	112K			49%
NH-Sen (GOP primary)	9%	4,567	23.2 mil	402K	3,172	3,733	24%
MI-06	31%	6,651	4.7 mil	44K		346,315	40%
NH-01	40%		19 mil	100K		50,131	48%
NC-03				99K	891		68%
SD-Sen	24%	10,528	5.2 mil				30%
KS-Sen	44%	4,270	1.7 mil			72,561	43%
IA-03	46%	1,819	580K			132,777	42%

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IMPACT: our issue

AZ-07 (DEM primary)
17 *

33% — Politicians putting their interests first
22% — Lack of good jobs
10% — Big donor influence
9% — Politicians putting big donors first
8% — Special interest influence
5% — Putting the middle class first
4% — Pollution

NH-01
91

23% — Lack of good jobs
20% — Politicians putting their interests first
16% — Big donor influence
12% — Protection of Social Security, Medicare
10% — Special interest influence
8% — Putting the middle class first
5% — Pollution
3% — Politicians putting big donors first

MI-06
49

25% — Politicians putting their interests first
22% — Lack of good jobs
14% — Protection of Social Security, Medicare
13% — Big donor influence
8% — Putting the middle class first
7% — Special interest influence
2% — Pollution
2% — Politicians putting big donors first

SD-Sen
27

28% — Politicians putting their interests first
14% — Lack of good jobs
14% — Protection of Social Security, Medicare
14% — Big donor influence
8% — Special interest influence
6% — Putting the middle class first
4% — Politicians putting big donors first
0% — Pollution

NH-Sen
16

26% — Lack of good jobs
22% — Politicians putting their interests first
14% — Big donor influence
11% — Protection of Social Security, Medicare
7% — Putting the middle class first
6% — Special interest influence
5% — Pollution
3% — Politicians putting big donors first

IA-03
59

25% — Politicians putting their interests first
22% — Lack of good jobs
14% — Protection of Social Security, Medicare
13% — Big donor influence
8% — Putting the middle class first
7% — Special interest influence
2% — Pollution
2% — Politicians putting big donors first

NC-03
-64

28% — Politicians putting their interests first
25% — Lack of good jobs
17% — Protection of Social Security, Medicare
14% — Big donor influence
5% — Special interest influence
4% — Putting the middle class first
2% — Politicians putting big donors first
1% — Pollution

KS-Sen
86

30% — Politicians putting their interests first
16% — Lack of good jobs
11% — Protection of Social Security, Medicare
10% — Big donor influence
9% — Special interest influence
7% — Putting the middle class first
6% — Politicians putting big donors first
1% — Pollution

Our issues (including the influence of big money donors and special interests) are consistently among the top issues people care about. **Donor influence matches protection of Social Security and Medicare in 6 of 8 races.**

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*For all races, lead among voters identifying special interests as most important issue. Issue ranking for NH-Sen from general election; point lead from GOP primary.

10%
AZ-07
(DEM primary)

16%
NH-01

11%
MI-06

14%
SD-Sen

14%
NH-Sen
**(GOP primary)**

13%
IA-03

**14%**
NC-03

10%
KS-Sen

At least 10% of voters in all elections said that the influence of big-money campaign donors on our democracy was their most important voting issue.

0%   100%

Average percent Democratic / Republican vote,
by precinct (2000-2012)

0%   100%

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10%
AZ-07
(DEM primary)

31% I
26% R
43% D
(NH-01)

35% I
26% R
39% D
(MI-06)

18% I
25% R
52% D
(SD-Sen)

14%
NH-Sen
(GOP primary)

21% I
18% R
61% D
(IA-03)

28% I
20% R
52% D
(NC-03)

14% I
42%R
44% D
(KS-Sen)

Voters who said that removing the influence of big money in politics was their most important issue span the ideological spectrum, **averaging 50% Democratic and 50% Republican and Independent.**

+11% men
+5% Hispanic
+4% Af. American
+8% 18-29
+26% 46+
(AZ-07)

+12% men
+3% white
+1% 18-45
(NH-01)

+13% men
+1% African
American
+1% white
+7% 65+
(MI-06)

+17% men
+2% white
+7% 65+
(SD-Sen)

+2% men
+1% white
+16% 46+
(NH-Sen)

+1% women
+3% white
+6% 46-65
(IA-03)

+1% African
American
+1% white
+9% 65+
(NC-03)

+2% women
+3% white
+8% 65+
(KS-Sen)

Demographically, the 10%+ of voters who hold reducing big donor influence as their most important issue are **disproportionately men aged 65+**. But AZ-07, IA-03 and NH-Sen show that millenials and adults 45-65 can also be mobilized.

45%
(AZ-07)

25%
(NH-01)

32%
(MI-06)

27%
(SD-Sen)

20%
(NH-Sen)

28%
(IA-03)

52%
(NC-03)

28%
(KS-Sen)

Our campaign was persuasive - at least 20% of voters said they were "much more likely" to vote for our candidate after seeing our ads. **Among issue voters across all races, this number averaged 47%.**

17
AZ-07
(DEM primary)

91
NH-01

49
MI-06

27
SD-Sen

16
NH-Sen
(GOP primary)

59
IA-03

-64
NC-03

86
KS-Sen

Among people concerned about the corrupting influence of special interests, in all races except one our candidates enjoyed a **double digit lead**. For many, these voters were their best audience.

