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UKRAINE / RUSSIA WAR WITH GENERAL HODGES Pyotr Kurzin \| Geopolitics ... General Hodges on Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive & Overwhelming Russia PLAY YOUTUBE VIDEO Original article: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XU0pwL3V8ro Peter Burgess COMMENTARY Peter Burgess
General Hodges on Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive & Overwhelming Russia Pyotr Kurzin \| Geopolitics Aug 30, 2024 26K subscribers ... 73,821 views ... 3.3K likes #kursk #russiaukrainewar #putin Ukraine's astonishing Kursk offensive has left Russia and Putin's military scrambling to know what to do. After 3 weeks, Kyiv continues to press further into Russian territory with basically no response from the Kremlin. Moreover, NATO's retraining of Ukrainian forces is exposing further still Moscow's incompetence and unprofessionalism of the military training needed to stop or merely deter Ukraine's further entry into Kursk territory. In this part 1 of 2 l am joined by retired three-star Lieutenant General Ben Hodges and former Commander of US Army Europe with three decades of military experience. We discussed Ukraine's newest gains and lack of Russian response, the stark contrasts of Ukraine's military evolution to Russia's ineptitude, role of Russian mothers in pressuring Putin, and Russia vs Ukrainian views. Gain early access to part 2 by signing up to support me on Patreon. ↭ SUPPORT MY WORK ↭ ► Patreon: / theglobalgambit ► Buy Me A Coffee: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/thegloba... ► YT Membership: / @uc7-tpqkmvid. . ↭ ENGAGE WITH ME ↭ ► 𝕏/Twitter: (@pkurzin): / pkurzin ► Substack: (The Global Gambit) https://pyotrskurzin.substack.com/ ► Instagram (@theecoexpat): / the.eco.exp. . ↭ PODCAST DOWNLOAD/REVIEW ↭ ► (The Global Gambit): https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast.. . ↭ WATCH THESE NEXT ↭ ► Sir Lawrence Freedman on Ukraine & Russia • Why Putin’s War in Ukraine is Unwinnable ► Rob Person on Russia without Putin • Can Russia Survive Without Putin? ► Jake Broe on Ukraine's Defiant Defence • How Ukraine Is Continuing to Withstan... ► Evan Soloman on the changing World Order • How the Global Financial System is Ra... ↭ CHAPTERS ↭ 00:00 Introduction and Overview 01:05 Developments in Kursk and Russia's Response 03:55 The Evolution of the Ukrainian Military 08:39 The Importance of Strategic Clarity 11:02 Russian Ineptitude and Ukrainian Success 15:44 The Impact of Losses on Russian Public Opinion 19:29 The Difference in Mentalities between Ukrainians and Russians #ukraine #russia #nato #kursk #geopolitics #military #putin #war #russiaukrainewar Music 1 songs Transcript Introduction and Overview 0:00 what are we learning from the Russians or very little about their inability to stop this counter offensive at this point you know the ukrainians control hundreds of square kilometers of very sensitive and symbolic um you know Russian territory first of all the most obvious thing I think that has resulted in a thus far slow and ineffective Russian response to this their command structure and the bitter rivalries between all the different organizations and institutions inside of Russia what's your assessment of the troop expertise or just general training on the Russian side well the key will be for the Russian side um are they able to mass enough artillery and Rockets to pound away at ukrainians and then try to drown the ukrainians and Russian corpses I mean that's that's basically the Russian approach is just to a trip to wear down because they don't care about their own losses they're willing to just keep pushing and pushing and pushing but key to that this is the global Gambit welcome back to the channel everybody my 1:00 name is p and this is the global Gambit where we look at and reimagine the West's place in the world and sort of Developments in Kursk and Russia's Response the Nexus of geopolitics and the global economic system now Ukraine and Russia and the war is probably the main thing that we cover on a reoccurring basis here and someone who I think has been one of the most prominent voices uh throughout and um well I'm incredibly delighted he needs no introduction I think is what I would say uh is General bent Hodes who is a retired US state army officer uh and he's been advisor to uh human rights first NATO um and well he's uh he's one of the most distinguished members of the of the US military put it that way and I'm absolutely honored uh to have him join the show and I'm very much looking forward to this conversation about developments in kurts uh Russia's responses um and then maybe a little bit further down the line about China and the bigger picture but uh General Hodges thank you very much for joining the show 2:00 um I hope you're getting on a right I