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Date: 2025-01-04 Page is: DBtxt003.php txt00027482
THE UKRAINE WAR
WHAT IS REALLY GOING ON?

Times Radio | Frontline: Putin pulls key assets out of Ukraine as Kyiv hits strategic aircraft and ammo dumps


Original article: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPBowiWBiXk
Peter Burgess COMMENTARY

Peter Burgess
Putin pulls key assets out of Ukraine as Kyiv hits strategic aircraft and ammo dumps | Frontline

Times Radio

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Sep 29, 2024

Frontline | The War in Ukraine and Global Security

Long range strikes into Russia and the shoot down of several A-50s have forced Putin to withdraw key assets from Ukraine as Zelensky's trip to the US saw new donations of American glide bombs. This week's Frontline experts have the latest analysis:
  • The Times' Maxim Tucker
  • Sean Bell, Retired Air Vice Marshal
  • Justin Crump, former British Army officer
  • James Heappey, Former Armed Forces Minister
  • Prof. Malcolm Chalmers, Deputy Director General of RUSI
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Transcript
  • 0:00
  • what's key is lifting the the restrictions on the use of these long wange weapons um so Ukraine needs to
  • have us approval to strike Targets in inside Russia um it also of course needs
  • more aircraft in order to to launch these Glide bombs so you know uh the
  • promise that the US will train additional 16 F-16 pilots in the US next year is good but it's not happening fast
  • enough it's not enough and ukrainians are still frustrated they don't have enough Pilots or planes in order to
  • attack the Russian bases from where they're being attacked themselves just want to now draw on
  • those recent reports that you've written earlier this week you did this really interesting Deep dive into the planning
  • and the evolution of Ukraine's tactics that destroyed an A50 spy plane and damaged its Airborne Command Center can
  • you just start by um telling us exactly what these aircraft are and how they've been operating so the A50 is an
  • equivalent to a NATO awax it's a it's basically a huge Airborne radar which can see for hundreds of miles across um

  • 1:03
  • territory and penetrate deep inside Ukraine and the Russians have been using these flying them over the azop sea in
  • order to get a great picture of what's happening in Ukrainian airspace um that allowed them to monitor Ukrainian jet
  • activity but also you know drones and any missiles that would be fired across the border at Russia or at Russian
  • troops inside Ukrainian territory um and this was a huge advantage that the Russians had over the ukrainians the
  • ukrainians did haven't had this kind of of capability um and in fact the ukrainians were able to shoot down two
  • a50s um in kind of surprise ambushes which involved in one case taking a very
  • old Soviet missile system that had been decommissioned 11 years earlier uh kind
  • of re-engineering it rebuilding finding all the components getting people who were familiar with this really Antiquated system putting it back
  • together um and mounting it some 40 kmers from the front line in the in the
  • um knowing the patrol route of one of these a50s across the Azo sea um they

  • 2:04
  • fired it at this A50 they missed it the first time but they inspired the it was
  • a Ukrainian Military Intelligence off um uh it was a Ukrainian Military Intelligence operation and they in
  • inspired the Ukrainian Air Force to then take up their own action and the Ukrainian Air Force drove a patriot
  • missile system with several other vehicles very very close to the front line and ambushed another A50 plane and
  • shot it down at a range of nearly 200 kilometers um and the the ukrainians
  • were then able to take the Antiquated s200 anti-aircraft system and shoot down
  • a second A50 um and after that the Russians simply couldn't put up any more a50s they didn't want to lose them
  • they're very valuable aircraft um and so the ukrainians have effectively denied Russia ra radar view over Ukraine from
  • these Airborne aircraft and at the same time Ukraine is going to be be getting Swedish uh radar aircraft Airborne radar

  • 3:03
  • systems to look into Russian airspace so the situation when they get those aircraft will change quite dramatically
  • and and just how risky an operation was it for the Ukrainian forces involved to take down those a50s so it's incredibly
  • risky for the the Patriot battery that had to drive very very close to the front line we're talking five or six kilometers within artillery range of the
  • Russians it had to be very covert very secretive Mission had to be done quickly dve in Ambush the plane and drive back
  • out and they've been trained by the Germans actually Who provided this Patriot battery on trucks um in this
  • kind of operation uh on the other hand the s200 is a completely static um air
  • defense system and that had to be built over a number of days and and then deconstructed over a number of days so
  • again they had to take very good care to camouflage that um and then Evacuate the area in case there was retaliation and
  • then start dismantling it later at night over over a period of few days and up to 13 kilometers of cables on that system

  • 4:04
  • it seems incredibly um audacious but also ingenious and you're talking to the people involved in in coming up with
  • this this plan I mean how did they view it what did they tell you with presumably incredibly proud and and and
  • but but very tricky operation to actually carry out yeah I mean they're obviously proud of what they've done and
  • you know the significance of it is huge in in destroying two aircraft which are worth $330 million each to build um and
  • Russia is really struggling to to replace them um I think the the idea is
  • always these ideas are born out of necessity if you have to do something you find a way to do it um and the
  • ukrainians have demonstrated great Ingenuity throughout the course of this conflict to solving problems that are
  • causing them great difficulties how much of a dent has it actually been then to Russia's ability to control the skies well I was talking
  • to uh a marshall Greg Bagwell the other day who was telling me that this was a massive massive blow to Russia not only

