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WAR IN UKRAINE THE AIR WAR Reasons for Russia's Failure to control the air? The performance of the Russian Air Force in Ukraine PLAY YOUTUBE VIDEO Burgess COMMENTARY I was working in Kazakhstan in 1985, 50 years after the end of WWII. The Russian (Red) Army and the Kazakh Army staged a joint military parade in Almaty to commemorate the WWII victory. It was the first time these two armies had done anything jointly following the demise of the USSR a few years before. Needless to say, the parade got a lot of local attention from both the native Kazakh population and the Russians who had once been in charge of the country. I had the opportunity to clamber over some of the military equipment that was parked getting ready for the parade, and afterwards before it was returned to wherever it was usually stored. My takeaway from looking at the military equipment ... tanks and a range of armoured vehicles from personnel carriers to high calibre guns was that the construction finish of all this equipment was very poor. The welds would have been rejected in any of the factories I had been associated with in both the UK and the USA, but they were the standard on most of this heavy equipment. I am not at all surprised at the analysis shared in the video ... though I did not dare to hope that it was this bad! I am also not at all surprised at the level of disorganization and potentially low morale in the modern Russian Federation military. This seems to be in sharp contrast to the military and the people of Ukraine. Peter Burgess
Reasons for Failure? Russian Air Force in Ukraine 1,142,532 views Mar 3, 2022 Military Aviation History 334K subscribers The 'absence' of the Russian Air Force in the reerupted Ukraine conflict is strange. Let's talk about that, the potential reasons, and shed more lights on the strengths and limitations of the Russian Air Force. - Guests - Justin Bronk, Research Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute: https://rusi.org/people/bronk Richard Shimooka, Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute: https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/cm-expert... - Check out my books - Ju 87 Stuka - http://stukabook.com STG-44 Assault Platoon - http://sturmzug.com German Panzer Company 1941 - http://www.hdv470-7.com/ - Support - Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/join/MilAvHis... Channel Memberships: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCmpa... PayPal: https://www.paypal.me/MilAvHis - Social Media - Twitter: https://twitter.com/MilAvHistory Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/milaviation... Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/MilitaryAvia... - Sources - Dominic Nicholls, Why the complacent Russian air force has failed to gain control of Ukraine’s skies, 01.03.2022, available at: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-new... [last accessed 03/03/2022]. Justin Bronk, The Mysterious Case of the Missing Russian Air Force, RUSI, 28.02.2022, available at: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research... [last accessed 03/03/2022]. Henry Foy and John Paul Rathbone, Air power counts for little in Ukraine war as caution prevails on both sides, 02.03.2022, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/faf80b4a-1... [last accessed 03/03/2022]. Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, What happened to Russia's Air Force? U.S. officials, experts stumped, Reuters, 02.03.2022, available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/... [last accessed 03/03/2022]. Oryx, Attack On Europe: Documenting Equipment Losses During The 2022 Russian Invasion Of Ukraine, available at https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02... [last accessed 03/03/2022 at 1745 GMT]. - Timecodes - 00:00 - Developing situation (Intro) 01:59 - Russian opening strikes (Feb.24, '22) 03:15 - What the Russians are not doing 06:35 - Intermission (Have your say) 07:01 - Trying to make sense of this 07:28 - Pilot skill and experience? 09:34 - Lacking equipment? 10:12 - Lack of air-ground coordination? 11:37 - Lack of preparation? 12:16 - Russian defense industry? 15:41 - Keeping forces in reserve? 16:21 - Underestimating Ukraine? 16:41 - Increasing activity 17:42 - Possible future scenarios and assessment 22:58 - Outro - Audio - Music and Sfx from Epidemic Sound #militaryaviationhistory #RussianAirForce Chapters Developing situation (Intro) 0:00 Russian opening strikes (Feb.24, '22) 1:59 What the Russians are not doing 3:15 Intermission (Have your say) 6:35 Trying to make sense of this 7:01 Pilot skill and experience? 7:28 Richard Shimooka, Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Canada Justin Bronk ... Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) COMMENTS 5,566 Comments (only a few shown) -------------------------------- Military Aviation History Pinned by Military Aviation History Military Aviation History -------------------------------- 3 days ago (edited) Note Messed up the iso setting on this one. Mea culpa - it happens :( - I'll get some sleep now, gn8 all! Big thank you to Richard and Justin for their input! Check the description for more info. -------------------------------- Goetz Liedtke Goetz Liedtke 1 day ago Another factor that could contribute to the low sortie rate may be poorly trained maintenance personnel using poorly planned maintenance procedures. With pilots that fly single digit flying hours per month, the maintenance crews have no urgency to repair quickly. What's more, that rate of training sorties does not require that all aircraft are operational. So the maintenance crews may have cherry-picked the best of their planes to keep up for the pilots to fly in training. As someone else pointed out in an earlier comment, complex, modern military aircraft require constant maintenance. If the maintainers aren't used to that pace of maintaining and they don't have the volume of parts necessary to support a wartime sortie rate (either sustained or surge), then the planes may have been absent while being repaired. That does not bode well for continued air battles, however, as the maintenance will never be able to keep up. Another factor may be that the most modern Russian aircraft were never stress tested in development. Much of the maintenance of modern military aircraft is preventative using knowledge of MTBFs and indications of imminent failure of different field replaceable units to test those units and replace them when the test results indicate imminent failure. If you simply wait until something fails, it's likely to do so while in the stress of combat. If, because of ignorance of this process, the aircraft FRUs haven't been characterized and tests developed then you are doomed to failures in combat. -------------------------------- Michael Merrell Michael Merrell 1 day ago It was good to see corruption brought into the conversation. As we've seen in their space program, it seems like a lot of the resources allocated end up getting siphoned off into the pockets of people at the top of the org structure. With the military, that would manifest in the fielding of less upgraded equipment than reported, and/or lower quality versions of that equipment being delivered, as well as lower readiness if training hours are limited to lack of funding. 226 -------------------------------- Lynx67 Lynx67 15 hours ago I was in the military, mostly based in West Germany during the Cold War. I remember, when the Soviet Empire collapsed, we were surprised at how we over estimated the Soviet War machine during the Cold War, although we knew we had to play smart to render their large force less effective. I think the same thing is at play now, and over estimating how shear numbers (Russia) competes against competence and determination (Ukraine) .Currently I see Russia as big, lumbering and slow, while the Ukrainians seem small, but agile and smart and using technology to their advantage. 41 A S A S 2 days ago I read somewhere that more than 80% of AG attacks that happened in Chechnya were conducted by dumb bombs and rockets. This is reminiscent of 1960s strategy which they have never really gotten out of it. You can still see that in footage of moder aircrafts carrying smaller bombs or rocket pods. Their military strategy favors artillery (specifically self propelled ones) and GG missiles. Aircrafts are mainly AA and AS. My opinion is that this is due to a lack of money to support trainings and to promote the airforce as the main striking power as in the case of Nato. 16 -------------------------------- William Martin William Martin 1 day ago (edited) I think one of the greatest weaknesses of the Russian forces is the lack of individual initiative in their junior officers and enlisted. Not only is it not encouraged, if anyone is foolish enough to try it, then they are punished if they're not successful. It's much easier and safer to be a drone who waits to be told what to do. I bet there are a lot of drones in that convoy stuck in the mud north of Kiev. 33 -------------------------------- Metalli Sika Metalli Sika 18 hours ago And even if they weren't punished for the attempt, would they even want to? The Russian morale is at rock bottom, very few of their soldiers want to be there. If they get imprisoned or even shot for deserting, then they fight, but do the absolute bare minimum of what is expected in order to avoid being court martialed. 4 -------------------------------- Benjamin Snell Benjamin Snell 15 hours ago Damn I never thought of that, manned planes may be proven ineffective after this war... What is the benefit of a plane over nowadays? Obviously this wouldn't happen overnight but there may be a lot less planes flying in future wars. 2 -------------------------------- Bangs Cutter Bangs Cutter 2 hours ago @Metalli Sika Makes sense now from the videos of Russian POWs. A common theme is that the conscripts were surprised that their captors treat them far better than their superiors. 1 -------------------------------- Alexander Yankovsky Alexander Yankovsky 21 hours ago Russians focus on the frame, engine and firepower in developing their aircraft, while their electronics are vastly inferior to their western counterparts. For this reason, their missions heavily rely on the ground control, from where some of the targets are 'guided'. That was the official version in the soviet air force (in mid-to late 80s) as of why the soviet aircraft performed so poorly in the Middle East (for instance). Modern Western military airplane is self-sufficient so to speak in performing its combat mission while Russians heavily depend on the assistance from the ground, at least when they deal with something more challenging than indiscriminately killing a civil population. 2 -------------------------------- Kevin Rusch Kevin Rusch 3 days ago I really appreciate your professionalism and attention to detail and 'look, I'm just guessing here' when called for. This is excellent stuff -- I'll be joining. 