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RUSSIA Mark Galeotti / Diane Francis / Kurt Volker Times Radio: Putin clings to floundering Ukraine invasion to stave off domestic 'discontent' \| Frontline: PLAY YOUTUBE VIDEO Original article: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ugNWpxlOurU Peter Burgess COMMENTARY Peter Burgess
Putin clings to floundering Ukraine invasion to stave off domestic 'discontent' \| Frontline Times Radio Sep 22, 2024 987K subscribers 'Putin doesn't feel he can afford to end this war. He knows the patriotic surge is the only thing keeping at bay all the discontent that has built up.' Frustration grows in Russia towards Putin's war as Ukraine solidifies its gains in the Kursk region, says this week's Frontline experts: Russia expert Mark Galeotti Senior fellow at the Atlantic council Diane Francis Former US ambassador Kurt Volker Join this channel to get access to perks - / @listentotimesradio 📻 Listen to Times Radio - https://www.thetimes.co.uk/radio 🗞 Subscribe to The Times https://www.thetimes.co.uk/subscribe/... 📲 Get the free Times Radio app https://www.thetimes.co.uk/radio/how-... Mark Galeotti Kurt Volker Diane Francis Transcript 0:00 pressures discontents are absolutely building up and interestingly amongst a whole bunch of different segments of the population you know you mentioned the ultr nationalists the So-Cal turbo Patriots they clearly are thinking not just that they have a problem with the war so much as they have a problem with just how incompetent it's management has been you've got the oligarchs who are seeing their their their business Empires under risk and their opportunities of being able to continue to enjoy the fruits of been connected to the outside world limited and you have ordinary Russians who not know exactly what's going on but they're terrified for example about a new mobilization wave and they just feel there is clearly something wrong if part of your territory is under foreign occupation hello and welcome to Frontline for times radio I'm James Hansen and today we're talking about the latest on the war in Ukraine and I'm delighted to be joined by a regular voice here on Frontline we always appreciate his time Mark gallotti honorary professor at University College London he's a highly respected expert in Russian politics and Global crime and is the author of many books including Putin's Wars from Chia to Ukraine Mark 1:03 always a pleasure welcome back good to be here wanted to start off by getting your thoughts on what appears to be a shift in position from the US and the UK but notably the US when it comes to restrictions placed on the use of longrange missiles by Ukraine inside Russia now we haven't had any official confirmation on this and some people are saying that Joe Biden is still a bit hesitant about giving the green light for this but there certainly seems to be of a be a bit of a gear change what would be the significance of that if those restrictions were lifted well I mean first of all just to talk about the political question yes it does seem to be happening more slowly than expected look remember that although Kama was over in in Washington talking to Joe Biden it's not really there that decisions are made decisions tend to be basically be made by lots of negotiations between officials and then announced and therefore it was a bit of a surprise and in some ways a bit of a setback that there wasn't such an announcement and it's not so much I think that the Americans are dragging their feet it's rather that they do 2:05 understand that Putin in some ways needs to be acclimated to any particular change because he's been making some very very sort of uh over-the-top statements about this would essentially be the cent of declaring war on Russia and it's more than an understanding that Putin can get his head round reversals but in some ways tends to take time and they don't want to bounce him into feeling that he has to respond in some escal way because the impact would be significant I mean this is the trouble I mean each time there's some new weapon system whether it's the f-16s or highas Rockets someone will crop up saying this is it this is the wonder weapon that is going to change the nature of the war and that's quite dangerous because precisely it sets up expectations that are inevitably going to be dashed this will allow the ukrainians a new capability to be able to Target military bases and it's worth stressing that even the permission that is likely to be given will not be C blunch we we're not 3:01 going to see these weapons open to be used against civilian targets even if the ukrainians wanted to be very specifically military strategic targets but at a at a wider range and perhaps most importantly with a very high level of precision because this has always been the kind of the trade-off the ukrainians do have systems that that can Target quite quite long range but their accuracy and their capacity to get through Russian air defenses are always a little bit more more questionable you know these are very accurate very effective weapon systems so it's going to push further out the radius at which the ukrainians can strike and already we've seen it having its effect because the aircraft that the Russians use to launch these quite formidable Glide bombs very large weapons are now being pushed further out so that they're outside the Storm Shadow radius and okay it means that they can't be hit but nonetheless it means it's that much harder that they're they're going further into their range to actually be able to hit Ukraine so look this is an 4:01 important step forward it's not a war winner but nonetheless it is part of the overall process of supporting the ukrainians it's interesting also How the West seems to be selling this as a response to Iran providing Russia with around 200 ballistic missiles so it's a response as opposed to an escalation I suppose is how they're trying to Brand it I suppose one of the the counterarguments to to those who say this might be an escalation is the idea that actually that the kers incursion proved once and for all that many of Putin's so-called red lines are just a bluff and people would say if Ukraine can show that you can physically invade Russia and Putin won't reach safe for tactical nuclear weapons that goes to show that he's been bluffing about these red lines all along yes up to a point I mean there is what what we're really talking about here is kind of boy cried wolf scenario in that absolutely from the very beginning Putin has been trying to lay down these these red lines to try and inhibit us from supporting Ukraine I mean the very notion of sending combat 5:04 equipment to Ukraine in the first place was considered a red line then it was long-range artillery and Rockets and attacks on the curse on the Crimean bridge and then most recently f-16s and now it's this and each time we we we pass these red lines they turn out to be merely a sort of a slightly faint pink and perhaps there'll be a day or two of additional raids on Ukrainian cities or something asort of vindictive punishment but that's about it however we have to recognize two things first of all just because past red lines have been non-existent really it doesn't mean that there aren't any and to be honest though I think that the real red lines are very different things they basically the the presence for example were their NATO combat troops being deployed into Ukraine to fight were their NATO weapons being used against civilian targets or was there the prospect of imminently losing crime I think those are really for me the 6:01 three genuine red lines so yes we we have to take it into account but on this business of essentially branding this not as escalation but as a response to the Iranian ballistic missiles I mean this is very disingenuous because frankly this is this is a process that started well before there was any talk of of Iranian nuclear missiles and my problem is that sometimes in the west we get a little bit too carried away precisely with the spin which fine it matters within Democratic political systems but not necessarily so much with international relations and I'm inclined to think back to the Cuban Missile Crisis which after was one of the times when the world came closest to nuclear war and there when the Russians decided or Soviets rather decided to send short-range nuclear missiles to Cuba this was regarded as a sort of a terrible escalation whereas as far as the Soviets were concerned this was simply a response to the fact that the Americans