  • 5:01
  • in terms of the war with Ukraine but also its ability to confront NATO these are quite old aircraft they're very
  • difficult to build they have a lot of um Specialists crew that are needed and you know in both instances they lost the
  • crew of these aircraft there Decades of experience on that plane that could be used to train others um and they only
  • have a handful of them I think there're supposed to be less than nine of these functioning a50s um and he said that a
  • lot of those would probably have already been cannibalized for spare parts and the the fact that Russia hasn't been
  • able to put any more a50s up into the air May demonstrate that the others are not flight
  • worthy one of the factors behind the success was the element of surprise wasn't it those o crew never imagined
  • they were within range can you explain another tactic the ukrainians have been using the so-called sambos what is it
  • and how has it been used so this is the idea that you take a anti-aircraft
  • defense system which you would primarily expect to be used to defend uh an area

  • 6:02
  • against uh aircraft or missiles and use it in offensive capacity instead of a
  • defensive capacity and that involves kind of driving it or placing it uh
  • towards where the the object that you're trying to attack is and attacking it from very long range um and only a few
  • of the Ukrainian systems have the capability to do this the s200 has a very long range it has a very it can
  • shoot down aircraft at high altitude but it's not very maneuverable so you need you can only hit something big like an
  • A50 or strategic bomber they also shot down using the s200 A 222 M3 nuclear
  • capable strategic bomber which again affects the the confrontation with NATO and Russia's ability to deliver nuclear
  • weapons if it needs to um and the Patriot system has a shorter range and that really had to go a lot closer to
  • the to the front lines but it's about using these objects which are usually used in air defense and an offensive Capa capacity and the ukrainians have
  • also done this in Brians in May of last year they shot down a number of planes um over Brans region of Russia and

  • 7:04
  • they've uh done it over kinky as well and that's helped a lot with some of the the Glide bomb attacks on Ukrainian
  • positions but obviously the numbers of Glide bombs are so vast that and they still don't have enough Patriot systems
  • and enough air defense systems to move around and that's why zalinsky is in Washington at the moment saying we need more of these systems but yeah and
  • another example though of ingenious ways of of coming up with things out of necessity
  • right and it's something that the Americans were really surprised because they don't use their Patriot systems in that way they use them as a kind of Aira
  • defense tool and they defend strategic objects but the Germans do use had well at least envisaged using these in that
  • way their their Patriots are mounted on trucks and they much more mobile so and an American air defense Commander was
  • saying this is something we hadn't witnessed in in kind of 22 years of my career as air defense Commander um but
  • the Germans were drilling the ukrainians to kind of wake up in the early hours of the night March some where Drive their

  • 8:00
  • vehicle somewhere to go about fight an air defense battle and then return so this kind of Mo fight shoot and Scoot as
  • it's is known is being applied across the Ukrainian forces but very innovatively in air defense systems can
  • can I just ask you a bit about the piece you're currently working on um as I understand it's about prisoner exchanges
  • what did you set out to do so I was very interested in how sporadic these prisoner exchanges are
  • and what motivates them and how they come about um why it happens sometimes and why it's not consistent what what
  • the Russians are asking for when they have these prisoner exchanges and there was a very long Hiatus in prisoner
  • exchanges before Ukraine invaded the K region of Russia so I was looking at why
  • that had been and then suddenly there were Mass prisoner exchanges after that so ukrainians had captured a lot of
  • conscripts um during the KK operation and they were young people from um you
  • know places that could be St Petersburg or Moscow who would were told that they would never be in a Frontline

  • 9:04
  • battle uh and the the families of those were quite outraged um that they had
  • been captured when they shouldn't be anywhere near the front line and that had put some pre some pressure on Putin
  • and suddenly he was willing to negotiate this but the ukrainians said that the reason these negotiations had slowed
  • down before was that all of the kind of Russian contract soldiers and and kind of prisoners and people that had been
  • captured before um the Russians weren't really interested in retrieving them and they were only interested in extracting
  • as much as they could as many concessions as they could from the ukrainians in order to get the Ukrainian presis back the ukrainians are very keen
  • on bringing back their people um and the one person that I spoke to who party to this negotiation said it was something
  • like an 18th century slave market it wasn't a humanitarian Mission it wasn't a humanitarian exercise the Russians
  • just wanted to get as many of their people out um in return for as few ukrainians being released as possible
  • and every time ukrainians would go to the negotia or the Russians would come back with some ridiculous demand that

  • 10:03
  • was unable that they were unable to meet did you learn much about the process yeah so it's quite uh an
  • interesting process so the Russians don't have a coordination Center in the same way the ukrainians have it's not
  • very organized um ukrainians have to reach out to different people they were talking about how kadirov is very
  • interested in getting his chin back so if you capture cin that's great because you almost certainly will get a prison
  • of War back in in exchange for a cin but the the the Russian government is not really interested in it and the
  • ukrainians have informal roots with people that you know the denet People's Republic and the luhansk People's
  • Republic so-called republics that Russia set up in 2014 um the ukrainians have links to
  • some of those and they're able to negotiate with them on those basis and uh there's one particular
  • story that you you you featured can you tell me a bit more about the the woman the uh veteran is she's a serving
  • Soldier is that right she's a former Soldier a former combat medic who was fighting in Mar opal um and she was

