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Date: 2025-01-04 Page is: DBtxt003.php txt00027528
YEMEN
THE HOUTHIS

CaspianReport: Why the US Navy can’t stop Houthi rebels


Original article: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y_eCu_pW6-4
Peter Burgess COMMENTARY
SECTION I

During my working career I worked in the Horn of Africa and in Yemen on a variety of assignments. Mostly 'reading' and 'writing' are foundational for people engaged in management and decision making in most every organization ... especially between management and employee.

This assumption tends to be less applicable when managers write in the English language and use Roman numerals for numbering and most of the employees do not!

Over time, I became quite adept at communicating some essential performance goals and results in ways that could be understood by managers and workers who had no familiarity with anything 'english'. In the Middle East, both text and numbers needed conversion ... but in places like Kazakhstan in the former Soviet Union the text needed conversion, but the numbers did not!

Looking back, I am appalled at the low level of understanding that international decision makers had about most of the underlying organizations and their performance. It really is no wonder that so little progress was made in the early post colonial era ... say 1955 to 1975. For about a century before this, the old Colonial powers had country experts everywhere who were truly eperts inmost everything important for the local country. by about 1960 most of this amazing human resource was gone ... never to be replaced ... and the results have not been good!

SECTION II

Being old is not 'all bad'. The big advantage of age is that one has had time to see mistakes and make mistakes. In some cases. one might have actually learned something from the mistakes!

So ... I am now 84 years old and my mental capacity is not severely compromised ... though maybe this to some extent is wishful thinking!

During my working career I was mainly involved with performance analysis whether in the corporate world where profit was the goal or in the public sector and government where broader socio-economic progress was the goal. In my life 'post-work' I have done a lot of thinking and analysis of issues that seem to me to be important and where younger 'experts' seem to be getting it wrong!

My lifetime experience has been somewhat unusual. My education was much 'broader' than normal embracing engineering at Cambridge University and then economics also at Cambridge. I got some industrial training in the heavy engineering industry in the UK before transitioning to training as a Chartered Accountant in London with Coopers Brothers & Co that was in the process of becoming Coopers and Lybrand (which is now PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC).

I started my adult career in the UK, but migrated to North America in my mid/late 20s, initially into Canada and later the United States. I became a very young CFO in the corporate world with responsibility for 'corporate accounting', data based strategic planning not to mention enabling transitions from manual accounting to EDP supported accounting!

After almost 20 years of corporate employment, I ventured into independent management consulting. My expectation was I would do work somewhat similar to the work I had been doing within a corporate organization, but this did not work out. Instead I found myself being recruited into the world of socio-economic development with organizations like the World Bank and IFC and humanitarian relief with organizations wihin the UN system. This kept me reasonably busy until most of the key staff who had recruited me over time became of retirement age and younger staff took their place. By this time, I might also have developed a reputation for being very 'independent' in my thinking ... something that should mostly be a positive 'value' but not always in big organizations where many other factors are in play.

Though my consulting career ended more abruptly than I would have wished ... my interest in global socio-enviro-economic progress and performance has remained strong. This has been stimulated by a number of mega-trends that have emerged during recent decades and need to be addressed, but have been essentially on 'auto-pilot' as well as being in the wrong direction because much of global 'top-leadership' has the wrong goals.

My work to develop TrueValueMetrics is a response to this matter ... maybe 'too little and too late' ... but perhaps, 'better late than never'!
Peter Burgess
Why the US Navy can’t stop Houthi rebels

CaspianReport

Sep 13, 2024

1.57M subscribers ... 1,029,951 views ... 26K likes

#Houthis #ad #Navy
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The #US #Navy finds itself in the most intense naval engagement since World War II. Six months on, the #Houthis remained undeterred. Why is that?