986 Military Aviation History -------------------------------- Randy Randy 1 hour ago (edited) I was a USAF Ground Controlled Intercept Technician in the 70's. That was a lifetime ago, but there are some problems with the Russian offense I've noticed that should not have come to pass this day and age. You mentioned mission specialization a few times. In my understanding and experience with Russia, each military member has a specific job that embodies their purpose. For example, in a radar facility where I spent my career, radar troops were used in all of the positions such as Surveillance Scope Operator, Teller, Command and Control, ECCM, Fighter Control, Plotter and so on. We may have been qualified best in one or two specific specialties but were trained in ALL of them and could be used to man all of the positions. In Russia, if someone is a plotter, that's all he does. If he operates a radar surveillance scope, that's typically all he does. There are good and bad points to both approaches. The difference here is flexibility. On the flip side, if the only things a Russian troop does all day is plot or man a scope, he becomes very good and experienced at it. The Russians jumped into this fray with a specific plan in mind and did not cope well with the complications of controlling a bustling society inside a modern country at least by Eastern block standards. In short, the Ukraine is not a primitive desert country with vagabonds and gypsies riding camels. The second problem with the invasion was the Russians used many of their older (Cold War) equipment to complete the mission without considering they would be met with the zeal and resistance of the invaded. I think I saw a pair of Mig-25's on the news the other day. If this was file footage, I get it. If the Russians REALLY deployed this particular aircraft and other dated aircraft like it for air to mud missions in this battle, they didn't take the Ukraine's resolve to heart. I think they figured they could go into the conflict and mop up quickly to get the territory under control. But they didn't attempt to control the air. Anybody knows that to win a war, one must gain and maintain control of the air. That is not accomplished with helocopters. Third, not only did the Russians not expect the level of resistance from the Ukrainians, they absolutely miscalculated the anger from the world that met them at the front door, particularly from a paper tiger like NATO. The world watched as Russia invaded Georgia, then Crimea several years ago. The message now is 'Enough is Enough! They didn't do anything to you.' I firmly believe there is nothing wrong with Vladimir Putin's mind. I believe this goat rope he started has not worked out for him from any perspective that would relegate it to 'business as usual.' The losses in battle have been unreasonable. His assets are stretched too thin based in part by the 4 front attack strategy as opposed to a unified front and his military is inexperienced and untested. I think he is just totally pissed off at the malaise this assault has created. I don't think he has the wherewithal to just back out and admit it was a mistake to do this in this way at this particular time. He doesn't need the Ukraine. He didn't need Afghanistan, Georgia or Crimea either. He got greedy and arrogant. When a man is at the top of his game, there is only one way to go after that and it's not up. 2 -------------------------------- Krzysztof Cygan Krzysztof Cygan 2 days ago Also I'd assume they have these too: The tactical defense alert radar (TDAR) is not a component of the Stinger weapon system but is an associated piece of equipment used to detect targets. The tactical defense alert radar is a lightweight, early warning detection device designed to be a rugged, transportable radar system that provides LAAD units with an organic cueing, alerting, and early warning capability. The tactical defense alert radar provides low altitude air defense units with a 20 kilometer detection capability against fixed-wing aircraft and an 8 to 10 kilometer detection capability against rotarywing aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles. 4 -------------------------------- Simon James Dean Simon James Dean 13 hours ago The Russian AF has been over-rated for decades. Yes, it has some impressive aircraft...BUT...the numbers are small and half of those are unserviceable due to lack of funds/parts. One positive about the Ukraine war is that it has put on display Russia's military hardware and tactics for all to see, and the upshot is that NATO would wipe the floor with Russia. Another positive is that Russia is losing essential military hardware with each passing day, and cannot afford to replace it thanks to the crippling sanctions. Putin has really messed this one up. His best option would be to retreat now and salvage what he can of his military...but obviously he wont. 8 -------------------------------- watchgoose watchgoose 1 hour ago A couple years ago they were having problems with ejection seats NOT working...... -------------------------------- Cyril Arabatzis Cyril Arabatzis 1 hour ago 90% of everything you said, is war propaganda bro. -------------------------------- Vito Tuxedo Vito Tuxedo 15 hours ago If true, the 'inadequate time to plan' explanation could only result from the following conditions: 1) Hopelessly deficient chain-of-command communication from the top down, with a corresponding lack of attention to the necessity of rapid, effective bottom-up communication confirming that the attack plan had been received, understood, and