  • 11:06
  • captured during the defense of AZ of style along with her husband who was in a separate um fighting unit uh and they
  • were held in Russia for a period of time after the fall of a of star she was then
  • released as part of a prisoner exchange but her husband was not he he stayed in Russia um and she has desperately been
  • trying to get her husband back after this and and facing blockage and it's very difficult for the families even on
  • the Ukrainian side because the process is quite opaque and the Ukrainian coordination Center says look it's
  • actually unhelpful for us to name who we want because if we say who we want to the Russians they try and extract a
  • higher price from us so we're kind of dealing with we give them the list but then see what happens um the danger is
  • when you've done something and it hasn't really achieved what you expected to achieve you then look for other
  • reference points to try and claim success I have to say as a purely military guy you generally operate

  • 12:00
  • you've never got enough resources to do everything you want to do so you have this lovely term of main effort where
  • where do you focus your priorities and and it's very dangerous to have more than one main effort and um what appears
  • to have happened is that seninsky is judged that by having you know invading an incursion into K that that would only
  • embarrass Putin force him to do something about it and potentially undermine him uh his position back in
  • Russia um now there's a couple of things to unwrap in there one of which is um you know Putin is sustained by a
  • democracy of sorts not really it's the oligarchs that keep him up there and and
  • Putin also controls the The Narrative out to the country and if that narrative is we're winning there's nothing to
  • worry about all of a sudden a whole area of the country has been invaded 120,000 people have had to be evacuated they all
  • talk and and of course it is another in the dam but do most experts believe that's going to be enough to
  • topple Putin almost certainly not uh and the worry is of course that from a military perspective you put potentially

  • 13:03
  • 10,000 of your Fighters Ukrainian Fighters into an area of Russia that
  • really doesn't count and Russia can fix those Fighters there whilst it worries
  • about fighting in the in the dbass and if you look at it purely in a sort of
  • graphic objective perspective Russia has accelerated its uh progress in the dbass
  • since the time of the K Invasion now again you can't directly link those two
  • because as a military guy I would argue that um Russia is pushing hard in the
  • dbass to try to achieve its objectives before the end of this fighting season
  • because frankly Russia is losing so many soldiers at the moment that it's faster than it can actually recruit them
  • therefore it's not a sustainable model but if and there a big if but if Putin can complete that task before uh the
  • winter settles in that times with about the of the US elections it's possible

  • 14:01
  • there will change of administration possible that President Trump might try to do a deal with President Putin and
  • therefore he'd want to be at that situation that t in a most powerful situation that he could be so
  • overall I think it's too early to say but it doesn't appear to have achieved the objectives that President zalinsky
  • probably would have wanted from that incursion if we do get confirmation that
  • the West will allow Ukraine to use Storm Shadow missiles to hit targets inside
  • Russia how big a difference will that make sure and I'm conscious of the fact that for months we were talking about
  • the f-16s potentially being a game changer and in and of themselves yes they will make a difference some might
  • say they're making a limited difference already but they're not going to transform the war there's no one game-changing weapon but how significant
  • would you say this the storm Shadows are I think less significant than possibly we in the media are sort of painting
  • them out to be I think if we go back to the f-16s I think they could have been a

  • 15:03
  • game Cher but for the fact that Ukraine has so few Pilots that are trained to operate them um you know if rumors are
  • to believe there's less than you know single figures of Pilots so it doesn't matter the fact that they've been promised 85 f-16s if you've only got you
  • know a dozen or so Pilots then there's very limited effect you can actually achieve I think the weapons front though
  • is interesting because I have no doubt at all that we the supply of weapons let's take Storm Shadow because that's
  • one of the weapons we talked about um in big handfuls I think the UK bought about
  • a thousand of those 30 years ago uh cost about 2 million each I think in the
  • intervening period we've used less than 200 of them in actual conflict uh it got to the stage where they were time
  • expired and we therefore needed to upgrade them we've decided to upgrade not all of those that remaining I
  • understand it's only a few hundred to be upgraded and that left us with several hundred of these
  • that we either disposed of that would have cost us money or we store them that would have cost us money so one of the

  • 16:06
  • options when the war happened was yes we can give these weapons to Ukraine it saves US money but also because it's
  • 30-y old technology we're not that worried if that falls into the Russian Russians hands my point being though
  • it's a very limited supply of those weapons and my understanding is that um Ukraine's had most of them already so um
  • the fact that if they gave them the permission to use them even further inside Russia um you know Ukraine would
  • still be faced with this very limited Supply I think the story that's happening behind the scenes excuse me
  • much more much more important is that either you make or buy and if you can't
  • buy something you have to make it and one of the things that's interesting at the moment is Ukraine seems to have
  • developed its own Skunk Works um its own way of rapidly developing weapons it's developed its own ballistic missile and
  • it's developed its own U long range uh drone now uh you can't just suddenly

  • 17:05
  • magic that from nowhere I wouldn't be at all surprised if the West is providing technology and components but now
  • they're a lot easier to provide in bulk as long as president seninsky his team can put them together if you're in the
  • west you'd have to do a whole load of safety cases you'd have to make sure that you did loads of test flying to
  • make sure they were robust and credible that can take years if you're in Ukraine you don't do any of that you bolt them
  • together and fly them on a mission so I think the and we've seen over the last few weeks a much increased tempo of very
  • effective strikes by Ukraine deep inside Russia beyond the range of um Storm
  • Shadow and attack's missiles and I suspect the conversation behind closed doors is that this is not about giving
  • Ukraine a military effect the danger is that the overwhelming issue is political
  • that actually by giving sininsky permission that political intent