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Transcript
  • 0:00
  • smoke Rose above the yemeni port city of
  • Hoda in Late July as the Israeli Air
  • Force carried out a series of strikes on
  • transportation and energy infrastructure
  • the operation which marked Israel's
  • First Direct involvement in the country
  • came in response to houie strikes
  • against Tel Aviv the week prior yet such
  • strikes also occur in the context of the
  • broader Red Sea crisis in October 202 3
  • in response to the Gaza conflict the
  • houthis began a partial blockade of the
  • bab al-mandab Strait by January 2024
  • traffic through the Red Sea had haved
  • drawing the ire of the West the United
  • States launched operation Prosperity
  • Guardian deploying a carrier strike
  • group alongside 20 Regional and
  • international allies the Americans had
  • planned to take the fight directly to
  • the hou

  • 1:00
  • whereas their European allies sought to
  • provide escort missions through their
  • own separate task named Operation as
  • speedies 6 months on however the houis
  • remained undeterred and more than 100
  • incidents have been reported with no end
  • in sight on the contrary June saw a
  • significant spike in attacks on shipping
  • the sinking of the MV tutor the second
  • major vessel sunk by the houthis since
  • the start of the crisis drove insurance
  • premiums
  • Skyhigh not necessarily outgunned but
  • certainly out maneuvered the US Navy
  • finds itself in the most intense Naval
  • engagement since the second world war
  • Warfare is expensive and the operation
  • costs are already amounting to close to
  • $4
  • billion yet Washington has made little
  • to no progress in the fight against the
  • houthis but why is that why is the

  • 2:00
  • world's Premier Naval power unable to
  • overcome a ragtag band of rebels Perhaps
  • it is true even Giants can
  • fall hoi attacks have increased global
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  • now despite its current prominence the
  • houthi movement has humble Origins
  • beginning its existence as a minor youth
  • group in the early 1990s it rapidly Rose
  • to prominence under the tutelage of its
  • namesake Hussein al- Hui initially
  • focused on zidi revivalism which is one
  • of the major branches of Shia Islam the
  • huis soon took on a more revolutionary
  • character in response to the US invasion
  • of Iraq before long the group was
  • questioning the legitimacy of the yemeni

  • 4:01
  • state in the 10 years that followed
  • yemeni president Abdullah alale would
  • attempt to crack down on the movement
  • driving the houthis into the northern
  • mountains squeezed between Yemen and
  • Saudi Arabia the houis began to move
  • closer to other Shia factions in the
  • Middle East ultimately courting the
  • support of Iran and its axis of
  • resistance with the outbreak of the
  • yemeni revolution in 2011
  • local hostilities evolved into a front
  • in The Wider Iranian Saudi proxy war as
  • the revolution collapsed into a Civil
  • War the houthis skillfully navigated
  • Yemen's internal Dynamics they partnered
  • with the then deposed Sal to take the
  • capital sah by February
  • 2015 having seized power once more Sal
  • turned on the houis by this stage
  • however houthi agents had infiltrated
  • Sal's forces

  • 5:00
  • after a brief struggle the houthis
  • deposed s and took over the Army
  • overnight the ragtag rebel movement came
  • into possession of the military and
  • demographic wealth of North Yemen more
  • importantly however the houthis had
  • broken out of their confinement and
  • gained a coastline consequently the
  • group came to possess a valuable
  • geopolitical position just across the
  • bab Al mandab straight at about 30 km
  • wide at its narrowest point the babal
  • mandb is a vulnerable Gateway for
  • shipping and an opportunity for pirates
  • the ranks of which the houthis rushed to
  • join access to the ocean allowed the
  • houis to establish new supply lines and
  • engage in the arms trade abroad thus
  • even as the houis later lost the port
  • city of Aiden revenues from Maritime
  • related activities and piracy remained
  • High surpassing one $ 1.5 billion by

  • 6:02
  • 2020 the viability of the houthis
  • provoked fear in Riyad and in 2015 Saudi
  • Arabia led a direct intervention in the
  • conflict under the fog of war the houthi
  • Insurgency sustained itself and even
  • Advanced owing to the inflow of Aid and
  • materials from sponsors in tran and
  • Beirut years of the Saudi Le air
  • campaign had taught the houthis the
  • value view of force dispersal and
  • asymmetric Warfare through capturing
  • several of Yemen's ports the houthis
  • came into possession of the defunct
  • yemeni Navy anti-ship missiles and
  • Limpet mines but with Iranian assistance
  • such Technologies were reverse
  • engineered into viable and deadly
  • weapons by 2022 the growing Fleet of
  • explosive boats was complemented by the
  • delivery of a host of anti-ip Rockets