think you're in Germany yes yeah I live in uh Frankfurt just got back from 6 weeks in the states for the summer uh good to be back home here in Frankfurt yes no it's and I I'm very as I say delighted to the first thing one of the first things you were like yes I'll come and join that Brit in the uh in the London uh show so um I think very quickly I'd like to learn from you your immediate reactions to the developments uh in Kurtz obviously yesterday was one of the largest missile and artillery barges we've seen across Ukraine by the Kremlin in quite a while um so maybe just sort of your initial reactions to the lay of the land so to speak well I think uh this K counter offensive by the ukrainians uh has achieved already three or four important things number one it has changed The Narrative of the war that somehow a Russian Victory is inevitable uh the ukrainians are changing the narrative about what's about what's possible uh 3:03 they have created a very difficult um domestic problem for the Kremlin now what we can't tell has have they achieved the effect that they wanted which is to draw forces away from other Russian efforts such as in the East uh the Russian offensive going against polr cannot tell yet whether enough forces have been drawn away from that to lessen the pressure on the ukrainians out in the east but i' I've been impressed with the Ukrainian general staff uh with how they have managed so many different things despite having inadequate resources from the United States from UK and other Western countries um if you think about it this this counter offensive in K is is not a standalone thing it's not happening in a vacuum I mean while the ukrainians are doing this and they pulled off a massive surprise The Evolution of the Ukrainian Military against Russian forces and surprised us as well they are continuing to launch 4:01 long range Precision strike against Russian airfields Uh Russian oil and gas infrastructure um and also of course they destroyed one of the most important faery links between Crimea and the Russian Mainland so this this counter offensive is a part of Ukrainian style multi-domain operations so one of the things that I think a lot of people are reflecting on is the longevity of such an incursion campaign operation whatever people prefer to call it um but I think what has been Illustrated is that the ukrainians we say retraining and complete restructuring of the military in the past 10 years or so has been significant and I'm just kind of curious from your perspective with that expertise in time that you led the US um military in various capacities what you know how how do you reflect on the progress and of 5:00 involvement uh that the Ukrainian military has shown in in its operation you the first thing you mentioned petor was the uh what do we call this the Ukrainian government and the general staff have done a good job of protecting information we're not entitled to know exactly what they intend to achieve how long they're going to be there but um the word incursion does not sound adequate uh given the scale uh and what I think the objectives are I think and it's not a raid obviously because it's much more significant than that so I have I have been calling it a counter offensive because I do believe that the primary purpose of this is to counter slow down the Russian offensive against Ukraine so this is a counter stroke if you will but um that's for uh the labeling of it it does it does matter because the words do have different meanings regardless yeah no 6:01 how long are they going to stay there well of course that depends on what what is the ultimate end state that the the general staff and the government hope to achieve my sense and again this is only speculation because they haven't laid it all out nor should they my sense is that they are trying to create a buffer to deny a large area on the Russian side of the border that has been used by the Russians for launching attacks against Ukrainian civilians so uh and because the United States and UK and Germany have not allowed Ukraine to use long- range weapons against targets inside Russia ukrainians are um which which by the way creates Sanctuary for the Russians the ukrainians are saying okay well we'll just we're going to move the line then and so by going deeper into Russia they can bring their own weapons further forward and start striking Uh Russian targets deeper inside Russia so that's what I think is one of the principal objectives they're 7:01 trying to accomplish now I believe the point of your question though was about you know the evolution of the Ukrainian Armed Forces um for sure when we first started working with them uh about 10 7:15 years ago well that's not that's not 7:17 true we had ukrainians with us in Iraq 7:19 and Afghanistan so there were uh 7:22 cooperation with Ukrainian