MAYDAY.US

IMPACT: our campaign

$150,001 reached 32% (AZ-07)

$303,000 reached 34% (NH-01)

$2.3 million reached 50% (MI-06)

$2.1 million reached 74% (SD-Sen)

$1.9 million reached 76% (NH-Sen)

$793,000 reached 53% (IA-03)

$100,000 reached 33% (NC-03)

$1.4 million reached 56% (KS-Sen)

Our ads had reach - in our lowest spending races, we engaged an average of **33% of voters** and in our higher spending races - **64% of voters.**

"Billionaires & corporations"
Positive
Issue-oriented
Online
(AZ-07)

"Special interests"
Negative
Issue-oriented
Online
(NH-01)

"Can't be bought"
Positive
Issue-oriented
TV/Online
(MI-06)

"EB-5 Scandal"
Negative
Candidate-specific
TV
(SD-Sen)

"Beantown Brown"
Negative
Issue-oriented
TV/Online
(NH-Sen)

"Can't afford Young"
Positive
Issue-oriented
TV/Online
(IA-03)

"Fight Corruption"
Positive
Issue-oriented
Radio
(NC-03)

"Earmarks"
Negative
Issue-oriented
TV/Online
(KS-Sen)

In general, **the ads people responded to most strongly in each race - with the highest "much more likely" rates - were issue-oriented and aired on TV or online.** Whether they were negative or positive varied fairly evenly.

+3% women
+7% Hispanic
+3% Af. American
+8% 18-29
+10% 65+
(AZ-07)

+27% Democrat
+3% women
+5% white
+11% 65+
(NH-01)

+37% Democrat
+7% women
+2% Af. American
+6% 30-45
(MI-06)

+32% Democrat
+8% women
+5% white
+5% 65+
(SD-Sen)

+5% women
+7% white
+13% 46+
(NH-Sen)

+40% Democrat
+10% women
+19% 46-65
(IA-03)

+11% Republican
+6% men
+10% white
+10% 18-45
(NC-03)

+7.5% Independent
+26% Democrat
+10.5% women
+6% 46-65
(KS-Sen)

Voters who responded most strongly to our ads were **disproportionately female, of the candidate's party, slightly more white and mostly middle-aged.**

68%
(AZ-07)

82%
(NH-01)

83%
(MI-06)

69%
(SD-Sen)

99%
(NH-Sen)*

90%
(IA-03)

89%
(NC-03)

82%
(KS-Sen)

Among voters who said our ads made them "much more likely" to vote for our candidate (or against our opponent), **at least 69% and as high as 99% actually reported doing so.**

*Figure from general election (% of people who saw our negative ads against Brown, said they were "much more likely" to vote for an opponent and voted for Shaheen)

+**30%**
(AZ-07)

+**39%**
(NH-01)

+**47%**
(MI-06)

+**38%**
(SD-Sen)

(NH-Sen)*

+**52%**
(IA-03)

+**27%**
(NC-03)

+**17%**
(KS-Sen)

Voters who had a strong, positive reaction to our ads **were also at least 27% more likely than average to believe that our candidate was the most committed to ending the influence of big money on politics.**

*Figure not available for NH-Sen GOP primary.

+4%
(AZ-07)

+2.5%
(NH-01)

+7.2%
(MI-06)

+5%
(SD-Sen)

+4.5%
(NH-Sen)*

+7.5%
(IA-03)

+4%
(NC-03)

+5.7%
(KS-Sen)

Among voters who remembered our ads, there was a minimum 2.5 percentage point increase in the number who said reform of money in politics was important to their vote. **In races where we spent over $500K, the figure was at least 4.5%.**

*Figure from general election.

AZ-07 (Won)

Wilcox — Candidate $427,000
Gallego — Mayday $150,001; PACs $96,750; Candidate $486,502

NH-01

Guinta — PACs $5,457,959; Candidate $1,007,751
Shea-Porter — Mayday $303,000; PACs $3,081,532; Candidate $1,491,761

MI-06

Upton — PACs $631,165; Candidate $3,098,063
Clements — Mayday $2,288,713; PACs $8,760; Candidate $700,485

SD-Sen

Rounds — PACs $1,665,142; Candidate $4,825,476
Weiland — Mayday $2,082,765; PACs $1,719,795; Candidate $1,980,892

NH-Sen

Brown — PACs $70,000; Candidate $8,600,000
Rubens — Mayday $1,868,439; Candidate $344,715

IA-03

Young — PACs $3,973,777; Candidate $1,744,854
Appel — Mayday $792,772; PACs $3,302,829; Candidate $1,919,126

NC-03 (Won)

Jones — Mayday $100,000; Candidate $658,003
Adame — Candidate $21,357

KS-Sen

Roberts — PACs $10,337,097; Candidate $6,953,318
Orman — Mayday $1,412,602; PACs $5,202,393; Candidate $3,488,036

In all races except one, the candidates who had more money - their own or PAC - won. The only exception is IA-03, where Appel lost having raised more money than Young - but only by $300K.