had cited short-range missiles in Turkey just over their border so the 7:00 problem is that everyone finds their justifications when we're in this kind of Crisis there is a constant stream of I don't want to call them necessary escalations but but moves that that all have their their counter move so by all means let's spin but I do hope that in the the sort of the councils of government they're fully aware that this is a new move doesn't mean to say we shouldn't be doing it but we have to recognize it for what it is I wanted to ask you Mark about how Vladimir Putin is dealing with the kers incursion in terms of the messaging inside Russia I've heard a lot of people say that he's almost trying to play it down and he doesn't want to Big it up too much because it draws attention to the fact the war has literally come to Russian territory is that your reading of things yeah and it's interesting the very fact that he can't even actually name it for what it is a Ukrainian Invasion or incursion or whatever we have all these euphemisms the current situation these circumstances and it's it's fascinating because it's very reminiscent of how he dealt with the opposition leader alexe Nali you know while he was alive he 8:05 would never refer to Nali by name it would always be that individual or so forth It's almost like actually the things that he genuinely fears like Voldemort he can't actually bring himself to name them so in that context yes he's he's trying to play it down because I think the reason is that apart from the fact it was just deeply embarrassing to have Russian territory being taken by the ukrainians but also more broadly I think it's calculated in a very bloodless kind of way but actually it makes sense that in fact better from his point of view to maintain the the effort on pushing forward in on the donbass front in eastern Ukraine and except that there's going to be uh Ukrainian territ ukrainians holding parts of Russian territory for the next weeks months whatever but it's not important territory especially not from the point of view of Putin who doesn't really care about his regions um than actually to focus everything on driving them out so I think given that he reckons that this 9:02 may well be something that'll take some time to address he doesn't want to make too big a deal of it because that builds up expectations people will be thinking well when is Russian territory going to be free why are they not free yet and he doesn't want to divert his primary forces his seasoned veterans away from the donbass front to deal with his curs incidents and to what extent has the curs incursion weakened Putin's position domestically and who he be most concerned about some of the ultra nationalist Russian military bloggers have been quite critical of Russian tactics and operations in recent weeks and months but then you've also got some oligarchs speaking more freely in opposition to the war in Ukraine I think Al der Pasa was on a trip to Japan relatively recently and criticized the war in Ukraine the fact that he feels he can speak out how significant is that yeah I mean to deal with the D of Pasco issue it's often difficult to know because there's there's a degree in which there's a kind of um calibration and calcul in that certain figures they're more 10:02 given a certain amount of leeway in order to create s is all very much theatricality to create the impression that there is a degree of pluralism when there really isn't this is still a personalistic authoritarian autocracy in terms of the impact on Putin though I think that there's a paradox here in that on one the one hand it absolutely has weakened him I mean if one thinks back what were the two pillars of his legitimacy historically it's always been first of all Prosperity you can tell to ordinary tell ordinary Russians look next year is going to be even better than last year it's a lot harder for most Russians to believe that in the current situation particularly with inflation Rising the economy sort of showing some signs I mean it it can last for some time but it's not a comfortable situation for the economy and the other pillar was security that Putin is the man who can keep Russia and Russians safe well that too is now being eroded so you know there is a a sense in which people are feeling that Putin is not living up to his social contract and 11:05 in some ways that that you know the old man it's interesting how often he's now referred to as like grandfather and so forth you know just basically no longer has what it takes but at the same time there's also an inevitable rally around the flag effect you know people see a foreign army on Russian soil and there is that sense that this a very sort of strong lomy National patriotism that says now is not the time to be trying to sort of challenge or under the regime so I think what we're actually seeing is a situation in which in the short term k actually kind of strengthens Putin's position because as I say this is not the time to destabilize the situation but pressures discontents are absolutely building up and interestingly amongst a whole bunch of different segments of the population you know you mentioned the ultr Nationalist the So-Cal turbo Patriots they clearly are thinking not just that they have a problem with the war so much as they have a problem with just how incompetent it's management has been you've got the oligarchs who are 12:01 seeing their their their business Empires under risk and their opportunities of being able to continue to enjoy the fruits of been connected to the outside world limited and you have ordinary Russians who may not know exactly what's going on but they're terrified for example about a new mobilization wave and they just feel there is clearly something wrong if part of your territory is under foreign occupation so I think for all of these reasons you know you have tensions that are building up but they're being kept at Bay by the war and in some ways that's what scares me because although I've never believed that Putin went in to Ukraine because he feared some kind of internal protest at home it may well reach a situation in which Putin doesn't feel that he can afford to end the war because he knows it's that patriotic surge is the only thing that keeps at Bay all the discontent that has built up so it's very long answer I'm afraid sorry to to a simple question it's an interestingly complex question and on 13:02 the topic of mobilization will he be reluctant to do that out of fear of what the public reaction may be yeah absolutely there's no question about that for a long time his generals have been telling him you really want us to be making ground in Ukraine we need more troops but the first mobilization wave that was carried out in Autumn of 2022 was so disruptive remember for every Soldier they managed to bring to the ranks two to three Russians fled the country country and was just very very unpopular well Putin who is after all a very risk averse figure ironically enough clearly didn't want to do it before the presidential elections then while he was contemplating it we had the prian Mutiny sort of um story as well you know for all of these reasons there's a lot of you know each time there there's some kind of a challenge Putin kind of backs away now if he orders a mobilization today he won't have his troops frankly until late autumn by which point the conditions in Ukraine are not really very propitious for major offensive operations so yes the generals 14:06 would love to see it but so far at least Putin's timidity has fortunately kept that from being started and I suppose as well he will be waiting to see what the result is of the US presidential election in November and on that note of course we're recording this uh in the hours after what appears to be a second attempted assassination attempt against former president Donald Trump and it's interesting that the suspect in question who's been arrested has links to Ukraine he went out to ke in 2022 he tried to coordinate efforts to recruit us Nationals to to fight on on behalf of Ukraine obviously the Ukrainian government have distanced themselves from him and said that he was frankly delusional but it's interesting how the ukrainians have also said they expect the Kremlin to try and exploit the situation and spread disinformation to try and undermine American support for Ukraine I mean this presumably is just absolutely part and parcel of the Putin Playbook Mark absolutely it's a gift to the krein and 15:05 frankly they would they would be what has to acknowledge