prepared for implementation in accordance with the planned schedule; 2) Massive incompetence in the preparedness for and execution of the battle plan; 3) An unworkably unrealistic command structure wherein the armed forces are expected to respond instantaneously to political orders by morons who are utterly clueless regarding the logistical, training, and materiel requirements necessary to any successful military action; in other words, a military under the full control of civilian political idiots (OK...'political' and 'Idiots' are redundant terms), who have no knowledge, experience, or link to reality in the realm of military matters. ...or all of the above, all of which are the inevitable consequence of top-down, authoritarian, totalitarian systems whose operating mode is predicated on the assumption that all that is necessary to achieve any objective is naked coercion, or the fear induced by the threat thereof. At best, it might work for a while, but ultimately it makes enemies of the people whom it commands, especially when its success-proof nature begins to incur unsustainable losses. Add corruption to the mix (an inevitable ingredient with coercive systems, with the amount of corruption proportional to the level of legalized state coercion), and any such system cannot endure, due to its own inherent instability. Why? Because it constitutes an attempted violation of human nature. All people live to pursue happiness. Systems based on the rule by legalized coercion ignore that natural law, and THAT is the fundamentally destabilizing factor that ensures their inevitable failure. 3 -------------------------------- Carl Cantrell Carl Cantrell 1 day ago (edited) One thing you didn't consider is that, with both forces using similar weapons systems, it will be harder to tell friend from foe, increasing the friendly fire potential. They may be keeping their numbers lower to help prevent the confusion that could increase friendly fire. Another probability is that they know the US/UK militaries will be watching and gathering intel on the strengths and weaknesses of Russia's most advanced weapons systems so the Ruskies are probably holding those weapons systems in reserve just in case the West jumps into this fight. You don't want to show you whole hand to the enemy. 8 -------------------------------- Ron Wilson Ron Wilson 1 day ago (edited) A couple of thoughts: Modern jet fighters are quite complex with high tech avionics and so require a large numbers of spares (e.g. 30% or so) to keep the force readiness high. But if one has limited dollars (plus corruption) Russia may have skimped in buying those spares. Also there are two sortie rates that Air Forces employ, surge sortie rates and sustained sorties rates where the later may be half or a even a third the former. But there is also the time one can maintain a surge sortie rate before it seriously degrades the sustained sortie rate, and even more is if one lacks spares. So it is not just combat losses or damage that limits sortie rates but simply flying a mission can reduce ones sortie rate due to equipment failures [edit] and having to cannibalize working aircraft for spares thus rending them as hanger queens... but if you don't try to choose to fly them you can hide that too from Putin that they couldn't fly even anyway if you wanted them to. On top of that Russian equipment may have low MTBF (mean time between failures) and this too (due to corruption) may be hidden from Putin in that why admit that if one cannot do anything to fix that, better just hide that. But the Russian Air Force generals would certainly know that and may be fearful of reducing their surge sortie rates given say NATO decides to employ a no fly zone and such and they too must be terrified of having to face off against western aircraft, proticual;ry 5th gen fighters such as F-22s and F-35s, [edit] and not just in losing their entire Air Force if they try to prevent that but in losing their heads once Putin sees that is indeed the case, the later being more than likely the much greater fear). Hence the urgent imperative to keep as much as their Air Force flight ready as one can. So these are logistics factor that even careful planning could not mitigate all that much but would be systemic. 169 -------------------------------- Plamena Plamena 2 days ago Taking into consideration the mentality, historical knowledge, current experience (Syria and Ukraine 2014) I am not very surprised by the results until now. And with the reports that Putin has only yes-men left around him nobody should be very surprised by them underestimating Ukraine and the West's reaction and overestimate themselves. Also I remember how numbers were inflated artificially in the ex-Warsaw pact countries. So every number given about the Russian forces always needs to be taken with a big stone of salt crystals 😉 78 -------------------------------- Edward Elliott Edward Elliott 1 day ago I was surprised too by the somewhat mediocre support Russian ground soldiers have gotten from the Air Force. Did they totally misjudge the amount of resistance? Is the readiness of the airplanes at such a low standard that they can’t fly more? What is going on? On a related front there are numerous reports of the ground forces tanks, trucks, etc failing in the field or running out of fuel. Could it be the military just don’t have the heart for this war? Or was it such a snap-judgement decision to go to war they just weren’t ready.

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