  • 18:03
  • inflames Russia and therefore why would you do that if there is another way of giving Ukraine the capability they need
  • which is the technology and the components then maybe they can build them for themselves and potentially do
  • it a lot quicker a lot cheaper and a lot more effectively president zelinski is in New York for the UN General Assembly
  • we're expecting him to address the UN General Assembly on on Wednesday this week and of course they'll have lots of
  • meetings significantly with President Biden and other world leaders where do you think we are in terms of Western
  • support for Ukraine at the moment yeah I mean we how long we got and where's the bottle of wine to answer that question
  • um I mean frankly if you look at the war from a grand strategic perspective it's not really been going Ukraine's way this
  • year um if you look at it as fighting Seasons I know it's flippant but when it gets into the late Autumn early winter
  • it's freezing cold it's very much more difficult to conduct maneuver Warfare um

  • 19:02
  • at the start of this year you know Ukraine was waiting for 60 billion dollars of Aid it didn't come that left
  • them shorter weapons Russia capitalized um jumped on the front foot and it's been the tail of the of the war this
  • year um with Russia pushing hardrada forward we can talk about that um certainly in more detail but the um
  • Ukraine pushed into KK but um potentially as a distraction has that really work probably not um and still
  • you know the Russians are pushing forward now um Ukraine knows full well that it relies heavily on the west for
  • financial and um Military Support um if you remember back was it last year the
  • spring offensive the West effectively opened the cupboards saying we can virtually give you whatever you want if
  • you can you know break through it didn't happen the West has continued to supply
  • weapons um but you know it hasn't it it's almost certainly helped the ukrainians but it hasn't stopped Russia

  • 20:02
  • grinding away in this war of attrition and the worry here I think in big picture is that um the the stop bars of
  • Western weapons upon which you know Ukraine has relied are are virtually
  • empty and therefore you rely now on a factory spinning up generating new
  • weapons um and that's not as easy as it sounds to do yes you can generate bullets and artillery shells you know
  • dum weapons relatively quickly um but frankly the more weapons like that you provide the ukrainians the more you drag
  • them into a war of attrition which is just the war they don't want to fight um and I think one of the really important
  • things about zelinsky's visit is that he's apparently going to be um briefing
  • us leaders on his victory plan uh we don't obviously we don't know much about it but we understand that there are
  • three components to it one of which is you know the supply of weapons the ongoing the future Supply how do you

  • 21:00
  • stop this being feast and famine how do you provide a degree of continuity there's also about how the West provides
  • more coherent diplomatic pressure um bring it to bear on Russia and finally
  • how you hold Russia accountable longterm for this illegal Invasion um but again
  • behind closed doors who knows what's actually being talked about but I'd be very surprised also if they're not also
  • talking about the use of longrange weapons which President zilinsky has been regularly appealing to the west to
  • try to take the restrictions off and allow him to use the weapons as he sees fit providing they're used in in
  • accordance with the law of armed conflict the Russians actually have been very significant in this ability to make us afraid to do what's required to win
  • by making all these threats they have almost never followed through on now that doesn't mean there wouldn't be an escalation subversion sabotage other
  • acts that we've seen escalating within Europe but all of those things are being done by Russia to try and not have a
  • direct conflict with NATO they argued they're in conflict with NATO they put out propaganda almost nightly they're in

  • 22:04
  • conflict with NATO they run simulations on their evening TV programs of what a nuclear strike on London would look like
  • and they've been doing that for two years um but the reality is they don't want a war with NATO because they would
  • lose they're barely winning a war against Ukraine on its own with fairly iffy support from the West uh in many
  • ways it's certainly shy of a massive commitment to win so they don't want it they want to threaten it because it
  • scares us and we don't have help Ukraine and that's how they win this war it's as simple as that um to do things that
  • would actually start a war with NATO it's a very risky thing now they'd love to break NATO up they'd love to fracture
  • the alliance so it loses cohesion America pulls out of Europe the US is no longer supporting backbone of our um of
  • our defense they'd love to see that they'd love to see the baltics get harassed to the point that there was
  • something that should trigger Article 5 that doesn't and NATO becomes irrelevant when Article 5 uh is potentially
  • triggered and it is vetoed and there is no Collective defense these are Russian victories in the long term but they

  • 23:03
  • don't achieve that by doing something that's so clear say a strike on Poland that the poll say that's it you know
  • you're GNA face something back for this um because again Russia comes out of this badly they they need us to be
  • frightened they've succeeded in that to the point we're having this debate just on the Storm Shadows if these are
  • British weapons and the same for the French supplied Scout weapons why do we need the approval of the US government
  • for them to be used by Ukraine if we've given them to Ukraine there's a few angles to it there's lot things talked
  • about whe they use us systems or you know uh if you speak to other people well you know call some of the data might come from the US or you speak to
  • someone else and say well they can only get them to the Target if they use other us systems alongside it and I think that's all a bit of a bluff I mean I
  • think the real um Point here around that is the fact that um we're trying to move
  • forward as an alliance and if the US doesn't like things it risks fracturing that Unity of moving forward um and of
  • course no Nation trly wants to be the one that absolutely breaks ranks and wads into this and then finds everyone

  • 24:03
  • else didn't follow them and now they're in a war with Russia and everyone else says you brought that on yourself so I think there is this real desire to move
  • forward as an alliance with clear commitment from everyone so again if the UK was to just cross the lines I mean
  • because on the same point you can say well maybe the polls should send 50,000 soldiers armored vehicles in their Air Force to defend Ukraine and if they just
  • did that on their own without consulting everyone else I'm pretty sure the Russians would say Okay Poland you're in the fight and I'm not that the UK and
  • France would say well we we're behind them all the way after they took that unilateral action um you know I think
  • that's now a Poland Russia conflict and again that's how Russia wins because they get to pick off Nations one by one within NATO um so that temptation to act
  • unilaterally is is really really dangerous because it would allow um Nations to actually get to get
  • broken away from the alliance and eaten one by one u in the worst case you under giving a very extreme scenario I've got
  • no suggestion that Poland's going to go piling into Ukraine but once upon a time in the world that's something that could have happened with NATO no we need to