stupid not to take fullest advantage of this and particularly what's powerful about this is you know you talked about disinformation the most effective forms of information operations are those that are actually rooted in the truth so rather than just creating something out of nothing and hoping people believe you it's taking something that that is real and just seeing how far you can spin it so it absolutely we are going to see this as as as an important new battle fine in the information operation and the problem is that at present because no one really knows quite why he did it what was his motivation or whatever you know was it because of Ukraine was it nothing to do with that was it just simply that he wanted Fame who knows so actually at the moment you have a window of opportunity in which Russia's proper gists will be spinning what everything that they can and no doubt not just presenting one narrative 16:05 but many narratives all of which go against both the Democrats in America and also Ukraine and it that much harder to combat when you haven't really got a solid line of information to be able to spin against it and I'm guessing in particular the fact that it was Donald Trump who was targeted you know Donald Trump has been far more skeptical about American support for Ukraine than the Democrats for ex for instance you know the Biden Administration and kamla Harris's campaign and so they will be sensing an opportunity to further fuel skepticism about support for ke among Trump's base yes I think there'll be there' be two elements I mean on the one hand look the Russians are not totally naive about Donald Trump and the fact that there is often a yawning Chasm between what Donald Trump plans to do or says he's going to do rather and what he actually does but nonetheless it is clear from their point of view that that 17:00 they would prefer a trump Victory to a Harris Victory so on the one hand we're going to see this being used as a way of supporting Trump whether it's from insinuations about you know I wonder who was backing this man and so forth all the way through to you know Trump is a brave man who's willing to stand up dis and he will not be silenced or intimidated so that will be one narrative and then at the same time there will as you say be be a Ukraine skeptical narrative that says you know why are Ukraine's friends so terrified of Donald Trump that they're willing to use violence and assassination and and who was backing this man and all the other things you know I'm sure we're going to see some kind of implications that uh H Ukrainian Military Intelligence which after all has been behind a series of assassination campaigns inside Russia somehow may have been supporting him or egging him on or whatever you know this is unfortunately a a story that writes itself from the Russian propagandist point of view I wanted to ask you mark as well as as to whether you have noted a shift in tone 18:05 among Ukraine's Western allies in recent days and weeks whereas before it was very much look we are with Ukraine all the way whatever it takes obviously that is still very much the sentiment but I'm picking up a bit more we need to help Ukraine win we need to think about ways to bring this war to an end is is that a shift that you have also noticed yes definitely and in the process we're actually seeing a widening Gap particularly within Europe I would say between countries in particularly Frontline States like Poland and the Baltic states which are still very very strongly committed and other countries that frankly would just like this war to go away and a lot of it comes down to almost the semantics like win Victory Russia must lose you know everyone can can can use these kind of terms while meaning totally different things so for example you know for some Western countries is a victory for Ukraine means Russian troops out of every single Square centimeter of occupied territory reparations and the 19:06 like to others it just simply means well most of the territor is back in in Ukrainian hands or at least the shooting has stopped so I mean I think this this is one one of the problems because we never really in the west have dared to have that conversation about how we really think this ends and as many countries are are getting frankly fed up you know there's nowhere getting round it of the huge amounts of money there are billions of pounds euros and dollars that are after all spent on on supporting Ukraine every month to a degree ironically I think this has got worse or more visible since actually President Biden stepped out of the Electoral campaign because I think there was and certainly in in some countries you can actually get people off the Record to admit this there was almost a sense of well Trump's likely to win and Trump is going to impose some 20:02 kind of ceasefire because he'll threaten the Russians with increasing military aid if they don't accept it and the ukrainians will with cutting it if if if they don't accept it and then in a way to a degree we're off the hook because if America does stop supporting Ukraine Europe cannot make up a shortfall they can spend more money but they just don't have the military productive capacity to be able to make it up so in some ways it would have provided a perfect Alibi for countries which would like to actually step away then they can say look if it was up to us we keep supporting Ukraine but with the Americans now out of the Coalition it's all senseless and it's good money being thrown after bad so I I think that you know we are seeing a degree of Ukraine fatigue at the level of certain when I to stress this certain elements of certain governments and a sense of just wouldn't it be good to try and end it but at the same time when it comes down to it it is clear that zalinski is 21:03 signaling I mean he's has his new victory plan which is meant to be also in part of Peace plan you know he's signaling that he's not willing at the stage to countenance any kind of Peace for land deal and America is the only country which could conceivably be in a position to force him to change that position so I mean I think we're not really Advanced any further this is just more grumbling than anything that I think is going to lead to real policy change unless we see something happen in American politics and let's say hypothetically there were serious peace talks what could Vladimir Putin accept what could he sell internally in Russia as a kind of moral victory that equally the ukrainians might go for I mean this is the issue I think I think from from Putin's point of view and obviously you know the the honest answer is you know he will want anything he basically feels he can get and particularly if this is a peace plan that is that is pushed by the West he 22:05 will feel in a stronger position so I mean I think what he will want to do is essentially try to hold on to all the territories that he's got at the moment de facto if not deure and wants to stop Ukraine from certainly being part of NATO and well it's unclear whether he would really care if Ukraine is part of the EU or not but essentially that's said you know he he wants to hold on to to to this territory I cannot see that being acceptable to Ukraine both because you know it would mean basically surrendering 20% of their of their territory but also because the ukrainians ironically like the Russians see time as on as being on their side there is that sense that they're now you know better armed than before they finally getting the pipeline of new recruits getting it sorted so that in a few months time they will have stood up a series of new brigades fresh brigades you know which is after all what 23:03 everyone wants is is fresh troops um such that they'll be in a position next year to be able to launch a new Counterattack and put them in in a much better position so look there's a lot of talk about this but to be perfectly honest at the way things stand at the moment I think Putin is not willing to make the kind of concessions that could possibly appeal to the ukrainians because he will want to hold on to not just Crimea at this stage but also at the very least the land Corridor connecting Crimea to the Russian Mainland and I cannot see zeny frankly even just politically surviving even if he was actually willing to take that deal so does that mean that you think we're still unless it's really pushed for by let's say a president Trump if he were to win again you cannot see successful peace talks anytime soon I so wish I could answer and any other way but no I