AZ-07

Congressional Leadership Fund (led by Karl Rove)

$1.5 million

NH-01

American Future Fund (led by Koch Brothers)

$406,720

MI-06

American Chemistry Council

$428,000

SD-Sen

Ending Spending Action Fund (led by Joe Ricketts, TD Ameritrade)

$4.5 million
(over whole race)

NH-Sen

National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action

$568,755

IA-03

NC-03

Freedom Partners Action Fund (led by Koch Brothers)

$3.1 million

KS-Sen

Our opponents enjoyed significant support not just from their party but **outside groups with deep pockets and connections to the Koch brothers, Karl Rove and special interests like the NRA.**

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OUR RACES

ARIZONA 7 - RUBEN GALLEGO

100%

0%

Average %
Democratic
by precinct
(2004-2012)

35

ARIZONA 7 - RUBEN GALLEGO

Won by 13 points.... with help from voters who prioritize campaign finance reform

Chart legend:
- July poll (light green)
- Election result (dark green)
- Post-election poll (dark green)

Chart values:
- Ruben Gallego: 41% (July poll), 49% (Election result)
- Mary Rose Wilcox: 31% (July poll), 36% (Election result)
- Undecided: 27%
- More likely to vote for a candidate who supports campaign finance reform: 41%
- Campaign finance reform was an important issue to your vote: 62%

Y-axis: 0% to 55%

8% of voters reported the corrupting influence of special interests was **the most important issue** to their vote. Among these voters, Gallego enjoyed a **17 point lead.**

100%

0%

Avg % precinct Democratic vote (2000-2010)

MAYDAY.US

$150,001 spent on

7.2 million impressions

THEY'RE SPENDING BILLIONS TO BUY AN ELECTION

52% in a post-election poll said our online video made them "**much more likely**" to vote Gallego

101,522 households

RUBEN GALLEGO IS FIGHTING AGAINST A CORRUPT CAMPAIGN FUNDING SYSTEM.
HE'S FIGHTING FOR US.
RUBEN DOESN'T PLAY THEIR GAME. JOIN HIM.
GO TO MAYDAY.US TO LEARN MORE ABOUT TAKING BACK OUR DEMOCRACY

38% said our mailers made them "**much more likely**" to vote Gallego

57% of "**much more likely**" people reported voting for Gallego

IOWA 3 - STACI APPEL

100%

0%

Average %
Democratic
by precinct
(2006-2010)

MAYDAY.US

IOWA 3 - STACI APPEL

Lost in the general election...   but our ads increased support for Appel as the leader on campaign finance reform

Chart legend:
- % who agreed Appel was the candidate most committed to campaign finance reform (light green)
- % who reported voting for Appel (dark green)

Category	% who agreed Appel was most committed	% who reported voting for Appel
Overall	34%	39%
People who remembered our ads	42%	46%
People who were "much more likely" to vote for Appel after watching our ads	86%	90%

100%
Average % Democratic by precinct (2006-2010)
0%

7% of voters reported that the corrupting influence of special interests was *the most important issue* to their vote. Appel performed best among these voters, enjoying a *59 point lead* over Young.

MAYDAY.US

$792,772 spent on

1,819 gross rating points of TV ads

578,699 digital impressions

132,777 calls

28% in a post-election poll said our campaign made them "much more likely" to vote for Appel

15% said the best reason to vote Appel was her support for the middle class and small businesses, not the wealthy and big corporations

28% said the best reason to vote against Young was the money he got from special interests

38

KANSAS - GREG ORMAN

100%

0%

Average %
Democratic
by precinct
(2004-2012)

39

KANSAS - GREG ORMAN

Lost in the general election...   but our ads increased support for Orman as the leader on campaign finance reform

- 88%
- 82%
- 50%
- 46%
- 41%
- 40%

Overall — People who remembered our ads — People who were "much more likely" to vote for Orman after watching our ads

■ % who agreed Orman was the candidate most committed to campaign finance reform   ■ % who reported voting for Orman

100%

0%

Average % Democratic by precinct (2004-2012)

*9% of voters reported that the corrupting influence of special interests was **the most important issue** to their vote. Orman performed best among these voters, enjoying a **86 point lead** over Roberts.*

MAYDAY.US

$1.4 million spent on

4,270 gross rating points of TV ads

1.65 million digital impressions

72,561 calls

28% in a post-election poll said our campaign made them "**much more likely**" to vote for Orman

20% said the best reason to vote Orman was his commitment "to **ending the influence of big money in politics**"

19% said their biggest concern about Roberts was that he "doesn't care about the people" and "**serves the 1%**"

MICHIGAN 6 - PAUL CLEMENTS

100%

0%

Average %
Democratic
by precinct
(2004-2010)

MAYDAY.US

41

MICHIGAN 6 - PAUL CLEMENTS

Lost in the general election...   but made significant gains in familiarity and share of the vote

10% of voters reported that the corrupting influence of special interests was *the most important issue* to their vote. Clements performed best among these voters, enjoying a **49 point lead** over Upton.