  • 25:00
  • move together we need to maintain Collective defense and deterence and so the US is really important for this now
  • that said the UK has been the nation that has bushed boundaries the most supplying main battle tanks um doing
  • training for Pilots before anyone else even if we didn't Supply airframes you know we we've always pushed the boundaries and pushed at Russia's red
  • lines and there's a reason that the UK is singled out by Russia and Russian propaganda just so often and you know
  • this this almost constant contemptuous statement they could just wipe us off the map with their nuclear weapons if they felt like it but we're the
  • aggressors you in that in that narrative um you know it sort of shows actually how annoyed they were and particularly
  • Boris Johnson who sort of if you go to ke um there are paintings of Boris local artists have done because they're so
  • grateful for the support he gave right at the start of the conflict that that Drew the lines and that the UK said actually we will back you you know we
  • feel we should and we must um that set the tone for others and so we are the people pushing for this um because we
  • always have been pushing to do more for Ukraine the US are the people that are The Gatekeepers frankly because they're

  • 26:02
  • 50% the military support and the Heart of the NATO military Alliance and again on the point about American approval for
  • the use of of storm Shadows there might be some who go well look Ukraine have got them already as you mentioned they've been using them in crier why not
  • just use them on Military targets inside Russia and and what are the Western
  • allies going to do I mean as far as we're aware there was no prior approval of the kers incursion had they said we're thinking of physically invading
  • Russia they probably would have been told absolutely do not do that so is that something zinsky will have
  • privately considered I'm sure they thought about it it's like we got these things we could use them um but of course what guarantees were given when
  • we we offered them you know and the deal was very much you can have these and the support and the knowhow and the engineering Sport and everything else to
  • use them but on the basis didn't cross this particular this particular line um and of course a nation that's under
  • desperate threat might say well forget that we just need to do this but the ukrainians know if they did that that would be the end of any further support
  • for them potentially intern naal pressure to say right stop this conflict um so I'm sure they thought about it um

  • 27:02
  • I mean I'd sure be thinking about it and saying well we could just do it anyway but that would be the only chance we get to use them because after that you might
  • find that a lot of things stop happening for us so um and Ukraine has occasionally you know done things that I
  • think um in private aroused a certain degree of annoyance from its backers um
  • and I think conversations are had afterwards sometimes about things and I think of course ukrainians go we we're the ones in the battle for survival
  • you're not um you know sorry we uh we're seeking forgiveness not asking permission but I think on this one it's
  • such heavily loaded and it's such a red line it's not worth them doing it overall um and of course Ukraine is
  • adapting and finding other ways to strike at these targets they're developing their own missiles and knowhow um they were doing that before
  • the conflict they've obviously accelerated that um and they are developing longer range weapons of their own and if nothing else being able to be
  • allowed to use Western weapons within the operational theater if you like not within the internationally recognized found of Russia well then whatever they
  • can make which is probably going to be quite a low rate of production at least they can then use that outside the borders so hey you know what we'll keep

  • 28:05
  • using attacks and Storm Shadow inside our borders and we use our low rate production indigenous weapon systems for
  • things further a field which is what they are doing but imagine the effect of course if out of a clear blue sky or morning they could use the whole lot you
  • know against Russian military targets Logistics hubs training grounds Railway networks um all the things are
  • supporting the effort on the front lines um and they could hit them at the same time that that would be closer to a
  • knockout blow that would help the front lines dribbling attacks creates problems for the Russians but it isn't a knockout
  • blow and Russia's got that problem against Ukraine itself even with their access to weapons that they can't
  • deliver knockout blows on Ukrainian infrastructure they just can't Mass the amount of weapons and systems needed to
  • do that um and Ukraine faces the same problem of course but Ukraine has nowhere to hide Russian troops at the
  • moment can basically cross the border into Russia and don't have to fear a storm shadow um they might have to fear

  • 29:00
  • a an improvised drone and they should be at the moment because those are getting a thousand plus miles into Russia and
  • hitting you very high value targets but in general you're safe in Russia in a way that you're not safe in crime and
  • you're not safe in the dbass Ukraine has really shown what it can do on deep strikes using drones in Russia with
  • these recent attacks it's carried out on a large Armament Depot in torpet and then a huge Depo in Tor esque I'm not
  • quite sure if I've said that right but apologies if I haven't to our audience is Ukraine reaching the point where it
  • can it can seriously slow Russia's ability to wage war by Method methodically targeting Russian Logistics
  • at source 100% And by the way I think that's been the case from the very
  • beginning it's just been giving them the means to do so I me they are they are Steely Warriors and they're crafty in
  • the way that they design their missions and they're pretty audacious too um so
  • the the ability to strike into the Russian depth disrupt their Logistics