forces I'm 7:25 I'm still dear friends with a Ukrainian 7:27 officer I met almost 20 years ago when 7:29 in uh Iraq but there there still is a 7:34 legacy of Soviet mentality in Soviet 7:38 education in some parts of the Ukrainian 7:42 forces um the the vast majority of the obviously younger officers the troops the the units um have either came in after that or they've shaken that off but there still is a little bit I think some residual thinking 8:00 um that's got to be eliminated uh 8:03 General jaly was working hard to 8:05 eradicate that when he was still the 8:07 chief of Defense but of course they're 8:09 in the middle of a war a war for 8:11 survival and so institutional reform is 8:14 not necessarily at the at the front of 8:18 mine I do think that uh one area where the ukrainians have got to improve is what we call the institutional Army this is the part of the army that's responsible for recruiting training education all the stuff that's required to put operational forces into the field The Importance of Strategic Clarity uh and this means you have to dedicate quality experienced officers uh to be faculty for example at education or to or quality experienced sergeants to help be trainers and then you have to have quality people that that are out there recruiting um so that families have confidence that if their son or daughter join joins the Ukrainian 9:00 Armed Forces they won't be sent into the fight until they are properly trained properly equipped and put into a unit that is ready to go fight so you mentioned um about the sort of mentality and it's remnants of the Soviets I I do want to touch upon Soviet Doctrine uh but after this question though which is 9:19 that um for me it's a bit of a catch 22 9:22 in that I look at 9:24 the uh the the current current offensive 9:27 if we call it that and the um the 9:29 developments are on the one hand good 9:32 because it shows you the successes the 9:34 ukrainians can make but they haven't 9:36 communicated that with uh Berlin London let alone Washington right um barely anyone knows including uh the Kremlin but at the same time by they did that largely I think because of the UN underwhelming success of the 2023 cter offensive right but at the same time if they're not uh telegraphing in any way shape or form what they plan to do could 10:00 that not be a potential hindrance to sustain support by uh NATO the us because they're like well we're not sure what Ukraine's going to do unless they tell us first so is there not a potential imitation by keeping things under rat that it might limit you know 10:16 how far the you know a new 10:17 Administration is willing to go or you 10:19 disagree with that 10:21 sen um well first of all I I think uh 10:25 you made an important Point reminding 10:27 everybody of last last year's uh counter 10:31 offensive I was I was overly optimistic 10:33 myself um but I think the ukrainians 10:36 learned from that number one they have 10:38 to do it their way with what they have versus trying to do it the way Americans or Brits might have pushed them to do it without providing them the stuff that Brits and Americans would be using such as air power so the ukrainians have to do it their way secondly I think they were very suspicious uh and car care ful about talking too much about this Russian Ineptitude and Ukrainian Success 11:02 because for sure if too many people 11:04 inside Washington or London or Berlin 11:06 knew about it the Russians would have 11:09 absolutely known about it I mean that's 11:12 um that's just the way these things are 11:14 and so uh the discipline with which they 11:17 maintained operational security really 11:20 impressed me the the fact that almost 11:22 all of us were totally surprised the 11:24 fact that they could get so many troops 11:26 up near the Russian border without being 11:28 Det Ed and then blow through the Border forces um that that impressed me and you you have to have discipline operational security I spoke to someone the other day who said that uh to a Ukrainian who said that they had talked to soldiers who found out the day before where they were going that's exactly the way it should be down at the troop level otherwise you've got people get on their on their cell phones and they start calling home and say hey we're going to do whatever so 12:00 I I was impressed so okay now I I 12:02 mentioned Soviet Doctrine so this is 12:05 obviously we touched upon the vertical 12:06 commands horizontal so I'm kind of 12:08 curious through your perspective though 12:10 there are remnants of what you're saying 12:12 is a Soviet Doctrine in in the Ukrainian 12:14 forces but it's obviously still 12:16 basically what has been described in the 12:19 Russian uh approach to things uh Putin 12:22 has a very stonghold I think despite 12:25 being a terrible Master strategist to 12:27 