MAYDAY.US

$2.3 million spent on

265,826 mailers

346,315 calls

32% in a post-election poll said our campaign made them "**much more likely**" to vote Clements

47% of people who saw our ads believed Clements was the **candidate most committed to reform**

86% of "much more likely" people and **46%** of those who saw our ads reported voting for Clements, compared to 37% overall

MICHIGAN 6 - PAUL CLEMENTS

Mayday ad buys reduced Upton's net approval by over 10 points - forcing him to double his ad buy the last week in order to recover

Ad Buys (GRP) — Clements — Upton — MayDay — Outside R

Net Approval — Upton Net Approve

When asked their biggest concern about Upton, **26%** *said he was "not for the people," "for the wealthy" or "gets money from special interests."*

40% *said their biggest concern about Clements was that he was unknown.*

$2.3 million spent on

6,651 gross ratings points of TV ads

4.7 million digital impressions

"Web takeovers" of **3** papers - Kalamazoo Gazette, Holland Sentinel and St. Joseph Herald Palladium

12% said the most persuasive reason to vote for Clements was that he "won't be bought by corporate special interests."

43

NORTH CAROLINA 3 - WALTER JONES

100%

0%

Average %
Republican
by precinct
(2004-2010)

Won by 36 points.... as the candidate most committed to - and only Republican champion of - campaign finance reform

$100,000 spent on

891 radio gross rating points

53% in a post-election poll said our radio ads made them **"much more likely"** to vote Jones

113,772 individuals + households reached by mailers

Bar chart:
- Overall: 55%, 64%
- People who remembered our ads: 74%, 80%
- People who were "much more likely" to vote for Jones after watching our ads: 82%, 89%

■ % who agreed Jones was the candidate most committed to campaign finance reform
■ % who reported voting for Jones

100%

0%

Average % Republican by precinct (2004-2010)

5% of voters in this heavily Republican district reported that the corrupting influence of special interests was **the most important issue** to their vote.

BIG MONEY IS DROWNING OUR DEMOCRACY.

Paid for by Mayday PAC. Not authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee. www.Mayday.us

51% said our mailers made them **"much more likely"** to vote Jones

75% of issue voters were **"much more likely"** to vote for Jones after seeing our ads

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45

NEW HAMPSHIRE 1 - CAROL SHEA-PORTER

100%

0%

Average %
Democratic
by precinct
(2000-2010)

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46

NEW HAMPSHIRE 1 - CAROL SHEA-PORTER

Lost in the general election… but gained significant traction among voters concerned about money in politics

Among people concerned about the influence of big money campaign donors on our democracy, percent who would vote for...

Chart:

	Carol Shea-Porter	Frank Guinta	Undecided
September Poll	53%	37%	10%
Post-Election Poll	69%	25%	

■ September Poll   ■ Post-Election Poll

100%

0%

Average %
Democratic
by precinct
(2000-2010)

*10% of voters reported that the corrupting influence of special interests was **the most important issue** to their vote. Shea-Porter performed best among these voters, enjoying a **91 point lead** over Guinta.*

MAYDAY.US

$303,000 spent on

19.2 million digital impressions

30% in a post-election poll said our online ads made them "**much more likely**" to vote Porter

99,815 mailers sent

50,131 calls

28% said our mailers made them "much more likely" to vote Porter

82% of "much more likely" people went on to vote for Porter, compared to 46% overall

47

NEW HAMPSHIRE - JIM RUBENS

100%

0%

Average %
Republican
by precinct
(2000-2010)

NEW HAMPSHIRE - JIM RUBENS

Lost in the Republican primary....

but made significant strides in visibility and electability as a campaign finance reform candidate

Bar chart showing Visibility: July Poll 36%, Post-Election Poll 58%; % of Vote: July Poll 9%, Post-Election Poll 23.5%

Legend: July Poll, Post-Election Poll

Average Republican by precinct (2000-2010) — 100% to 0% scale

14% of voters in the GOP primary reported that the candidates' positions on reducing the corrupting influence of money in politics was the main deciding factor in their vote. Among these voters, Rubens enjoyed a 16 point lead over Brown.