  • 30:01
  • disrupt their command and control is definitely the way that a David fights a
  • Goliath that that is that is definitely the sort of in the western NATO
  • Parliament we call it the maneuver approach you don't pitch strength against strength you seek to you seek to
  • push strength against what you perceive to be your adversary is weakness and invariably the sort of depth is weaker
  • than the you know their depth positions where they Logistics and their Comm and control are are invariably uh easier
  • targets softer targets than the sort of armored formations that are that are close in so I think we should be
  • doubling down on our support uh for Ukraine with that sort of capability
  • just take the legs from out of from from under the Russian uh offensive and then
  • you know grind them to a standstill and then a tripment with glide bombs yeah
  • and the advantage to all of this is that it actually takes stuff doesn't even get to the battlefield in the first place

  • 31:03
  • exactly that and and and that has two effects um you know there are three
  • parts of combat power the conceptual how do you fight the physical what do you fight with and the mental do you have
  • the will to fight and actually when you are attacking Logistics chains you're attacking two of those three um part
  • components of fighting Power physical obviously you're removing ammunition you're removing supplies you're removing
  • replacement vehicles and and and titing platforms but on the moral component side if an Army on the front line starts
  • to doubt that it's going to get more ammunition more food more water that it's going to lose all of the support
  • that it needs to keep going it will very quickly lose the will to keep pushing forwards because it'll be worried that
  • it becomes ever more isolated unsustainable and will'll end up meeting a Grizzly end so getting after the
  • logistics train is a very very very potent way of halting an army um and you

  • 32:01
  • know I think the ukrainians should double down on doing exactly that and you mentioned just briefly the um Glide
  • bombs what are you s suggesting Ukraine should have or should be able to do well
  • I I think the announcement the us are going to furnish Ukraine with glide bombs is a very big deal um you know it
  • is the Russian use of Glide bombs has proven to be devastating um real mass of
  • Munitions that you can just drop on front lines that can't be interdicted by
  • electronic warfare or anything else just gravity doing what it does um and it's
  • been incredibly effective so giving the ukrainians um the American equivalence
  • with the system that Russians have been using um sends a really big message to to Russia that what they've that that
  • they'll reap what they seow um but also uh you know says to the ukrainians that here's another commitment that the US is
  • is making to the Ukrainian cause it's not it's not the absolute top of

  • 33:03
  • zelinsky's list that was the ability to use attacks onto Russian soil but
  • nonetheless as a consolation prize walking away with a new supply of Glide bombs is it Joint Strike weapon they
  • call it um that's a that's a really big win for Ukraine and we have a lot of have a big psychological effect on the
  • Russian front lines when these Glide bombs and I think I read earlier today some of the immediate reporting of the
  • announcement that they're likely to be Glide bombs carrying cluster Munitions well cluster Munitions are the absolute
  • devil for enemy entrenches on the front line because they just you they obliterate a really wide area as they
  • are deployed and the psychological impact of that when you're hunkered down in your trench already hiding from some
  • pretty miserable weather and then all of a sudden you start just be having all these bomblets raining down on you awful
  • awful awful experience and may well break the Russian will who knows do we know how many and when no I've not seen

  • 34:00
  • anything uh on that I just a headline announcement that they are part of the new package it's really really
  • interesting development isn't it and and something that's been the bane of of the Ukrainian forces life so interesting to
  • see the tables turned and the effect that's actually going to have in the coming months if it is in the coming months um just wanted if I may uh to
  • draw your attention or your get your thoughts on some comments made by the French President Emanuel maon in his
  • international meeting for peace in Paris and he called on on a new international order and a rethink on relations with
  • Russia in the future and the organization of Europe acknowledging that the current world order created
  • after World War II was incomplete a new model needed to take into account equal representation for All European
  • Nationals and larger peace building tactics why do you think he's saying this and do you think he has a
  • point well [Music] um you're looking for the Diplomatic
  • answer aren't you it's not language that I would seek to use at this point because I think it can

  • 35:03
  • sound awfully consiliary to uh to to Russia uh and I
  • I've never subscribed you there was a time at the very beginning of the war where the media uh handling advice for
  • me as a UK Minister as regular spokesman for the UK government was to really uh
  • you know and relentlessly say Putin never Russia uh in my sort of CR condemnation of what was going on and
  • and the big idea was we needed to vilify Putin alienate him from The Wider
  • Russian Elite but not alienate Russia from the European community that we hope
  • one day to reconcile it too I think Putin I I think macron is you know
  • communicating today in very in a very similar vein and it's definitely the case that you know whether whether
  • Russia you hopefully Russia will be completely vanquished in
  • Ukraine and when a vanquished Russia licking its

  • 36:04
  • wounds probably going through some very traumatic political moment as well looks
  • westwards I think it probably does matter to to sort of validate macron's point that Russia feels like there is a
  • route back to being a part of the European there's no doubt that the Russian Elite in Moscow and particularly
  • St Petersburg see themselves as Europeans not Asians
  • with you know with China as their as their obvious um partner but I think
  • that macron is choosing when zalinski is in New York talking about Victory and
  • trying to uh embolden both sides of the US political system to stick with them
  • for another year another two years another three years maybe having that sort of talk about a sort of
  • reconciliation with Russia feel a bit premature and counterproductive at this particular moment what what do you think

  • 37:02
  • that Western countries should be doing though now to prepare for a post Putin Russia to avoid the kind of mistakes of
  • the 1990s when the Soviet Union collapsed well I dispute whether or not the way
  • that the West engaged with Russia uh in the 19s early 2000s was was
  • particularly um wrong-headed you know I think that you know the return of
  • someone like Putin you know it just played to a sense of Russian nationalism and Russian
  • Russian identity as a superpower um and you in the in the immediate afterall the
  • M of the fall of Soviet Union Russia was going through some pretty significant internal domestic things and I think and
  • the West has to be really careful because if the West is too visibly seeking to take over and be part of a
  • you know a transition in Russia after the war in Ukraine appears to be meddling in Russian politics I think the