think when it comes down to it one or both sides still has to become 24:04 more exhausted by the war more willing to accept that its position in 6 months or 12 months time will be worse than now and at the moment there's really no signs of the kind of give on either side and just finally mark on the K incursion for how long do you think Ukraine will be able to or will want to hold the territory they've captured I mean this is a difficult question and so much of it depends on how much force the Russians are willing to throw at it I mean they they could reconquer it I wouldn't say easily because the ukrainians have shown how dogged they could be in the defense but if they're willing to for example precisely transfer forces away from the donbass front given that Putin still seems determined to fight this this particular incursion on the cheap largely just using the kind of whatever random forces 25:02 he can gather from all around the country I mean there are exceptions the 51st Airborne regiment for example which is a relatively well I won't quite say Elite but certainly you know a relatively good unit um has been identified there but even then I think it's it's not that it was necessarily was was transferred away from other combat operations it was just part of the the rotation so you know on on on the level the current level of resourcing the Russians are not in a position to quickly take KK back and the ukrainians have the option if they do really want to hold on to this territory of surging more more troops in albe it at the cost of of the other fronts the interesting thing is though what is the intent I mean at first it looked as if this was meant to be a relatively limited operation TimeWise but now we're talking about well president zalinski is talking about this being um you know for indefinite period of time of it being a buffer zone against Russian attacks or indeed being a bargaining chip in some kind of future negotiations now that implies that 26:03 they're planning on holding on to at least part of this territory in in in the long term so I mean I think it's really going to be just simply a question of of the algorithm of commitment who is willing to devote the resources necessary to hold on to it if the ukrainians do not decide that this actually something that they really need to do then I imagine at some point we're going to see a a controlled withdrawal after they feel have embarrassed and bled Russia enough but last point and I'm unfortunately seem to be in a very downbeat mood today is my my concern is this becomes a little bit like the battle for bakut where you had you know this city that was of really minimal strategic value and yet which became something of a grudge match between the two sides you know originally the ukrainians had planned to just hold it briefly to try and bleed the Russians at some of their best troops and slow down their advance but then they ended up digging in um both physically and 27:06 psychologically and by the end of the of this the conflict the entire city had been leveled there had been massive losses on both sides and one could argue to what end so you know the risk is that this cursed concurs becomes another one that almost becomes a a psychological tussle rather than a military strategic Gambit we'll just have to wait and see it has cause some questions to be raised among the elite you don't hear things in a public way in Russia because they control the media and they control the public profile in a way that no one in the West can do but when you see that Vladimir Putin is the only Russian leader to have provoked an invasion of Russian territory and lost Russian territory since World War II uh this has got to raise questions in the minds of the elite does he know what he's doing is this going to end well uh so I think that those things are causing him to Double Down stay on the offensive downplay this incursion into ksk see if 28:04 he can wait out the US presidential election and see what the new US president does but I think the doubts have grown in in Russia or in Moscow particularly among the leads as to the wisdom of what they're doing hello and welcome to Frontline for times radio I'm James Hansen and today we're talking about the latest on the war in Ukraine and I'm delighted to be joined by the former US ambassador to Nato Kurt vulker he's also a distinguished fellow at the center for European policy analysis and served as US Special representative for Ukraine Ambassador welcome to front line thanks so much great to be with you wanted to begin by talking about the kers incursion do you think this goes to show that a Ukrainian strategic Victory is possible I wouldn't quite go that far yet but it shows that it is not a a resignation into some kind of deep stalemate that Ukraine eventually loses uh what it is is it's showing the Russian people that there's a war going on bringing it home to them popping a 29:01 hole in Putin's narrative that this is some kind of antiseptic special military operation and exposing the weakness in the Russian forces that they're they're not really able to be on offense and defense defending Russia at the same time and they're actually choosing to be on offense attacking Ukraine not able to maneuver not able to get to defend these areas that that Ukraine has threatened so it does a lot for Ukraine to shake up The Narrative of this war but they still need more support particularly The Long Range Systems uh to go after Russian logistical supplies and bombers and airfields if they're going to really turn a strategic corner here yes it's a good point you raised about the ongoing debates about the supply of of longrange weapons to Ukraine for use inside Russia we'll come on to that in a moment just on the Russian response to the KK incursion have you been surprised by how relatively slow it's been I mean it's more than a month now since Ukraine essentially invaded kco blast and Russia have tried to launch a limited Counterattack but they haven't really been able to push back much so far against the ukrainians has that surprised you uh honestly no no that's 30:06 kind of what I thought we saw coming because Russia is actually quite stretched in its military commitments it's having a difficult time advancing in Ukraine as it is logistically to get around where Ukrainian forces are to go reinforce is very difficult uh so they don't really have the ability to just go and launch a major Counterattack and that's why also the political narrative around this has been played down in Russia before the incursion of course Putin's always out there threatening nuclear weapons and saying we defend the Homeland when it actually comes under threat he plays it down because he doesn't want to expose his own weakness and not being able to do much about it is that do you think the most significant thing to have come out of the kers incursion so far the fact that it once again shows that some of these red lines that Putin has been drawing are essentially a bit of a bluff that Ukraine can physically invade Russian territory and Putin doesn't reach for 31:01 say tactical nuclear weapons that that's exactly the case uh it does un underscore that his threats his language there is mostly about trying to deter the west from helping Ukraine than it actually is about Russia having an intention to follow through of course what we have seen simultaneously in recent months is Russia continuing its advances on the front line in the east of Ukraine particularly around psk how significant do you think that is well I don't think that prros is some you know magic gateway to the rest of Ukraine sometimes that's overemphasized in the media maybe picking up the way Russians talk about it it is far in the East it is still part of the donbas region um and it is not materially different from other things that Russia has done such as taking aifa or taking bakut these are isolated fights Far East in the country not affecting the Strategic picture uh they do it does in a way help Putin advaned his narrative that he's going to take over all of these four provinces that he claims to have annexed and so 32:07 this is a a step in that direction but it is not changing the overall trajectory of the war and in some ways we're in a contest of time uh can Putin hold on long enough to see if things change on the Ukrainian side and can the ukrainians hold on long enough and shake it up enough that Russia is having problems with Manpower and equipment and holding it all together as well I want to come back to the situation with Russian Manpower