MAYDAY.US

$1.9 million spent on

7,739 TV and radio gross rating points

23.1 million digital impressions

402,000 pieces of mail

3,733 calls

25,502 doors knocked

60% of voters in the general election recalled our ads...

among these, **61%** had an unfavorable view of Brown

49

SOUTH DAKOTA - RICK WEILAND

100%

0%

Avg % precinct
Democratic vote
(2000-2010)

SOUTH DAKOTA - RICK WEILAND

Lost in the general election... but we hit Rounds hard, forcing the Republican Party to jump in and make significant ad buys

$2.1 million spent on

10,528 gross rating points of TV ads

5.9 million digital impressions

Mayday ad buys corresponded with a jump in Weiland's favorability - above Rounds

	Old	9/2-9/8	9/9-9/15	9/16-9/22	9/23-9/29	9/30-10/6	10/7-10/13	10/14-10/20	10/21-10/27	10/28-11/4

Ad Buy (GRP) — Weiland — Rounds — Mayday + Every Voice Action

Favorability* — Weiland — Rounds

100%

0%

Average % Democratic by precinct (2000-2010)

*8% of voters reported the corrupting influence of special interests was **the most important issue** to their vote. Weiland performed well among these voters, enjoying a **27 point lead** over Rounds.*

* Joint polls with Every Voice Action

27% in a post-election poll said our campaign made them **"much more likely"** to vote for Weiland

69% of "much more likely" respondents reported voting for Weiland, compared to **32%** of those who remembered our ads and **28%** of voters overall

51

IN SHORT

We have a consistent, bipartisan voter base that responds strongly to targeted campaigns on the issue of money in politics. And then vote for candidates in elections of all kinds, accordingly.

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APPENDIX

Numbers about our campaign were aggregated from our staff across races ("campaign data"). They are the best data we have on what we executed this cycle.

Issue and candidate polling figures came from our internal polls. In particular, post-election exit polls conducted for us by PPP in the same format for all 6 general election races plus the NH-Sen general election from November 4-5 and in a similar format for the AZ-07 primary ("post-election PPP") from September 2-4.

Note that all polls are weighted to better represent the demographics of the region. Therefore our percentages – just like all polls reported by polling companies or news outlets – do not directly reflect the raw data. Unfortunately, the weighting formulas are proprietary so we have no way to provide the weighted data – although you can easily weight against Census demographics (e.g. race, age).

The exception is the September 9 Global Strategy Group NH-Sen GOP Primary Exit Poll, for which we were able to get raw data along with weights that should calculate out and directly reflect our results.

Other, supplementary data sources will be noted by page.

Page 9 | Map of Mayday.US contributors, geo-located by zip code.

Page 10 | Mayday.US donation data (as released on website).

Page 12-15 | Campaign data.

Page 17 | Campaign data. Polling data from our internal polls of each race –

MI-06: Initial data from August 5-7 Gerstein Bocian Agne poll conducted for Mayday, with % who would vote for Clements ("candidate poll," q 22).

KS-Sen: Initial from October 4-6 GBA poll, with % who would vote for Orman (q 16).

SD-Sen: Initial from September 30-October 2 GQR poll, with % who would vote for Weiland (without leaners, q 3).

NH-1: Initial from September 10-13 Lake Research Partners poll, with % who would vote for Shea-Porter ("candidate poll," page 13).

IA-03: Initial from August 14-17 GBA poll, with % who would vote for Appel (q 25).

AZ-07: Initial from July 22-24 PPP poll for PCCC (accessed here: http://act.boldprogressives.org/survey/post_gallego_polling/), with % who would vote for Gallego (q 2).

NH-Sen: Initial July 17-20 Global Strategy Group poll for Mayday, with NET % who would vote for Rubens (q V1).

Final candidate votes from official election results at Real Clear Politics, rounded to the nearest integer (http://www.realclearpolitics.com/elections/live_results/2014/senate/; http://www.realclearpolitics.com/elections/live_results/2014/house/).

Page 19 | Bar graphs of data from responses to question in post-election PPP polls (including NH-Sen general) asking which issue out of 8 voters regarded as most important to their vote. In AZ-07 this was q 4; IA-03, MI-06, NH-01, NH-Sen (general election), and KS-Sen – q 6; SD-Sen – q 7; and NC-03 was q 5.

Highlighted in dark green is "influence of big money donors."

Related issues including "Politicians putting their interests first," "special interest influence," and "politicians putting big donors first" highlighted in light green.

Bars sorted in descending order.

Other, grayed out issues were "lack of good jobs," "pollution," "protection of Social Security, Medicare," "putting the middle class first" and "something else / not sure." (Latter not represented in graph.)

Lead enjoyed by our candidate also from post-election PPP polls – specifically, the crosstabs of how people who chose the influence of special interests as their most important issue actually reported voting in an earlier question.

Exception is NH-Sen, calculated with data from a September 9 GSG GOP primary exit poll. Took the crosstab vote differential between Rubens and Brown (q 4) among those who said that the candidates' positions on reducing the corruption influence of money in politics was the main deciding factor in their vote (q 10).

% said most important issue from post-election PPP polls (% who said "the influence of big money donors" was the most important issue to their vote). In AZ-07 this was q 4; IA-03, MI-06, NH-01, NH-Sen (general election), and KS-Sen – q 6; SD-Sen – q 7; and NC-03 was q 5.

Note there is no party breakdown for the primaries, where only voters who identified with the relevant party (or Independents) voted.

In IA-03 party identification was question 20; MI-06 was q 26; NH-01 was q 24; SD-Sen was q 25; KS-Sen was q 21; and NC-03 was q 19.