  • 38:02
  • reaction of the Russian people will be incredibly negative so if I were the West I would focus on defeating uh the
  • Russian army in Ukraine restoring as much territory as possible if not even
  • all of that territory then worry about what you do in Russia thereafter I think if you try
  • and run with hound and air you know zero compromise on the battlefield in Ukraine whilst hinting compromise Around The
  • Wider long-term strategic relationship I just think you kind of it just confused
  • yeah exactly exactly and as for ending the war in Ukraine um there are some hard choices ahead aren't there there
  • was once the zalinsky Mantra of victory at any cost is he now facing the
  • prospect of Peace on the best terms possible and if so what would that look like look so I no longer have any
  • privileged information so um this is simply my reflection on the move music
  • of his trip to the UN General Assembly and then onwards to Washington it feels

  • 39:03
  • to me as if they are starting to see an offramp that might not be full
  • territorial restitution but my view is that the position of the UK government and the
  • wider donor Community should be that that is our aim until it is explicit
  • from the Ukrainian government that that is no longer what they're seeking to achieve that I think the moment that you
  • even half indulge that Putin gets to bank any of his territorial game the game is the
  • game is up me you might as well effectively just draw stumps immediately um so until zalinski wants to stand up
  • and say that I think we all have to keep giving them everything they need to achieve an absolute Victory here today
  • at the labor conference uh we've heard speeches from uh David Lamy foreign Secretary of the UK John Healey defense
  • secretary um they've both reiterated that that dedication and support to Ukraine I think it's a the 3 billion

  • 40:01
  • they they've now promised uh in addition um and they've stuck to the line for to
  • support Ukraine for as long as it takes that line has been attacked criticized
  • by some for being in a way too vague but is that more careful verbal approach
  • needed when things like deep strikes into Russia are being discussed behind the
  • scenes you know there's a danger in uh in defense which when you're fighting a war uh of of being too public of what
  • you're doing I mean it's each side we're reacting to what the Russians are saying
  • and doing and and and they're doing the same we need to keep the element of surprise we need to keep adaptability
  • deterrents relies in clear signals but it also relies in a degree of ambiguity
  • so as long as it takes of course is ambiguous what what does that mean what is it um and president zinsky of course
  • is playing an ambiguous game as well he's ask asking for everything he can get he's he he appeals to our public

  • 41:02
  • opinion and when we're divided he sees that and and tries to achieve things in his own country's interests our
  • interests are not exactly the same as those of Ukraine uh Ukraine would like us to be fighting on the front line with
  • him British troops and American troops but our governments have I think quite rightly assess so far that that's a risk
  • we're not prepared to take uh but we're prepared to do just about everything else which I think is is also right so
  • there's going to be a lot of uncertainty and of course that's this has all been taking place in a context where uh any
  • discussion of negotiation has been for the birds and I think it still is but there may be a moment next year I would
  • argue uh maybe then spring next year where uh there will be more momentum
  • towards that and we need to be prepared to uh to put Ukraine in the best
  • possible position for those negotiations so they can maintain their independence and so if there is to be any sort of

  • 42:01
  • armistice or or windown of the of the conflict that it doesn't just give
  • breathing space for Russia it also gives breathing space for Ukraine and um just to to finish off uh
  • is there anything further that you're going to be listening out for here at conference um from K starma perhaps in
  • the speech tomorrow that could change things on the ground at all in Ukraine you know I think that uh um when people
  • are in the Kremlin are calculating the staying power of the NATO alliance they
  • have looked at the experience of recent conflicts in which we've been all in but then we've pulled out which is what
  • happened in Afghanistan they they do look at the
  • election results in several European countries including Germany and
  • France uh and indeed the Netherlands and see parties gaining votes uh which are
  • more sympathetic to Russia and want to pull back Aid to to Ukraine but they

  • 43:03
  • also see a British government and indeed a British political consensus it's not a labor issue actually uh all our big
  • political parties labor conservative libd are all full Square behind this effort so uh the UK is going to be a
  • critical part of persuading Putin that Europe is not for changing of course the
  • countries of Northern Europe the scand avians Norwegians Sweden fins and indeed the East Europeans have always been very
  • strong on the Ukraine question because of geography but the fact that the UK is with them I think is making a real
  • difference there is an alternative Universe we've in the past in which the
  • UK has focused its defense efforts globally it's to some extent allowed Europeans to balance off each other
  • offshore balancing it's sometimes called uh but that's not the approach the UK's Tak we are in it we're committed to

  • 44:00
  • European security and that's I think a very important signal which uh I hope we
  • continue to descend um in a joint statement uh with MI6 earlier this month
  • CIA director William Burns uh said that the K incursion was causing doubts in
  • Putin's regime and within the Kremlin are there any further signs that you know the Deep strikes uh the discussions
  • that have been going on last week with America um could could could cause further instability within the
  • Kremlin I'm doubtful that this will K cause that degree of instability it's
  • very hard to tell um the Broan Rebellion went on for months and and did seem to
  • be quite a significant threat and it was very striking how many key Russian leaders didn't fall in behind Putin
  • immediately when when that march to Moscow abort of mar to march to Moscow
  • started uh but I think uh I would put more emphasis on the fact that in the

