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THE UKRAINE WAR Analysis of General David Petraeus ... October 2024 The Military Show: Retired U.S. General Explains Why Putin's Military Is Crumbling PLAY YOUTUBE VIDEO Original article: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SmbqpB1THfw Peter Burgess COMMENTARY This is an interesting presentation. It is not a direct conversation with General Petraeus but a report on a lot of what he has said. The information is pretty good ... but is not directly what Petraeus is saying. I am something of a fan of General Petraeus. I have heard him talk at a number of events in Manhattan ... for example the Japan Society ... and is views seem solid. The one issue that I have with General Petraeus is an inadequate embrace of the critical value of an effective partnership between the civil and military segments of any society. I have watched this issue for all my adult life ... since around 1960 ... and by now, I would have thought that someone would have picked up on this either in the military or in civil society and academia ... but so far, no such luck! Peter Burgess
Retired U.S. General Explains Why Putin's Military Is Crumbling The Military Show Oct 18, 2024 1.12M subscribers #militarystrategy #militarydevelopments #militaryanalysis In this video, we dive into the insights of retired U.S. General David Petraeus on why Russia’s military is on the verge of collapse. Despite starting the Ukraine war with overwhelming force, Russia has been outmaneuvered by Ukraine’s determined and strategic military efforts. General Petraeus explains how Ukraine’s recent invasion of Kursk highlights Russia’s military weaknesses, including the use of inexperienced conscripts and crumbling defenses. Watch as we explore how Ukraine is shifting the war in its favor and the potential downfall of Putin's military. #militarystrategy #militarydevelopments #militaryanalysis #themilitaryshow SOURCES: https://pastebin.com/yx6bPtQ2 ATTRIBUTIONS: https://pastebin.com/i1E6LrTZ Transcript 0:00 Russia’s forces should have been overwhelming. By December 2021, it had amassed around 100,000 troops around Ukraine, surrounding the country on three sides. When Russia finally entered Ukraine in February 2022, it had assembled 83 battalion tactical groups, with the initial incursion seeing up to 200,000 soldiers invade in what was supposed to be a smash-and-grab exercise. Their goal was simple – secure Kyiv in a matter of weeks so Russian President Vladimir Putin could depose Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and claim Ukraine as part of Russia. Only, that’s not what happened. Facing seemingly insurmountable odds, the valiant Ukrainian troops pushed Russia’s initial advance back. And since February 2022, those soldiers have fought valiantly, slowing Russia’s progress to a crawl, retaking key cities like Kharkiv, and, as of August 6, 2024, entering Russian territory to conduct an invasion of their own. Russia has been outsmarted at every turn. Outmaneuvered regularly by a Ukrainian military it dwarfs 1:00 both in terms of sheer manpower and the amount of equipment that it has at its disposal. And now, Ukraine is no longer holding the line while trying to defend itself – it’s overseeing the crumbling of the Russian military that will ultimately see Putin and his army collapse under the very type of pressure he tried to exert on Ukraine. That’s the opinion of retired U.S. General David Petraeus. But why does Petraeus believe that Russia’s military is on the verge of crumbling? This video will answer that question using interview quotes from the general himself, along with evidence to support the claims he makes. But before answering that question, we need to answer another: Who is David Petraeus? Born in November 1952, Petraeus is a U.S. Army general who was appointed to lead the multinational forces former President George W. Bush amassed to serve in Iraq in 2007. Petraeus is also the former Commander-in-Chief of Central Command, or Centcom, a role in which he served between 2008 and 2010, as well as a former director of the CIA and one of the commanders who led U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. He has received a slew of honors for his service, 2:02 including the Distinguished Service Medal, four Legion of Merit Awards, a pair of Defense Superior Service Medals, and a Bronze Star with a “V” device, which is given to those who display great valor. In other words, he is a military expert who has seen and done it all. So, when he talks about the state of Putin’s military, it’s wise to listen to what he has to say. That brings us to August 18, 2024. On that date, interview footage emerged of Petraeus speaking about the strategic brilliance Ukraine has displayed during its war with Russia and how that brilliance has allowed Ukraine to reshape the entire war. It has taken the war out of Putin’s control, grasping the momentum and putting Putin in a position where he has to watch the slow collapse of a military that many believed to be one of the world’s strongest before February 2022. Petraeus starts with