In AZ demographic composition were questions 16-18; IA-03 were q's 19, 21-22; MI-06 were q's 25, 27-28; NH-01 were q's 23, 25-26; NH-Sen (general election) were q's 19, 21-22; SD-Sen were q's 24, 26-27; KS-Sen were q's 20, 22-23; and NC-03 were q's 18, 20-21.

In AZ-07, whether respondent thought our ad made them "much more likely" to vote for our candidate (or against our opponent) was q's 13 and 15. IA-03 and NH-01 were q's 16 and 18. MI-06 – q's 16, 18, 20, 22, and 24. SD-Sen was q's 17, 19, 21 and 23. KS-Sen was q's 16, 18, and 20. Finally, NC-03 was q's 15 and 17.

% who said "the influence of special interests" as the most important issue to their vote in AZ-07 was from q 4; IA-03, MI-06, NH-01, NH-Sen (general election), and KS-Sen – q 6; SD-Sen – q 7; and NC-03 was q 5.

In AZ-07 the question about who they voted for in the election was q 2; IA-03, MI-06, NH-01, NH-Sen (general election), and KS-Sen – q 4; SD-Sen – q 5; and NC-03 was q 3.

Exception is NH-Sen, calculated with data from a September 9 GSG GOP primary exit poll. Took the crosstab vote differential between Rubens and Brown (q 4) among only those who said that the candidates' positions on reducing the corruption influence of money in politics was the main deciding factor in their vote (q 10).

Page 26 | Campaign data and post-election PPP polls, with % who remembered our ads (averaged across all ads for that race).

In AZ-07, whether or not respondent remembered our ads was q's 12 and 14. IA-03 and NH-01 were q's 15 and 17. MI-06 – q's 15, 17, 19, 21, and 23. SD-Sen was q's

16, 18, 20 and 22. KS-Sen was q's 15, 17, and 19. Finally, NC-03 was q's 14 and 16.

Exception is NH-Sen, where the % reached is the average of people who reported seeing or hearing any advertising in support of Jim Rubens or against Scott Brown from the September 9 GSG GOP primary exit poll.

Page 27 | Post-election PPP polls and campaign data.

In AZ-07, whether respondent thought our ad made them "much more likely" to vote for our candidate (or against our opponent) was q's 13 and 15. IA-03 and NH-01 were q's 16 and 18. MI-06 – q's 16, 18, 20, 22, and 24. SD-Sen was q's 17, 19, 21 and 23. KS-Sen was q's 16, 18, and 20. Finally, NC-03 was q's 15 and 17.

Page 28 | Post-election PPP polls. Demographic breakdown of people who said they were "much more likely" to vote for our candidate (or against our opponent) after seeing our ads, averaged across all ads in a race.

In AZ-07, whether respondent thought our ad made them "much more likely" to vote

for our candidate (or against our opponent) was q's 13 and 15. IA-03 and NH-01 were q's 16 and 18. MI-06 – q's 16, 18, 20, 22, and 24. SD-Sen was q's 17, 19, 21 and 23. KS-Sen was q's 16, 18, and 20. Finally, NC-03 was q's 15 and 17.

In AZ demographic composition were questions 16-18; IA-03 were q's 19, 21-22; MI-06 were q's 25, 27-28; NH-01 were q's 23, 25-26; NH-Sen (general election) were q's 19, 21-22; SD-Sen were q's 24, 26-27; KS-Sen were q's 20, 22-23; and NC-03 were q's 18, 20-21.

Page 29 | Post-election PPP polls. Cross tab of "much more likely" people and who they reported voting for in the race.

In AZ-07 the question about who they voted for in the election was q 2; IA-03, MI-06, NH-01, NH-Sen (general election), and KS-Sen – q 4; SD-Sen – q 5; and NC-03 was q 3.

NH-Sen figure from general election (% of people who saw our negative ads against Brown, and said they were "much more likely" to vote for his opponent - then voted for Shaheen).

Page 30 | Post-election PPP polls. Cross tab of "much more likely" people and who they believed was the most committed to campaign finance reform.

In AZ-07 the question about which candidate was most committed to reducing the influence of money in politics was q 3; IA-03, MI-06, NH-01, NH-Sen (general election), and KS-Sen – q 5; SD-Sen – q 6; and NC-03 was q 4.

Note that this figure is not available for the NH-Sen GOP primary since we did not run an ad analysis poll directly after the primary (only after the general).

Page 31 | Post-election PPP polls. Difference in the percentage between those who said they remembered our ads among all poll respondents and among only those who said that the "influence of big money donors" was an important issue to their vote. In AZ-07 this was q 5; IA-03, MI-06, NH-01, NH-Sen (general election), and KS-Sen – q 7; SD-Sen – q 8; and NC-03 was q 6.

Note, NH-Sen figure from general election.

Pages 32 & 33 | All data from Opensecrets.org, except for data on our spending that came from our campaign records.

On page 33, highlighted biggest outside contributor, apart from party committees like the DSCC and NRSC.