  • 45:01
  • end this has turned into a war of attrition the biggest problem both sides
  • have in very different ways is how long can they sustain the war both sides are
  • finding it hard to resupply their forces there certainly reports that by Autumn
  • of 2025 a lot of key assets Russia will have very few armored vehicles left for
  • example current rates of attrition and that's also true actually of our artillary shells and of course Ukraine
  • we know their problems increasingly Reliant and rather unreliable Western supplies uh so that that's I think so
  • there is a question of who breaks first and the Ukrainian side is a real shortage of personnel uh they've lost
  • proportionately and the large number of military age males and that's that's hurting and ukrainians are leaving even
  • though men are not supposed to leave but they are leaving so uh both both sides I think are hoping that in that war of

  • 46:01
  • attrition the other side will cave and that might well be the case you could
  • see a this long period of of a static front line suddenly dissolving as one side can't any longer hold the front and
  • then things could change rather quickly now that your Calculus of that long
  • range battle should be seen in that context maybe the other risk which Russia does not face but Ukraine does is
  • one of economic collapse the the targeting of the energy infrastructure
  • is very significant and ukrainians have incredible degree of resilience but
  • nevertheless if they don't have electricity and heating this winter then
  • that will put an enormous strain on the civilian economy which in the end is necessary to support the military effort
  • so I think that's that's something we we should really be worried about I think a more probable scenario is we'll go into
  • next spring uh the situ on the ground the the the line between the two sides

  • 47:00
  • won't have changed that much and we'll have with a new American president will
  • have renewed interest in whether there is trade space for some sort of negotiation it feels right now the two
  • sides are far apart their objectives are fundamentally incompatible uh but uh in all conflicts
  • when you get to you can get to a hurting stalemate in which the parties to conflict are are prepared to compromise
  • in their ultimate objectives because they're hurting so much and we may be approaching that point sometime next
  • year and you know you speak about the length this war has gone on for now um
  • do you think the Kremlin ever expected this level of response and support from Ukraine's European allies and the us as
  • well you know deterrence almost always fails because of miscalculation by one
  • side or another and it's not a simple it's not a a simple calculus uh
  • ukrainians could not have predicted did not predict that they would fight so well and for so long and the Russians

  • 48:05
  • didn't either if in those first days Uh Russian Special Forces the hit squads
  • that were sent in to ke had killed zalinski and many of his co-leaders then
  • it's possible the Ukrainian situation would have been a lot worse and ultimately this invasion was actually a
  • special forces uh La lead effort it was not a military Le effort it was not
  • designed by the Russian military and the Russian element of the invasion was was very poorly organized although they did
  • very well in the South let's not forget they failed in the north uh but they
  • they succeeded to take a large amount of territory in the South relatively quickly um so yes I think
  • Putin wouldn't have predicted this um but he's still he's still in the game
  • Russia can still win this conflict there is a plausible scenario in which Western

  • 49:02
  • support falters Ukrainian morale declines there's a significant Russian
  • breakthrough in the dbass and uh a new American president uh decides to cut
  • their losses as they have they did in Afghanistan not so long ago so Ukraine
  • is not as vital to the United States that necessarily is to Europe at least to some American leaders and we know how
  • divided the United States in this so there is a plausible path to victory for Putin and I think what the next months
  • will be about is making it clear to Putin that there is no plausible path to
  • Victory and he needs to get round the negotiating table seriously and for that
  • the immediate task for the UK and our allies is to ensure that president
  • zalinsky can go into those negotiations with us strong hand so he can achieve
  • most of what he wants and most of all of course what Ukraine wants is the ability

  • 50:05
  • to be independent and determine its own course and so where do you think we are
  • on that at the moment do do you see any signals coming out about whether Putin
  • thinks that path to Victory Trump still possibly on on route to win uh in
  • November do you think looking at that situation and where you is now on the ground Putin is feeling you know the
  • Kremlin are feeling confident they think they've got that route to Victory now or is this still on a bit of a knif edge
  • for them I think it's a knife edge but I think if I were in the kemman with the information I can see I would say that I
  • still have a plausible path of Victory it's not at all guarantees maybe not even probable but it is plausible and it
  • would be such a geostrategic victory for Russia uh such a gain for The
  • credibility of the Russian leaders leadership to their own people and fundamentally

  • 51:00
  • for most Russians Ukraine is part of historic Russia it's been part the zaris
  • empire for a long time Ukrainian nationalism has of course also always been there uh but the Russian Empire has
  • involved for centuries the subjugation of other peoples and Ukraine has been
  • Central to that and of a lot of intermarriage and significant number of Russian speakers in Ukraine including of
  • course course uh president zinski himself so achieving that would be such
  • a gain for Putin but it may be out of his grasp and I think uh it's very much in our interest in the UK and other
  • European countries to ensure it remains outside is grasp this is not a battle
  • for dbass this is not a battle for Crimea the largely uh Russia had large
  • part of the dbass and Crimea already they didn't fight this war in order to gain a little bit more of dumbass uh
  • they fought it because Russia believes Putin believes that Ukraine must be

  • 52:05
  • subjugated and subordinated perhaps fully integrated into Russia or at least
  • most of Ukraine as long as Odessa and keev and other main cities to some
  • extent but most of all those are out of Russia's grasp uh Ukraine can continue
  • as a as a modern State uh a state which will be even more antagonistic to Russia
  • much more antagonistic to Russia than it was in the past um and that's a strategic loss which any Russian regime
  • will find hard to stomach thank you for watching today's episode of Frontline for Early Access to our videos member
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