COMMENTARY

Peter Burgess

Iraq without America Sovereignty without security The departure of American troops has already been followed by a resurgence of sectarian hatred

ON DECEMBER 18th America withdrew from Iraq, as the last convoy headed south into Kuwait, where around 4,000 of its troops will remain for an undisclosed length of time. An optimistic Iraqi government had recently begun to remove some of the capital’s checkpoints and blast-walls, easing traffic and boosting morale. But the better mood did not last long. On December 22nd at least a dozen car bombs exploded within two hours of each other in Baghdad, killing more than 60 people and injuring another 200—one of the highest death tolls of the year. With security as patchy as ever and politics entering a new phase of sectarian hatred, few Iraqis now think the American withdrawal heralds a joyful new era. Some even wonder whether, without a ring-holding American military presence, the country will even stay together.

The latest wave of violence followed hard upon a row between Nuri al-Maliki, the Shia who has been prime minister since 2006, and two of Iraq’s most prominent Sunni politicians who were supposed to be helping him maintain a sectarian balance in government. After one of them, Saleh al-Mutlaq, a deputy prime minister, had called Mr Maliki a “dictator”, the prime minister swiftly called for a vote of no confidence in him in parliament; tanks surrounded his house.

Then, even more menacingly, Mr Maliki declared that a warrant had been issued for the arrest of another leading Sunni, Tariq al-Hashemi, Iraq’s vice-president, on charges of terrorism. Mr Hashemi fled to Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdish area. Mr Maliki told the Kurdish authorities to send him back to Baghdad, which they refused to do. In the absence of an American military presence, the American vice-president, Joe Biden, telephoned Mr Maliki and several other leading Iraqi politicians to urge compromise, evidently in vain. No independent analyst suspects Messrs Hashemi or Mutlaq of involvement in the dozen bombings on December 22nd, which had the hallmark of al-Qaeda, ever eager to exploit sectarian divisions.

Mr Maliki has been gradually consolidating his position and that of Iraq’s new Shia-led establishment since he became prime minister. In March 2010 his mainly Shia front narrowly lost a general election, winning 89 seats out of 325 in Iraq’s parliament; a rival front led by a secular Shia, Iyad Allawi, with broad support from Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, pipped him with 91. But after eight months of drift as various shifting alliances failed to accommodate each other, Mr Maliki eventually managed to patch together a majority a year ago, on the understanding that a number of leading Sunnis, such as Mr Hashemi and Mr Mutlaq, as well as the aggrieved Mr Allawi, would be granted influential posts.

But many key positions were never agreed upon, and the powers of jobs with grand-sounding titles, such as Mr Allawi’s proposed chairmanship of a strategy council, were never clarified. Meanwhile, for the past year, Mr Maliki has been acting as justice, interior and defence minister, concentrating ever more power in his own hands and ensuring that the security forces, in particular, are run by his men. Sunni leaders say that their co-religionists are unfairly singled out for detention and intimidation. Troops loyal to Mr Maliki are said to have recently carried out a string of arrests of people linked to the opposition.

Sunni Arabs, loth to admit that they number only around a fifth of Iraqis, yet still mindful that they ran Iraq since the country’s inception under British tutelage nearly a century ago, are again becoming fearful. In Dora, a mainly Sunni suburb in south Baghdad that is still surrounded by blast-walls and speckled with bullet holes, a woman puts a brave face on the future. Security, she says, is much better than it was a few years ago, when sectarian cleansing was rife and mixed neighbourhoods were torn apart. For sure, she admits, explosive devices still go off occasionally at checkpoints; “sticky” bombs sometimes blow up cars; a mysterious branch of the security forces is still liable to make random arrests. But she is afraid that even this relative calm may not last. “Fear still plagues Iraq,” she sighs. “Honestly, I didn’t want the American forces to go.”

Meanwhile a radical cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, who already holds the balance of power in parliament, is flexing his political muscle anew. It was he who insisted, against Mr Maliki’s initial wish, that all American troops should be out by 2012—or face a new insurgency from his Iranian-armed militia, which Mr Maliki has curbed in the past but which still frightens many Iraqis, especially Sunnis. Mr Sadr’s people now want parliament dissolved and fresh elections held. If he came out on top, Iraq would be even less palatable to the United States and to Sunni powers in the region.

But it is not all gloom. Since the American military “surge” of 2007, which ended the worst period of sectarian bloodshed, security has improved enough to let the economy start growing again. Business is thriving in Sadr City, the most densely populated Shia part of Baghdad. The place is crammed with foreign-made cars. Markets are bustling. Iraq’s GDP per person before the fall of Saddam Hussein was estimated by the IMF at $518. Now it is said to be $3,306.