NH-01:
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary.php?id=nh01&cycle=2014; http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/10/congressional-leadership-fund-collects-corporate-cash/

MI-06:
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary.php?cycle=2014&id=MI06; http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/12/american-future-fund-draws-nearly-all-revenues-from-two-koch-linked-groups/

SD-Sen:
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary.php?cycle=2014&id=SDS2

NH-Sen:
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary.php?cycle=2014&id=NHS2;

http://endingspending.com/about/joe-ricketts/
IA-03:
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary.php?cycle=2014&id=IA03

KS-Sen:
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/summary.php?cycle=2014&id=KSS1; http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/2014-elections-koch-brothers-super-pac-107926.html

Page 36 | Campaign data.

Graph includes data from post-election PPP poll and July 22-24 PPP poll for PCCC (accessed here: http://act.boldprogressives.org/survey/post_gallego_polling/).

% vote from question 2, and 41% from response to q 5 ("Public financing of congressional elections would only cost $1 billion and could save taxpayers as much as $100 billion from big campaign donors writing our tax laws. If one candidate strongly supported public financing of elections, would that make you more or less likely to support that candidate, or would it not make a difference?").

Election results from Maricopa County (http://recorder.maricopa.gov/electionarchives/2014/08-26-2014%20Final%20Summary%20Report.pdf).

62% is percent who responded yes to q 5 ("Was the influence of big-money campaign donors on our democracy an important issue or not important to your vote for Congress last week?").

Separate calculation of the % "much more likely" to vote Gallego after watching online ads or receiving a mailer (q 13 and 15). 57% figure is the averaged crosstab of "much more likely" who said they voted for Gallego in q 3.

8% is the percent of voters who responded "Special interest influence" to question 4 of the post-election PPP poll, "I'm going to list eight issues you might have considered when deciding who to vote for in this week's election. Which of these was most important to your vote?" The 59 point lead is the crosstab of how this subpopulation reported voting for Gallego versus Wilcox in question 3 of that poll.

Page 38 | Campaign data.

Graph is from post-election PPP poll, takes the comparative crosstab of % who answered Appel to question 5 (who was most committed to reducing influence of money in politics) and % who voted for Appel according to question 4. Crosstab taken across 3 separate populations – all poll respondents, those who remembered our ads and calls (average of people who responded yes to questions 15 and 17) and those who said they were "much more likely" to vote our way subsequently (average of people who responded "much more likely" to questions 16 and 18). 28% is the average percent "much more likely" across all campaign interventions.

7% is the percent of voters who responded "Special interest influence" to question 6 of the post-election PPP poll, "I'm going to list eight issues you might have considered when deciding who to vote for in this week's election. Which of these was most important to your vote?" The 59 point lead is the crosstab of how this subpopulation reported voting for Appel versus Young in question 4 of that poll.

15% from November 5-9 post-election GBA poll (q 22/23 – "Regardless of whom you voted for, thinking about everything

you heard during the campaign, which ONE of the following was the most persuasive reason to vote for Staci Appel?").

28% also from GBA poll, question 28/29. Money from special interests aggregated the following three responses "He supports a plan to slash Medicare to pay for tax cuts for millionaires," "He will give tax breaks to millionaires and corporations funding his campaign" and "He has taken money from D.C. lobbyists, and other special interests" at 11%, 10% and 7% respectively.

Page 40 | Campaign data.

Graph is from post-election PPP poll, is the comparative crosstab of % who answered Orman to question 5 (who was most committed to reducing influence of money in politics) and % who voted for Orman according to question 4. Crosstab taken across 3 separate populations – all poll respondents, those who remembered our ads (average of people who responded yes to questions 15 and 17) and those who said they were "much more likely" to vote our way subsequently (average of people who responded "much more likely" to questions 16 and 18).

9% is the percent of voters who responded "Special interest influence" to question 6 of the post-election PPP poll, "I'm going to list eight issues you might have considered when deciding who to vote for in this week's election. Which of these was most important to your vote?" The 86 point lead is the crosstab of how this subpopulation reported voting for Orman versus Roberts in question 4 of that poll.

19% from November 5-9 post-election GBA poll, in response to q 13 ("Now thinking about everything you heard during the campaign, what was the biggest concern you had about Pat Roberts?" 20% from same poll (q 22/23 - "Regardless of whom you voted for, thinking about everything you heard during the campaign, which ONE of the following was the most persuasive reason to vote for Greg Orman?")

Page 42 | Campaign data.

Graph includes data from August 5-7 and November 5-9 Gerstein Bocian Agne polls. August familiarity figure from q 10 (% who were able to identify Clements), % of vote from q 22 (the vote % before ad messages were tested). November familiarity figure

from q 7 (% who were able to ID Clements), % of vote from q 10.

32% from post-election PPP poll, are the average of people who said that they remembered our TV/online ads, mailers and calls (q 15, 17, 19, 21, 23) and said they were "much more likely" to vote for Clements or Upton as a result (q 16, 18, 20, 22, 24). Subsequent figures are crosstab averages of % who believed Clements was the most committed to reform (q 5) and reported voting for him (q 4).