quote one online um sort of parody 12:29 account right um what are we learning from the Russians um or very little about their inability to stop this um this counter offensive at this point you know the ukrainians control hundreds of square kilometers of very sensitive and symbolic um you know Russian territory uh what what are we learning about the Russians in Attitude it there's uh two or three things that come to mind immediately that um should give us optimism and that should also U 13:01 Inspire or drive how we support Ukraine 13:06 um to be Su to be successful first of 13:09 all the most uh obvious thing I think 13:11 that has resulted in a thus far slow and 13:16 ineffective Russian response to this is their command structure and the bitter rivalries between all the different organizations and institutions inside of Russia the Border forces belong to the FSB uh the and then you have Rose Gardia and then you have um the general staff in the in the regular forces and even inside regular forces you've got conscripts you've got mercenaries you've 13:44 got professional like the vdv and uh the naval infantry who used to be the most respected and capable Russian forces all of these groups hate each other uh the general staff has no interest in seeing the 14:00 FSB be successful or seen as the heroes 14:03 for saving things yet the Kremlin put 14:05 the FSB in charge of dealing with the 14:08 curs uh counter offensive so I think 14:12 there's probably um a lack of coherence 14:15 in the command structure in how they 14:17 assess and how they respond that's 14:20 that's number one that's to the 14:21 advantage of us and ukrainians and so 14:24 playing on those divisions and and 14:26 hatreds and rivalries um I think that's 14:30 a vulnerability for the Russian side the second thing is um is related to that the logistics you know before this war started I was really impressed with the ability of Russia to move a lot of stuff real far real fast trains large aircraft gazillions of trucks Etc that transport um now you know that that Logistics system is under enormous pressure partly because of the losses they've suffered over the last two and a half years but 15:01 also again with this uh command 15:04 structure um somebody at some level has 15:07 to say okay priority is now eliminate 15:11 the curs salent and um you send these 15:15 forces here to here so that's when the 15:18 clock starts on marshalling the trucks 15:21 and trains and things that are required 15:23 to move thousands of troops with all their stuff and ammunition to where it's needed and it is several hundreds of kilometers from the poos area for example around to get up to the kurk area that's that is a challenge and especially if you were not anticipating the requirement even Russia uh will have The Impact of Losses on Russian Public Opinion some challenges marshalling enough transport to do that quickly and then finally the third thing uh we have been reminded that the Russians absolutely do not care about losses how many people get killed they that mean means zero um 16:00 and so um how many Russian troops are 16:04 killed is not a good metric or indicator 16:07 of success the only metric that matters 16:10 is uh Putin does he believe that he's 16:13 winning or losing and do people around 16:16 him believe that he's winning or losing 16:18 because losing of course is is 16:20 unacceptable in that system and so I 16:22 think that the 16:25 um the objective has to be something 16:28 that creates 16:29 big pressure on him and on the people 16:32 around him versus counting how many how 16:36 many Russian troops have been killed I will add one caveat to that conscripts um you've got young men from Moscow and St Petersburg that start getting killed and captured that will be different than the 600,000 men who have been killed or captured that are from everywhere else inside the Federation what it's almost like h for you knew what I was going to ask you 17:00 next but it was about the kind of um individuals the kind of demographics uh that we're seeing from the Russian perspective take on the sort of should we say uh stalling and intercepting of this of this counter offensive um I very much agree with your sentiment about the you the internal dynamics of the Russian side um there's a great video on YouTube from the Imperial War Museum here in the UK and its emphasis of which I think most people agree it was FSB led the initial out assault right on February 24th with the anticipation that they would administer sort of the main key areas of Ukraine and then the general sort of military would come in a bolster that but it was first and foremost a security Le operation not a conventional military so it was a what of a shell husk of what it really should have been to take on sort of the extent of of of land and territory that