in a moment it still seems though that we're a long way from the end of the fighting and we have seen Vladimir Putin escalate attacks on civilian infrastructure for instance in Ukraine we saw the the missile attacks on Lviv a couple of weeks ago what more should the West be doing to support Ukraine at the moment well first off let's not call it Russian escalation they've been doing this for almost two years so this is this is more of the same this is this is not some dramatic new escalatory response because of the Cur incursion this is what Russia has been doing uh as far as what the West 33:06 needs to do there are several things but um the key thing here is air defense to protect Ukrainian civilians and civilian infrastructure and help the country build strength and resilience and and develop its economy further and Outlast Russia um in order to do that um we need to give them the long range weapons because that will put pressure on on the Russian forces that are attacking uh the example that people often use is you don't you don't take out the arrow you take out the Archer and that's what Ukraine needs to be able to do with these Glide bombs and these missiles is don't just take them out one by one put at risk the airfields the aircraft the places where Russia now has sanctuary in order to launch these attacks on Ukraine put those places under threat and force A disruption in Russia's ability to attack that's the most important thing we can do additionally for air defense in addition to that there's always the 34:02 supply of the the missiles that go inside the air defense tubes so that um there's enough of them in Ukraine and I would argue also that Poland and Romania as neighboring states are facing an increasing risk from Russian missiles and drones flying around near their territory occasionally Landing there and so they should be extending an air defense Zone Eastward with Ukraine's permission to prevent those kind kind of a threats to Nato and that would also be a boost to Ukraine clearly one of the big debates at the moment is about whether Storm Shadow and Scout missiles should be provided to Ukraine for use inside Russia to hit Russian military targets why do you think the Biden Administration remains somewhat reticent about it it appears there is some movement but understandably You could argue there is some hesitation it's not an illegitimate fear of escalation but as we've been discussing a lot of people think that that Putin's red lines have been shown to be a bluff so why is there still this hesitation do you think well 35:03 it is certainly hesitation and fear of escalation I think they put such a high price on the idea of any nuclear use that they want that to be zero instead of maybe 1% or 2% um they also um they they want to be in a position where you can convince Putin to wind down rather than being forced upward into a confrontation that's the mentality that they have I I do think it's misguided because I think Putin plays on that he recognizes that's the instincts in the west and so he makes these threats in order to get us to back down from doing things that we otherwise might be able to do unfortunately I think the Biden Administration is dug in on this point uh fortunately the UK government is not and what I suspect will happen after the starmer Biden meetings in Washington is there will be no us objection to the UK using uh or allowing the use of the Storm Shadow missiles but the US will not authorize it for our own systems and 36:03 this in some way I I I suppose in the minds of people in the white house it's in some way keeping a line open to Vladimir Putin signaling to him we're not in this war to get you you know we're exercising restraint um hoping that it avoids some kind of further escalation it does feel to a lot of observers though like this is following a familiar pattern that first of all Ukraine wanted anti-tank missiles they were told they couldn't have them then they could then we moved on to things like the f-16s now they have got them now it's around the storm Shadows is there a good geopolitical reasoning behind staggering the provision of such weapons had we provided Ukraine with all of them at the get-go would that have been a proper escalation or is this a mistake on the part of Ukraine's Western allies yeah it's a huge mistake to have doled them out this way if we had done it all upfront with direct advice and assistance as well it would have shown 37:01 Russia early on it's not going to get anywhere and that would have prevented a lot of the war that we've seen over the last two years uh it it would have stabilized it somewhere uh unfortunately by doing it out this way we keep showing to Putin that we are cautious we lack the resolve we're afraid of escalation and he plays on that he uses that just on the point about the f-16s what impact if any do you think they have had on the war so far they haven't had much impact so far to be honest in a military sense um they have forced the Russians to pull back some of their aircraft and from the f-16s you can launch missiles that can fly a bit further toward Russia and that may take some of the pressure off but they haven't been a strategic game Cher now what I want to point out though is that you often hear that kind of language say from the Secretary of Defense the United States oh there's no magic bullet one weapon is not going to be a game Cher that's true but it's the accumulation of capabilities that when 38:06 applied can actually make a difference and if any one weapon is not a game changer You could argue to do zero but of course zero would mean instant defeat so it is providing everything that we're capable of providing and in combination and overtime so that it can convince Putin that he will not be able to win and F-16 is an important psychological component in that because it is the most advanced Western system provided so far it does have a long-term commitment of logistics and maintenance tail behind it and I think this is a signal to Putin that there are limits on what he's going to be able to do and I suppose Ambassador that raises the inevitable question if you follow that pattern of certain weapons being provided by the West over the course of the war whether it's anti-tank missiles whether it's the f-16s whether it's now the storm Shadows are there even more advanced weapon systems armor yes that that we're not providing ing them that you know what is next after the storm Shadows let's say they get provided what else could we should we be providing the ukrainians I 39:03 think there's probably a range of cruise missiles that we have still not provided and I think those would be incredibly useful for Ukraine ultimately we have to adopt a mindset that we want Ukraine to to stop the Russian forces defeat them in Ukraine so that the war ends until we do that Putin is going to continue to throw wave after wave of artillery ammunition Personnel at this front and is going to grind on uh we are not at that stage yet for the fear of escalation as you said but I think we have to get there if we actually want to see an end of the war has there been in your view Ambassador a slight shift in the language from Ukraine's Western allies in recent weeks I was struck that when the British prime minister K dama went to meet Joe Biden at the White House last week a lot of the talk was not so much about we'll be with Ukraine as long as it takes although I'm sure they would say that if asked and the rhetoric was more about we need to find a way to bring this war to an end find a way to help Ukraine win now that opens 40:05 the question as to what winning for Ukraine looks like but have you noticed a shift in rhetoric uh a slight shift yeah and for several reasons and and not necessarily the obvious ones first off the this phrase as long as it takes has become very tired and people don't know what it means as long as what takes what are you trying to do what's your goal and they've come in for a lot of criticis ISM for the repetition of that phrase um it also makes getting funding from the Congress difficult if you keep saying this is an open-ended billions and billions of dollars commitment and we can't tell you what it's for that doesn't help persuade members of Congress to vote for the funds so they have gradually pushed aside that as long as it takes second there's been a lot of criticism that they haven't been willing to say our objective is for Ukraine to win and finally mostly the Secretary of State Anthony blinkin occasionally the president have now come out and said