  • 7:00
  • from Iran these include the 120 km
  • ranged no and the 200 km ranged cader
  • anti-ship missiles as well as the 300 km
  • ranged College fars anti-ship ballistic
  • missile loitering Munitions such as the
  • Samad 3 drone and the Tolan 3 Blowfish
  • have likewise gradually found their way
  • into the houthi Arsenal the deployment
  • of these weapons is believed to be
  • coordinated by the Iranian intelligence
  • cell on board the MV bashad which is a
  • commercial cargo vessel that is used
  • covertly for reconnaissance and
  • intelligence operations in the Arabian
  • Sea as such over time fighting the
  • houthis became expensive too expensive
  • by 2021 the Saudis signaled their
  • intention to withdraw the houthis that
  • emerged from the years of war were
  • unrecognizable from the organization
  • that had marched on saana in

  • 8:01
  • 2015 as a truce was negotiated with
  • Saudi Arabia the houthis sought to shore
  • up their domestic and international
  • standing the outbreak of hostilities
  • between Israel and Gaza provided that
  • opportunity by attaching its actions to
  • a wider political narrative the houthis
  • were able to re-engage in piracy
  • politically
  • costree War had made the houthis and now
  • the houthis were Poise to make
  • [Applause]
  • war in July of 2002 the US Navy
  • conducted a war game known as the
  • Millennium challenge focused on a
  • hypothetical war between the United
  • States and Iran the war game was notable
  • in that it demonstrated the topheavy US
  • Navy unpreparedness to defend against an
  • asymmetrical threat throughout the war
  • game the team representing Iran
  • dispersed their forces and utilized

  • 9:02
  • analog Technologies such as motorcycle
  • Messengers and light signals to avoid
  • detection in combating the US Navy the
  • Iranian team employed fleets of
  • waterborne improvised explosive devices
  • simultaneously with massive salvos of
  • cruise missiles the Strategies employed
  • by the Iranian team resulted in the
  • deaths of an estimated 20,000 Sailors
  • and the destruction of 16 War ships one
  • aircraft carrier 10 Cruisers and five
  • amphibious ships two decades later and
  • the US Navy is confronted by a similar
  • threat profile whilst the houthis Do Not
  • possess the same capabilities of a
  • besieged Iranian State the US Navy is
  • similarly restricted due to wider
  • geopolitical
  • considerations with tensions increasing
  • in the South China Sea Washington cannot
  • afford to relocate its Force westwards

  • 10:00
  • resources are scarce such considerations
  • also limit other aspects of American
  • engagement between the ongoing Ukrainian
  • War and the evolving hotspots in South
  • America and the Middle East American
  • diplomatic and intelligence assets are
  • stretched thinly where force can be
  • applied it is limited by the costs of
  • deployment which is not always measured
  • in dollars since America is the chief
  • global Naval power the US Navy must
  • maintain a presence worldwide political
  • disruptions Force Washington to redeploy
  • its forces away from one region to the
  • next yet in doing so it downgrades its
  • threat response in the affected region
  • in the case of Yemen Washington has
  • already had to make such concessions
  • deciding to pull the USS Theodore
  • Roosevelt carrier out of the South China
  • Sea during a serious escalation of
  • tensions between China and the

  • 11:01
  • Philippines by deploying the carrier to
  • the West Washington incurs the Strategic
  • cost of one less carrier in the East
  • another problem with modern warships is
  • that they're pricey and designed for
  • combating other conventional warships
  • they're not made for asymmetric Warfare
  • and so no one wants to risk damaging
  • their assets to an unsophisticated
  • attack it doesn't look good for the
  • Ergo warships are like poker chips you
  • don't use them unless you're willing to
  • lose them for instance each Arley Burke
  • class destroyer deployed by the United
  • States costs $2 billion to build and
  • another $7 million to operate monthly as
  • for repair costs these can be in the
  • hundreds of millions even if the damage
  • is quite low take the case of the USS
  • coal bombing in the year 20 2000

  • 12:00
  • Al-Qaeda built an explosive boat that
  • cost less than $1 million yet it was
  • able to cause $240 Million worth of
  • damage and take the lives of 17
  • Sailors this economic logic also
  • functions in the inverse each missile
  • launched by the US Navy has caused
  • taxpayers between one and $4.3
  • million when these types of missiles are
  • used to take out budget drones worth
  • $2,000 it is the cost equivalent of
  • using a bazooka to kill a fly in such
  • cases it is hard to ascertain who killed
  • who not surprisingly the total cost of
  • operation Prosperity Guardian according
  • to Al jazer has amounted to$ 1.8 and4
  • billion these are not rookie numbers and
  • American taxpayers will consider such
  • expenses as they go to the polls in
  • November