they were trying to do as you said I think the northern border and and around Kirk is is being predominantly managed by conscripts who've had what 18:02 two three days worth of training whilst the seasoned quote unquote military are still around uh pesque and uh and other parts of the Eastern Front what's your assessment of the uh of the troop expertise or just general training on the Russian side and what could this mean for for them in terms of losses and engagement with the ukrainians well the key will be for the Russian side um are they able to mass enough artillery and Rockets to uh to pound away at ukrainians and then and then try to drown the ukrainians and Russian corpses I mean that's that's basically uh the the Russian approach is just to a tri to to wear down because they don't care about their own losses they're willing to just keep pushing and pushing and pushing but key to that uh are headquarters that can control this and endless amounts of artillery and Rocket ammunition that allow them to pound away at Ukrainian defenses and drones I would include drones inside 19:01 that so those are kind of the three components of of Russian uh offensive operations and so you know General Cavo sakur he said that you can defeat Mass with Precision if you have enough time and and of course what he's talking about to defeat that sort of Russian style that I just described you need longrange Precision weapons that can destroy headquarters because the headquarters are required for this very Central ized form of attack and then you The Difference in Mentalities between Ukrainians and Russians 19:32 need long range Precision that can destroy the logistics the ammunition that is delivered by trucks and trains and then you need the uh long range Precision to take out the artillery and and rocket launchers or also the airfields so you don't you don't have to have the ability to kill all these unlucky young soldiers that are attacking you but with Precision you can destroy the headquarters and the artillery that makes it possible for this poorly 20:02 trained uh unhappy unlucky infantry to overwhelm your position so this is this is what the fight is I think you've got a very centralized system versus a system that is more decentralized on the on the Ukrainian side but the ukrainians lack is enough endless long range Precision strike capability what about the Russian mothers um and sort of grandmothers as we saw in what the um Soviet operations in Afghanistan and then with the Chetan Wars uh I think one of the biggest domestic pressures that no one really but particularly the Kine didn't anticipate was the was that motherly sort of Love pressure um of the loss of young of their young boys do you think that that could come there been an omnipresent I think people for saying oh this is going to be a fact for the kemin to to consider but do you think that this could really become more of a pressure if we see the uh meat grinder 21:02 so to speak um really well becoming a thing in CT with conscripts as well um that's a great question and it's something I have tried to understand now for the last uh couple years at what point do Russian people say that's that's enough um I think this is not about their resilience this is about a lethargy and a a system where the people 21:29 don't do really matter that much um I I 21:32 don't think we're going to see something 21:34 like the mothers from Afghanistan who 21:36 were able to bring enough pressure on 21:38 the government because because I think 21:41 that the Kremlin has tried to avoid that sort of situation the the most of the people that they have recruited to join the military come from out in the much poorer ethnic regions of the Russian Federation where for somebody out in one of these areas uh is gets a huge amount of money relatively speaking to come be 22:02 a private in the Russian military and if they get killed you know the family hate to say it profits from it so um you don't have a lot of funerals taking place in Moscow and St Petersburg that's when that starts happening then I think you uh will see a change in the dynamic but so far they have been able to avoid recruiting too much out of the two major metropolitan areas yeah no for sure if you start sort of saying the more urban settled uh populations that's when it really begins to change I think the snow revolution of 2012 you know when we saw that huge protests against the Putin what restructuring of the Constitution is is symbolic of that and and also I think it's different to like the Soviet time because well it was the Soviet Union beginning to crumble you had the internal Dynamics the was that ability to pressure the government in a way that Putin's whole on power is precarious at times but still definitely not F out but [Music]

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