a brief analysis of Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk: “They did achieve enormous surprise with the Russians. They managed to assemble elements of four brigades – not just infantry and armor, but also artillery, air defenses, electronic warfare, and so forth – so it’s a real combined arms effort 3:02 with logistics.” Petraeus refers, of course, to Ukraine’s initial invasion of Kursk. Russia attempted to downplay that invasion, which began on August 6, 2024, claiming that it had ended what it dubbed a small incursion. It hadn’t. The initial group of 300 Ukrainians that is believed to have crossed the border on that date has since been supplemented with several thousand more, with Ukraine also claiming to control 482 square miles of Kursk. That includes over 90 settlements, according to Zelensky, with that success coming as a result of the combined arms effort that Petraeus highlights. The retired general also highlights one of the key mistakes Putin made that enabled the Kursk invasion in the first place, pointing out that the Russian defenses on the border were “not very substantial.” Again, that has been backed up by later reports, which were mostly made up of recent conscripts, many of whom were aged between 18 and 20. An August 30 report in The Moscow Times notes that the deaths and surrenders of these conscripts highlight a “hollow civic identity” within Russia while adding that the loss of those conscripts 4:01 will resonate within Russian society. That’s bad enough for Putin. However, The Moscow Times also notes that the use of conscripts in such a vital area shows “that the Russian army has degraded to the point where it cannot fight a full-fledged war with professional soldiers.” In other words, Russia has been exposed. When Petraeus says that the border defenses were “not very substantial,” he’s actually hinting at the fact that Russia’s military has already collapsed to such a point that it’s relying on inexperienced and poorly trained conscripts to defend its own territory. Back to Petraeus, he also reveals what Ukraine has already gained from the Kursk invasion: “They’re pushing the Russians out. From this, they’re gaining an enormous morale boost. They’re collecting Russian prisoners for later exchange for Ukrainian prisoners held by Russia. They have also cut a very important rail line that Russia uses to send logistics and troops from, say, the Moscow region down to the Southeastern part of Ukraine.” There’s a fair amount to unpack here. On the subject of morale, it’s clear the Kursk invasion had a positive effect. Speaking to Reuters on August 21, 51-year-old Kyiv resident Olha Pavlovska said: “This was a very brave and 5:03 important step…for keeping up morale in society.” Her words are echoed by many in Kyiv, as well as soldiers who were involved in the invasion. The Kursk invasion isn’t a simple act of Ukraine taking Russian territory. It’s a demonstration – one that shows Ukraine is now fighting the war on its own terms rather than Russia’s. And again, the fact the invasion was successful showcases the weakness of Russia in key areas. It may be pouring hundreds of thousands of soldiers into Ukraine, but it’s doing so while its internal defenses crumble. As for prisoners, Ukraine now has plenty of those. On August 27, Kyiv’s Chief Commander Oleksandr Syrskyi claimed that Ukraine had captured a staggering 594 prisoners of war, or POWS, in just 21 days, meaning prisoners are being taken at a rate of around 28 per day. “We managed to increase our exchange fund,” Syrskyi said, which reinforces Petraeus’ comments that Ukraine now has more leverage to get back some of its lost troops as a result of Kursk. Even in these early comments from Petraeus, we see evidence 6:00 that Russia’s military is crumbling. It barely put up a defense against Ukraine’s incursion – with those defending being recent conscripts rather than experienced soldiers – and it’s losing men to surrender at an alarming rate. Add to this actions like the crippling of the rail line Petraeus mentions and you see how Ukraine is also attempting to cut the Russians that are in its country off from their own country. The loss of that line means fewer troops and less equipment entering Ukraine from the north, setting the stage for further Russian crumbling later on. The situation is so bad, claims Petraeus, that Russia has been forced to scramble. “They’re having to pull forces from the southern area to react to this. It’s obvious that their border forces, the irregular territorial forces, and the National Guard have been incapable of standing up to the Ukrainians.” Again, the evidence backs him up. In the same Politico piece in which Syrskyi claimed Ukraine has taken almost 600 Russian soldiers as POWs, Ukraine’s leading general also highlighted how many soldiers Russia has been forced to send to Kursk. He says that “the Kremlin has sent some 30,000 soldiers from other directions to Kursk, and their number is growing.” That may seem like 7:01 a logical response from Moscow, and it is. But it’s also a response that shows weakness in the Russian military. If