yes okay our objectives for Ukraine to win 41:03 however that seems to be said without much conviction because we still put a lot of limitations on what we provide to Ukraine which would be part of the package if we really wanted them to win uh so that that phrasing is still off and then thirdly we are deep in the midst of our presidential election right now President Biden is not running for reelection anymore he has stepped out so the whole effort of the White House now is to make sure nothing happens that derails Camala Harris's campaign and so it is much more keep it Steady As She Goes no dramatic escalation counter Trump's language about avoiding World War II by saying we want to avoid the war we want to wind down the war Trump says he'd been bring peace in 24 hours No One Believes that so the Biden Administration says our objective is peace too trying to level out this playing field in the Electoral context what do you think think if we talk about this language of Ukraine winning what what do you think Ukraine winning looks 42:03 like in a way that is acceptable both to the Americans and to Keef key thing is that it's acceptable to Keef you know we're we're not protagonists in this it's their country they've got to figure out what they can do but I think the the key elements are Ukraine is a sovereign independent European democracy part of the European Union part of NATO future Generations are not going to have to worry about a war the way that this generation is having to fight one that's the ultimate definition of victory now that doesn't tell you where's the border is it the 91 border is it the 2014 border what happens to Crimea that's all in the mix that's all being played for on the battlefields right now and we should want Ukraine to be positioned uh to maximum Advantage uh which they are not at the moment uh but in the end the victory is really in Ukraine's sovereignty and survival as a European democracy I speaking last week on front line to a former British Diplomat who said that in his opinion the inevitable settlement will be that Ukraine has to 43:04 seed some territory probably Crimea maybe areas of the donbass in exchange for a guarantee around EU and NATO membership as a way of uring its future Sovereign territory do you think that might be feasible well I I'd say that's certainly one of the things that people are talking about it's not at the moment credible or acceptable to Ukraine because missing from that is any sense that Putin won't just attack again and so there have to be NATO membership there have to be guarantees of security and there have to be some kind of limitations on Russia's ability to attack uh or military buildup and presence uh for Ukraine to make that a credible sort of solution people talk about that now when Putin still talks about wiping out all of Ukraine it's not a serious uh it's not a serious negoti ation one thing also that people need to to pay close attention to Crimea has 44:02 always been part of Ukraine in the sense connected to Ukraine uh it was part of Ukraine as an independent state for far longer than it has now been claimed to be annexed by Russia and as a dry Peninsula sticking out into the Black Sea it's not really sustainable unless it is connected to the mainland which is Ukraine uh so just writing off Crimea and saying well that's going to be Russia uh that's not necessarily the way this has to fall uh it is a threat to Ukraine for Russia to be occupying Crimea and able to Target Odessa Nicolia the Ukrainian ports from Crimea and it's very difficult for Russia to sustain a presence in Crimea if it is cut off so I think that is much more in play than people give it credit for well that's a really interesting point and also a lot of military analysts have said that actually crime is perhaps the most vulnerable of the territory that's been captured by Russia so far in part because of the success that Ukraine have had at degrading the Black Sea Fleet the 45:03 cursed Bridge still appears relatively vulnerable so potentially Crimea could be captured by the ukrainians if they were given the appropriate supports yeah it could be captured or or I would say even more likely it could be isolated so that Russia is not able to sustain a military presence there if you cut out Sebastapol largely accomplished already you cut off that Kurt straight Bridge I'd say 50 % accomplished in the sense that they're not using it for Rail and they're not using it for heavy trucks they're trying to use the faeries to go across the as off sea those are being targeted so we've real the ukrainians have really degraded that connection the the other major one is a road and rail line that connects across Southern Ukraine uh from uh the the donbass region across through zapar isia to get to Crimea if with storm Shadows or other Long Range Systems ukrainians able to put that at risk as well it starts to change the picture for Russian forces 46:01 inside Crimea uh you wrote recently Ambassador that what was meant to have been a summer of summit decisions was instead of Summer of disappointments what do you mean by that yeah well there are a lot of missed opportunities and even the ones that we seem to have seized now are falling through our grasp again uh so with NATO for example there was an opportunity to actually send a strong signal to Putin that Ukraine is on its way into NATO invite them to join session talk start talking about Article Five in the NATO Russia Council show him that this train is moving and leaving the station um we didn't do that we we kept the language pretty much as it was uh with the G7 we didn't seize the $300 billion do in in Frozen Russian assets uh we just left them uh Frozen but not able to be seized and used instead there was a compromise about using the interest on those frozen Russian a ET so seizing that and paying that forward to Ukraine that has still not happened over three months from the G7 Summit uh so 47:05 that's a loss at the Ukraine recovery conference which was held in Berlin and it's been an annual event now was the year before it was in London um no real discernable outcomes from that either no creation of a permanent executive and international body focused on Ukraine's economic recovery uh no major investment mechanisms and risk mitigation schemes that could have come out of that so a lot of things that could have been done are still out there on the table yet to be done just thinking about Vladimir Putin's position especially since the kers incursion began how much do you think it has weakened him domestically I I think it has actually caused some questions to be raised among the elite you don't hear things in a public way in Russia because they control the media and they control the public profile in a way that no one in the West can do but when you see that Vladimir Putin is the only Russian leader to have provoked an invasion of Russian territory and lost Russian territory since World War II uh 48:05 this has got to raise questions in the minds of the elite does he know what he's doing is this going to end well uh so I think that those things are causing him to Double Down stay on the offensive downplay this incursion into ksk see if he can wait out the US presidential election and see what a new US president does but I think the doubts have grown in in Russia or in Moscow particularly among Elites as to the wisdom of what they're doing and do you think that explains why we haven't seen a fresh wave of Russian mobilization so far because you would have thought if you were purely thinking about it in military terms Russia needs fresh troops it needs higher quality troops fighting on the front line both in Ukraine and to defend K and yet there are political risks for Putin by doing so absolutely absolutely the last time he tried to do a major mobilization a million people left the country um most of the mobilization that has been done has been raiding people from the regions not the 49:02 russian-speaking territories of Russia uh but other regions around uh Russia to get forces into the military and paying them increasing amounts of money to convince them to go ahead and do so uh his ability to sustain this is also being jeopardized a bit he doesn't want to launch that major mobilization of russian-speaking people and so he's he's is trying to continue to press people in pay them more and more maintain a tempo of 20 to 30,000 entering the Armed Forces per month but that is just about keeping Pace with those losses How concerned are you Ambassador by what appears to be the increasing