  • 13:00
  • the legacy of the wars in Iraq and
  • Afghanistan has left the American
  • electorate with little appetite for
  • Foreign Wars particularly not Wars that
  • necessitate deep commitments such as
  • Israel's war in Gaza and its Associated
  • spillover the nature of this conflict
  • has also deprived Washington of relying
  • on its traditional strategy of Coalition
  • building due to the intense controversy
  • in Gaza none of the Middle Eastern
  • powers are willing to get directly
  • involved that leaves only the European
  • powers which are not much of help the
  • European task force operation aspides
  • has totally different rules of
  • engagement for one its mandate
  • discourages direct strikes on yemeni
  • soil and instead limits European
  • involvement to escorting operations yet
  • in deploying a naval Mission apart from
  • the US the European navies face a dual

  • 14:01
  • crisis of capability and confidence
  • simply put the European Fleet lacks the
  • number of ships necessary to defend
  • against the houthis because it doesn't
  • have the proper mission to start with
  • even where such ships can be gathered
  • the absence of a unified EU command
  • structure as well as the lack of
  • communication with the American British
  • Mission has been disastrous
  • faced with such difficulties it is no
  • surprise that both operations have
  • proven to be ineffective the ineptitude
  • of the US Navy has emboldened the houis
  • who have scaled up their attacks in
  • recent months for comparison between
  • January 2017 and June 2021 the houthis
  • performed 24 Maritime drone attacks on
  • average one every 70 days days however

  • 15:00
  • from November 2023 to July 2024 they
  • have performed 77 on average one every 3
  • days such Havoc has not been lost on
  • insurers who have increased premiums
  • substantially costs are extrapolated
  • along the supply chain with each
  • diversion around the Cape of Good Hope
  • increasing the duration of shipping by
  • 10 days in global trade everyday added
  • is accounted for in costs associated
  • with fuel crew salaries and insurance
  • premiums so Logistics get expensive
  • really fast lacking a military solution
  • Washington is increasingly forced to
  • pursue a just as unpalatable diplomatic
  • solution but this disengaged policy only
  • bolsters The Prestige of the houthis
  • still even in an unpalatable situation
  • there are choices between bad and worse
  • a few strategies are worth considering

  • 16:02
  • on the one hand Washington could resort
  • to strengthening the official yeny
  • government in Aiden which is unpopular
  • underfunded and considered as
  • illegitimate as the houthis given its
  • reputation for incompetence corruption
  • and infighting a clear alternative to
  • the houi Insurgency must be shown to the
  • yemeni public so that they can decide
  • what kind of country they want for
  • themselves America can count on Decades
  • of experience from Afghanistan in what
  • works and doesn't including the
  • appropriate levels of funding foreign
  • involvement political processes and
  • autonomous organic growth on the other
  • hand a concerted un effort will be
  • necessary to enact change Russia and
  • China can sometimes act as spoilers in
  • the security Council but this does not
  • mean that they are immune to the hou's
  • actions in addition to direct and

  • 17:00
  • indirect economic costs both are
  • sensitive to Saudi Arabia's needs and
  • may be persuaded to pressure Iran and
  • the houthis to subtly back down America
  • would likely need to make geopolitical
  • concessions elsewhere to get the
  • Russians and Chinese talking however
  • saving the Red Sea might not justify
  • sacrificing Ukraine and Taiwan which is
  • what Russia and China would undoubtedly
  • bring up so backchannel diplomacy would
  • probably not work lastly if America is
  • to stop the houthis it could try to
  • bring about a reasonable end to the
  • hostilities in Gaza robbing the houthis
  • of this justification for their actions
  • in the Red Sea would be a powerful
  • incentive to make them sit down at the
  • negotiating table and abandon behavior
  • that they have hither to benefited from
  • admittedly settling any deal that that
  • crosses Israel's interests would result

  • 18:01
  • in political backlash for the executive
  • office so this might not work either by
  • all accounts Washington has
  • inadvertently become a hostage to
  • contemporary international relations
  • there is no immediate resolution in
  • sight that is both practical and
  • politically redeemable it is unable to
  • stop the houthis by military means just
  • as it is unable to stop them by
  • diplomatic means meanwhile for the
  • destitute houthis now is their window of
  • opportunity every time they open fire
  • they are ringing The Dinner Bell so they
  • might as well make it
  • count I've been your host chivon from
  • caspan report thank you for your time
  • and S
  • [Music]
  • [Music]


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