Putin’s forces were as strong as he would like the rest of the world to believe, he wouldn’t need to divert soldiers from key locations in Ukraine to defend Kursk. He’d simply send some from Moscow or elsewhere in Russian territory. But he’s having to weaken his attack in Ukraine so he can defend Russian territory, which reinforces Petraeus’ point that Russia’s internal defenses simply aren’t strong enough. We may not be seeing the collapse of the Russian military in terms of the sheer number of soldiers, but the fact that 30,000 troops have been moved from Ukraine suggests that there is a major skill problem in Russia’s military. Putin doesn’t feel he can rely on the soldiers he has in Russia to do the job, which once again means Ukraine has succeeded in exposing Russia’s frailty. Petraeus then switches focus to consider the broader implications of the Kursk invasion on the Ukraine war, particularly when it comes to Russia’s attempts to take more territory in the Donetsk region. “I think they’re trying to continue their offensive in the southeastern area and Donetsk, in particular, and not interfere with that. And that 8:00 does, to be fair, continue to achieve incremental gains against Ukrainian forces,” he says. He's not wrong. Though Putin has been forced to divert troops away from some of Russia’s offensives, it is still slowly gaining ground in Donetsk and other regions. The Institute for the Study of War highlighted this in late August, with its interactive maps showing that Russia has made some significant advances in Pokrovsk, which is a city in Donetsk that serves as a key logistical hub for Ukraine. As of August 28, Russia has entered Memryk, which lies 18 miles from Pokrovsk, and it is continuing to slowly advance. Does that mean Ukraine’s effort to divert Russian troops has failed? Not necessarily. Petraeus notes that this continued focus on Donetsk belies Putin’s inability to create a proper response to the situation in Kursk. “So far, not a particularly coherent response yet,” the retired general says when talking about Putin’s response. “What the organizational architecture of this will eventually be is not yet clear to the observers out there. Eventually, they have to really push their forces against this to get the Ukrainians out of Russian territory.” Putin knows this. His problem is that he can’t come up 9:01 with a clear plan that details the logistics of how Russia will achieve this and where the combat power will come from. The redeployment of 30,000 soldiers to Kursk may make it seem like Russia is mounting a powerful response, but that high number is deceiving. Putin has given Ukraine plenty of time to mount defenses, as well as cut off access to the regions it’s already taken. It has already destroyed two bridges into Kursk, allowing it to create a buffer zone within Russian territory through which those 30,000 Russian soldiers will need to navigate. And without the bridges they would rely upon to get into Kursk, those soldiers are going to be far less effective than their numbers indicate. “It again shows how relatively inadequate these Russian forces inside Russia actually are,” Petraeus claims. “[Russia] is sending all of its main line forces into the offensive in the southeast and holding the line in the south.” Again, these comments point to a collapse of the Russian military on its soil. Diverting 30,000 troops sounds impressive until you realize that this diversion will be less effective because of the time it’s taken for Putin to create that response. It smacks of a leader dealing in desperation. He’s been 10:02 forced to recognize that Russia’s internal forces can’t stand up to a relatively small contingent of invading Ukrainians. Now, he’s stuck between a rock and a hard place – and he’s mostly choosing to continue the Russian offensive in southeastern Ukraine. That decision may come back to bite him as it opens the door for Ukraine to continue making gains in Kursk all while fighting off the inexperienced and scattered troops that Putin is sending to retake the territory. That indecision could also mean that Russia is no longer in a position to end the Ukraine war on its own terms. It also shows that Ukraine is capable of doing something that the increasingly weakening Russian forces can’t do – conduct complicated advances. Throughout the war, we’ve seen the same pattern in Putin’s strategy. Rather than relying on the combined might of his aerial and ground forces to conduct cooperative strikes against Ukrainian positions, he has simply bombarded those positions with artillery while sending soldier after soldier into them. Putin has created a meat grinder. We saw this during the Battle of Bakhmut, which lasted a year and, at one point, saw Russia losing 11:01 around 820 soldiers per day. Its loss tally by the end of that battle was around 30,000 – a heavy price to pay for taking a fairly small city of just 16.1 square miles. With the Kursk invasion, Ukraine has taken well over 20 times that amount of territory in less than a month, with barely any losses being recorded on its side. Part of the reason for