cooperation between Iran and North Korea and Russia we know that Iran has provided not only Shahed drones but now these 200 ballistic missiles to Russia and there is some speculation that this may be an exchange for help with nuclear technology even How concerned are you by that so we we've been seeing a lot of collaboration between Iran and Russia already and that should already be 50:04 concerning but the look into the future from there is if Russia is able to continue to succeed in Ukraine rebuild its military cooperate more with Iran it actually increases the risk of more Global confrontation uh we hear people you know President Biden Chancellor Schulz worry about avoiding World War I it is more likely that we start drifting in that direction if Russia and Iran are successful and just finally Ambassador looking ahead to 20125 and yes there are huge things that are going to happen between now and then notably the US presidential election but are you optimistic for Ukraine I am I am uh as I said as I Define Victory very much as Ukraine being a sovereign independent European democracy safe secure part of the EU part of NATO I do think that is the most lik ly scenario going forward I don't see much that will disrupt that but I do see a very hard slug for 51:03 Ukraine the people the front lines and harder if the West does not step up with the equipment that's needed there is a a sense in which people are feeling that Putin is not living up to his social contract and in some ways that that you know the old man it's interesting how often he's now referred to as like grandfather and so forth you know just basically no longer has what it takes I wanted to ask you Mark about how Vladimir Putin is dealing with the Cur incursion in terms of the messaging inside Russia I've heard a lot of people say that he's almost trying to play it down and he doesn't want to Big it up too much because it draws attention to the fact the war has literally come to Russian territory is that your reading of things yeah and it's interesting the very fact that he can't even actually name it for what it is a Ukrainian Invasion or incursion or whatever we have all these euphemisms the current situation these circumstances and it's it's fascinating because it's very reminiscent of how we deal with the opposition leader Alexa naly while he was alive he would never 52:01 refer to naly by name it would always be that individual or so forth It's almost like actually the things that he genuinely fears like Voldemort he can't actually bring himself to name them so in that context yes he's he's trying to play it down because I think the reason is that apart from the fact it was just deeply embarrassing to have Russian territory being taken by the ukrainians but also more broadly I think it's calculated in a very bloodly kind of way but actually it makes sense that in fact better from his point of view to maintain the the effort on pushing forward in on the donbass front in eastern Ukraine and except that there's going to be uh Ukrainian territory ukrainians holding parts of Russian territory for the next weeks months whatever but it's not important territory especially not from the point of view of Putin who doesn't really care about his regions um than actually to focus everything on driving them out so I think G that he reckons that this may well be something that'll take some time to address he doesn't want to make too 53:02 big a deal of it because that builds up expectations people will be thinking well when is Russian territory going to be free why are they not free yet and he doesn't want to divert his primary forces his seasoned veterans away from the donbas front to deal with his Cur incidents and to what extent is the curs incursion weakened Putin's position domestically and who will he be most concerned about some of the ultra nationalist Russian military bloggers have been quite critical of Russian tactics and operations in recent weeks and months but then you've also got some oligarch speaking more freely in opposition to the war in Ukraine I think Al der Pasa was on a trip to Japan relatively recently and criticized the war in Ukraine the fact that he feels he can speak out how significant is that yeah I mean to deal with the D of Pasco issue it's often difficult to know because there's there's a degree in which there's a kind of um calibration and calculation in that certain figures they more as given a certain amount of leeway in order to create s is all very much theatricality to create the 54:04 impression that there is a degree of pluralism when there really isn't this is still a personalistic authoritarian autocracy in terms of the impact on Putin though I think that there's a paradox here in that on one the one hand it absolutely has weakened him I me if one thinks back what were the two pillars of his legitimacy historically it's always been first of all prosperity you can tell to ordinary tell ordinary Russians look next year is going to be even better than last year it's a lot harder for most Russians to believe that in the current situation particularly with inflation Rising the economy sort of showing some signs I mean it can last for some time but it's not a comfortable situation for the economy and the other pillar was security that Putin is the man who can keep Russia and Russians safe well that too is now being eroded so you know there is a a sense which people are feeling that Putin is not living up to his social contract and in 55:00 some ways that that you know the old man it's interesting how often he's now referred to as like grandfather and so forth you know just basically no longer has what it takes but at the same time there's also an inevitable rally around the flag effect you know people see a foreign army on Russian soil and there is that sense that this a very sort of strong lomy National patriotism that says now is not the time to be trying to sort of challenge or undermine the regime so I think what we're actually seeing the situation in which in the short term k actually kind of strengthens Putin's position because as I say this is not the time to destabilize the situation but pressures discontents are absolutely building up and interestingly amongst a whole bunch of different segments of the population you know you mentioned the ALR nationalist the So-Cal turbo Patriots they clearly are thinking not just that they have a problem with the war so much as they have a problem with just how incompetent its management has been you've got the the oligarchs who are seeing their their their business Empires under risk and their opportunities of being able to continue to enjoy the fruits of being connected 56:04 to the outside world limited and you have ordinary Russians who may not know exactly what's going on but they're terrified for example about a new mobilization wave and they just feel there is clearly something wrong if part of your territory is under foreign occupation so I think for all of these reasons you know you have tensions that are building up but they're being kept at Bay by the war and in some ways that's what scares me because although I've never believed that Putin went into to Ukraine because he feared some kind of internal protest at home it may well reach a situation in which Putin doesn't feel that he can afford to end of the war because he knows it's that patriotic surch is the only thing that keeps at Bay all the discontent that has built up so it's very long answer I'm afraid sorry to to a simple question but I think it's an interestingly complex question and on the topic of mobilization will he be reluctant to do 57:01 that out of fear of what the public reaction may be yeah absolutely look there's no question about that for a long time his generals have been telling him you really want us to be making ground in Ukraine we need more troops but the first mobilization wave that was carried out in Autumn of 2022 was so disruptive remember for every Soldier they managed to bring to the ranks two to three Russians fled the country and was just very very unpopular well Putin who is after all a very risk averse figure ironically enough clearly didn't want to do it before the presidential elections then while he was contemplating it we had the prian Mutiny sort of um story as well you know for all of these reasons there's a lot of you know each time there there's some kind of a challenge Putin kind of backs away now if he orders a mobilization today he won't have his troops frankly until late Autumn by which point the conditions in Ukraine are not really