Iraq’s towns have become richer since 2003, the year of the American invasion. Government salaries have rocketed. Public-sector workers have started to spend more money. Foreign companies have swarmed in. Turks build housing estates, Italian oil-service providers create jobs in Basra, the southern capital. Iranians run new hotels in Najaf, a Shia holy city that pilgrims visit en masse. Foreign and local businessmen complain about corruption, Iraq’s impenetrable bureaucracy and weak work ethic, but concede that such defects are outweighed by the profits. The electricity supply, cited by Iraqis as the worst of all their country’s public-service deficiencies, remains patchy, but imports of such goods as refrigerators, televisions and air-conditioners have soared.

Lubrication at last

In the past two years the world’s big oil companies, eyeing the world’s fourth-largest reserves, have begun to invest heavily as the government has offered old fields for renovation and new ones for exploration and exploitation. Foreign companies are again operating in the oil-rich south. But oil production has yet to match its peak under Saddam Hussein. And foreign firms are taking risks if they make oil deals in the Kurdish north, since the government in Baghdad and the Kurds’ regional authorities have failed to agree on how to divide the spoils, despite years of acrimonious negotiation. After ExxonMobil decided, in frustration, to sign a deal with the Kurds in October, the central government responded furiously, threatening to penalise any company that dealt with the Kurds without its agreement.

Iraq has yet to find its place in the Arab world. Sunnis, who dominate it, are deeply suspicious of the new Iraqi order, often singling out Mr Maliki for derision. The Saudis, most hostile of neighbours, have yet even to send an ambassador to Baghdad, saying that Iraq is already a cat’s paw for Iran, the region’s leading Shia power. Many of Iraq’s prominent political, religious and militia groups are indeed close to Iran, which will surely seek to strengthen its influence with Mr Maliki and his Shia allies. But most of Iraq’s Shia religious and political leaders are keen to stay independent of their theocratic neighbour; ordinary Iraqis often resent Iran’s apparent eagerness to interfere in their politics.

The prospect of Iraq sliding into an Iranian orbit clearly rattles the American administration, which had wanted to keep a residual force in Iraq of at least 10,000 troops. Instead, the Americans will retain one of its biggest embassies in the world, with some 17,000 diplomats and advisers, secured by a military force of fewer than 200 troops. It also expects to sell a lot of weapons, including F-16 fighter aircraft, to the newly sovereign country. America still has some 40,000 troops spread around the Gulf region. But its ability to influence events in Iraq has plummeted.

In a new political departure, some of Iraq’s Sunni leaders in the provinces, such as Diyala, north of Baghdad, are pondering the possibility, provided for in the constitution, of creating autonomous Sunni-led regions, with powers akin to those of Iraqi Kurdistan. Hitherto, most Sunnis have loathed the notion of federalism, much vaunted by the Kurds, portraying it as a Western plot to divide and weaken an Arab nation. But Mr Maliki has made plain his distaste for the idea that Sunnis, despairing of wielding power at the centre, might set up their own federal fiefs.

Iraq’s own government now threatens to undermine the democracy imposed on it by the Americans. Saddam Hussein’s security men, informants and torturers have gone, and several sets of elections have been held that were free and fair within the constraints of civil strife. But Iraqi freedoms look far from guaranteed. Newspapers, magazines and websites abound, but journalists have been imprisoned and beaten, both in Baghdad and in the Kurdish region, for reporting on anti-government protests earlier this year that sought to echo Arab uprisings elsewhere.

One law recently presented to a parliamentary committee proposes life imprisonment and a fine of $40,000 for actions (including on the internet) that “affect the country’s interdependence and unity”. Another would make it illegal for a group to gather in a university or mosque for any reason other than study or worship. Religious laws may also be more strictly enforced. A human-rights activist says that, during Ramadan in August, rules were brought in to punish anyone who publicly broke the daylight fast, with brief jail terms. As the Arab spring spread, an Iraqi protest movement flourished briefly but fizzled in part because of intimidation and curfews that prevented demonstrations.

Many Iraqis, however much they hated Saddam Hussein, would surrender some of their hard-earned freedoms and comforts in exchange for real security. On balance, the Shia Arab majority that numbers some 60% probably prefers the new status quo. And the Kurds, safer than other Iraqis in their autonomous zone, are enjoying a golden age, albeit amid growing corruption and now without Americans to watch over Kurdish-Arab fault lines. But Iraq will not be fully democratic or truly prosperous until its three main components—Sunni Arab, Shia Arab and Kurdish—genuinely come to terms with each other. That prospect is still woefully remote.