10% is the percent of voters who responded "Special interest influence" to question 6 of the post-election PPP poll, "I'm going to list eight issues you might have considered when deciding who to vote for in this week's election. Which of these was most important to your vote?" The 49 point lead is the crosstab of how this subpopulation reported voting for Clements versus Upton in question 4 of that poll.

Page 43 | Campaign data.

Graph is the buying time competitive report on broadcast TV ad buys (in gross rating points) made by candidates, PACs and SuperPACs, post-election PPP poll,

and time series of Upton net approval ratings from GBA polls on August 5-7 (q 26), October 19-21 (q 19) and October 29-30 (q 19).

12% figure is from responses to q 21 in a November 5-9 GBA poll that asked "Regardless of whom you voted for, thinking about everything you heard during the campaign, which ONE of the following was the most persuasive reason to vote for Paul Clements?"

26% from same poll, q 24 (most persuasive reason to vote against Upton). 40% from q 22.

Page 45 | Campaign data and post-election PPP poll.

Graph is the comparative crosstab of % who answered Jones to question 4 (who was most committed to reducing influence of money in politics) and % who voted for Jones according to question 3. Crosstab taken across 3 separate populations – all poll respondents, those who remembered our ads (average of people who responded yes to questions 14 and 16) and those who said they were "much more likely" to vote our way subsequently (average of people

who responded "much more likely" to questions 15 and 17).

Separate calculation of the % "much more likely" to vote Jones after hearing the radio ads or receiving a mailer. 75% figure is the averaged "much more likely" (qs 15 & 17) percentage for the two ads among people who said influence of big money donors was most important to their vote (q 5).

5% is the percent of voters who responded "Special interest influence" to question 5 of the post-election PPP poll, "I'm going to list eight issues you might have considered when deciding who to vote for in this week's election. Which of these was most important to your vote?"

Page 47 | Campaign data.

Graph includes data from the September 10-13 Lake Research Partners poll and post-election PPP poll. Specifically, crosstab analysis of the relative vote differential between Shea-Porter and Guinta in September (LRP, page 13) among people who were concerned about the influence of big money campaign donors on our democracy (LRP, page 10). Then, comparative crosstab analysis of the

relative vote differential between Shea-Porter and Guinta in November (PPP, q 4) among people who thought the influence of big money campaign donors was important (but not necessarily most important) to their vote (q 7).

Separate calculation of the % "much more likely" to vote Shea-Porter after seeing the online ads, mailers or receiving a call (q 16, 18, 20). 82% figure is the crosstab average of the percent of "much more likely" people from all ads who reported voting for Shea-Porter (q 4).

10% is the percent of voters who responded "Special interest influence" to question 6 of the post-election PPP poll, "I'm going to list eight issues you might have considered when deciding who to vote for in this week's election. Which of these was most important to your vote?" The 91 point lead is the crosstab of how this subpopulation reported voting for Shea-Porter versus Guinta in question 4 of that poll.

Page 49 | Campaign data and post general election PPP poll. Specifically, figures are the average of people who said that they remembered seeing or hearing our TV/online ads in the general election (q 15,

17), and the crosstab of their unfavorability rating of Brown (q 3).

Graph data comes from July 17-20 GSG poll (where visibility equals percent of people who were familiar with Rubens – page 2) and September 9 GSG GOP primary exit poll (where visibility equals % people who expressed an opinion on Rubens other than "Never heard/Don't know" – q 5).

14% is the percent of voters who responded "Main deciding factor" to question 10 of the post-primary November 9 Global Strategy Group poll. This question asked, "When you were deciding how to vote, how much of a factor were the candidates' positions on reducing the corrupting influence of money in politics?" The 16 point lead is the crosstab of how this subpopulation reported voting for Rubens versus Brown in question 4 of that poll.

Page 51 | Campaign data and post-election PPP poll. Specifically, figures are the average of people who said they were "much more likely" to vote for Weiland or against Rounds after seeing or hearing any of our TV or online campaign ads (q 17, 19, 21, 23). 69% is similarly the averaged

crosstab of "much more likely" people across the 4 polled ads and those who actually reported voting for Weiland in a separate question (q 5).

Graph combines data from buying time competitive report on broadcast TV ad buys (in gross rating points) made by candidates, PACs and SuperPACs with data on Weiland and Rounds favorability ratings (out of 100) from a time series of Greenberg Quinlan Rosner polls for Mayday and Every Voice Action on July 21-23 (q 7), September 30-October 2 (q 7), October 16-19 (q 7), October 23-26 (q 7) and November 3-4 (q 7).

8% is the percent of voters who responded "Special interest influence" to question 7 of the post-election PPP poll, "I'm going to list eight issues you might have considered when deciding who to vote for in this week's election. Which of these was most important to your vote?" The 27 point lead is the crosstab of how this subpopulation reported voting for Weiland versus Rounds in question 5 of that poll.

Polls and GRP purchased in this race were a joint effort between Mayday and Every Voice Action.