very propitious for major offensive operations so yes the generals would 58:02 love to see it but so far at least Putin's timidity has fortunately kept that from being started Russia would like nothing more than another Minsk uh stoppage of the War uh that happened in 20 in 2014 and then we know what happened years later in 2022 and that was a a an arrangement to okay let's stop fighting let's talk about what we're going to do about this territory we've seized from you and of course it dragged on and on it also did however allow Ukraine to build an army because it had virtually no Army in 2014 and so you know it's a different situation now but to allow a peac meal peac meal ceasefires I think is the thin edge of the wedge it's distracting and it's something that uh that Russia would like to do now the other thing that of course has changed uh since in the in recent months is the seizure of of ksk and that to me is a bargaining chip in any negotiations but Putin won't countenance that at this point anyway publicly um you've written in recent days on the current equivocation about granting Ukraine 59:04 permission to fire its Western supplied Storm Shadow missiles deep into Russia what effect do you think this very public debate and delay is having on Ukraine's allies and on Russia well I think that uh I don't know if it's going to affect Russia until the bombs start to fly but uh it's a very important debate uh this is really kind of a reason behind the the the tedious stalemate War that's underway now uh the more that they can harm the energy infrastructure and the military infrastructure deep inside Russia the better off they're going to be in terms of Defending themselves and even inching forward to regain some of the propert some of the lands they've lost so it's it's a key it's a key strategy but you know the Americans are very concerned that and and Putin has warned that this this he would regard Ard this as a an attack by NATO and then therefore the war would escalate into a NATO versus 1:00:03 Russia War which is something that nobody really wants on the other hand uh What uh the British prime minister has been arguing and he's done a bit of a crusade he's hopping from Capital to Capital to talk to leaders starmer and he has done a good job of of raising the fact that you know they have been bombing inside Russia they've taken a piece of Russia uh for ages Crimea is under Siege and there's been no no major uh you know push back in terms of a nuke or anything like that so it's not that it's empty threats it's still threat it's still concerning but uh it's it's they haven't done much about it and And The ukrainians Have progressed and it's now thought that any decision regarding the permissions will be delayed until the UN General Assembly in New York next week when President zelinsky will also present his victory plan he says this week it's 90% done we know really very little about what's going to be in it don't we very little very little uh I think 1:01:03 his victory plan starts with another Peace Summit hopefully in India which hasn't agreed to do so uh they had a peace Summit in Switzerland major players didn't show including India and so I think that really he's what he's going to try and do to make this work is to get a gang up of of Nations on Ukraine's side sort of pushing Putin just come on let's let's talk at least and let's let's get some of these things out of the way but Putin is not going to be uh be deterred at this point in my opinion and when um regarding that Summit um when President zelinsky met the German Chancellor Olaf Schultz he he came away saying that they' agreed that they wanted Russia invited to that yes uh I think Russia should be invited to that but Putin says here are my conditions get all your troops out of the four provinces I want to I want to uh you know um seize uh get them out and of course that's that's a no no go for uh for zalinsky and the Ukrainian people at this point just on a subject of a recent 1:02:04 meeting here in London in the UK the head of the CIA and of MI6 gave a rare joint statement um in this the CIA director Bill Burns noted that the curs incursion raised questions across the Russian Elite about where this is all headed how long do you think Putin can keep playing down the occupation of Cur to his supporters uh he remember he controls the disinformation inside his own cocoon so I'm not sure that apart from Word of Mouth uh a lot is getting to the Russian public however the caskets keep arriving and the curse thing has spread throughout the population if only because people in Cur say can I can I have a bedroom I've just been kicked out by the ukrainians of my house so they haven't been able to control the messaging on that but Putin's enormously powerful Putin doesn't go unless he's forced to and he has to be forced to by the Inner Circle and they are there is discontent the oligarchs don't have the power to remove him but but the Inner 1:03:06 Circle the siloviki they call them they can do that um don't see that happening as yet but uh I think that you know the West also has to tighten the news even more uh I think gas exports have to be completely ended whenever possible and the oil exports to India and China are floating the boat and that's got to that's got to be stopped so what are the developments Dian that you'll be looking for from both the Ukrainian and the Russian camps as winter approaches and the fighting on the battlefield inevitably slows I think the war is Aral the ground war is stalemated they go an inch ahead they inch back kuris is probably going to remain in Ukrainian hands unless they can utilize it somehow as a bargaining chip to negotiate for peace uh so it's kind of a standstill but the aerial war is very important and so the bombing of 1:04:01 civilians and infrastructure in Ukraine is something I watch how many bombs are they unleashing you know it it can't go on forever how how good is their air defenses they're getting new Patriots they have the f-16s let's see how that works and then Al alternatively uh how uh how well are the special forces in Ukraine doing in terms of blowing up uh energy facilities storage facilities Port facilities bringing Crimea under Complete Siege destroying the Kirch bridge and all the things they are already doing very successfully um uh there I I published a map in my substack about the number of major oil refinery and oil facilities hits and it has disrupted about a quarter of their entire oil production and so if they can continue to do that but very dangerous work and uh so I think you're going to see that the aerial War the drones and the bombs uh 1:05:03 in Russia and in Ukraine are going to be what to watch for this winter and against that backdrop the people that you are able to keep in contact with in Ukraine how are they what are they telling you they're tired they're not giving up they're resolved but they're tired uh life is just not been normal and they don't see an end to this necessarily in a hard way and they feel you know they're they're absolutely dedicated because they feel and I actually do too that his intention is to erase ukrainians off the map of the Earth I don't think this is about you know anything other than that he is a very odd person and that's what he's doing which is why he he just doesn't care about Breaking All the Rules of war and bombs phys hospitals and schools and it's it's it's hard but but they they they hang in there they're amazing and what are you able to say in 1:06:05 in terms of support or any optimism you can give I cry I cry a lot I'm sorry Diane you okay yeah when go no it's very emotional well I hope the people that you keeping contact are safe and um and you know it's good to hear that they they are resilient as well um so and I know that they appreciate that you speak out um and you speak on front line for us really appreciate you spending time with us um Diane um if you want to read Diane's latest substat just she is a prolific writer she doesn't give up she's as resilient as the people she keeps in contact with in Ukraine her latest piece is on the situation in Lebanon actually and it's called Israel's Titanic and you can find it on her substack now Diane Francis thank you so much thank you Kate you've been 1:07:00 watching Frontline for times radio with me kateo if you'd like to support us you can subscribe now or listen to times radio or go to the times.co.uk my thanks to our producer today Louis hies and to you for watching bye-bye for now

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