that comes down to what Petraeus mentioned regarding Russia using recently assigned conscripts to guard its borders. However, Global Guardian intelligence analyst Joe Chafetz says there’s another reason. “If nothing else, Kyiv’s foray into Kursk has demonstrated that Ukrainian forces are capable of complicated mechanized advances,” he told USA Today. Continuing to use that strategy could allow Ukraine to replicate the Kursk success inside Russia, enabling it to take more territory. And in doing so, Ukraine could even thwart Putin’s strategy of making incremental and irreversible advances – the meatgrinder approach would have to end and Putin would be forced to focus on more complex tactics. Given that Russia has already lost around 613,500 soldiers as of producing this video – according to 12:05 Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance – and is set to lose many more, that need to match Ukraine’s complex tactics creates a problem. Russia’s military may not have the expertise needed, especially after losing so many combat veterans. So, its collapse may come, partially, as a result of ineptitude and inexperience rather than simply no longer having the manpower. Petraeus’ comments ended with his pointing out how inadequate Russia’s forces are. That alone could be taken as a sign of an impending collapse of the Russian military. However, there are other issues at play. Take the psychological impact this invasion could have on Russia and its military as an example. Before the Ukraine war began, Russia was feared the world over as having one of the world’s strongest militaries. This was an image that Putin was more than happy to play up, not least because it fed into the image of the “strongman” authoritarian leader that has enabled him to hold power in Russia for over 20 years. However, even before the Kursk invasion, Russia’s efforts in Ukraine had revealed it to be something of a paper tiger. Yes, it can withstand a lot of punishment. But 13:03 each of its attacks leads to severe losses, with those lost soldiers being replaced by contracted mercenaries or poorly trained conscripts. Now, those paper tiger accusations have intensified given how easily Ukraine entered Kursk. Beyond having a strong impact on Ukrainian morale, that incursion has to be damaging to Russia’s military and, in particular, how Putin’s people view his ability to defend his countrymen. The early signs of a decline in confidence are already coming in the wake of the Kursk incursion. Speaking to CBC in Canada, a Ukrainian soldier who wished to only be identified by his codename of “Wolverine” spoke about his experiences with Russians in Kursk following his taking part in the invasion. In addition to pointing out how good the capture of Russian territory was for Ukrainian morale, Wolverine noted that many of the Russian soldiers and people he came across seemed disillusioned. “They speak about betrayal from the Russian government,” Wolverine told CBC. “They did not declare evacuation and immediately turned off water and light, so they created unbearable living conditions.” In other words, Putin started 14:01 treating Kursk like a warzone without really thinking about its people. Granted, the evacuation orders eventually came, with around 200,000 of the oblast’s residents now having been moved on, but those early days of the Kursk invasion revealed a lot to the people living in the region. They showed that Putin had underestimated his Ukrainian foe and that he didn’t have a plan in place to help his people if they were ever in danger. Earlier, we spoke about Putin’s “strongman” image and how it is essential to the leadership of his people and military. That image relies on Putin being able to demonstrate that he can lead Russia to greater things and that, crucially, he can protect Russia from any external threat. The Kursk invasion shook that belief to the point where many Russians will now be doubting Putin’s leadership. What does that have to do with Petraeus's comments about the Russian military crumbling? Lowering opinions of Putin damaged a collective Russian morale that was already a problem before the Kursk invasion. In March 2014, The Forum for Ukrainian Studies published a piece in which it noted that one of Putin’s main military strategies appears to 15:00 be to lower Ukrainian morale via the maximization of Russia’s material and manpower advantages. The idea is to use constant pressure to bear down on Ukraine. Only now, the situation has been flipped. Ukraine’s soldiers are in Russia. Their morale is higher than it’s been for a long time. Meanwhile, Russian soldiers have been struggling with morale crises since the Ukraine war turned into a conflict of attrition. Putin has been recruiting people who never wanted to be in the war in the first place. Desertions and post abandonments are rife, with over 18,000 Russian troops abandoning the country’s Southern Military District in April 2024 alone. The pressure is now being placed on Putin and his military. Morale is key in war. It affects a soldier’s ability to engage in combat operations, in addition to affecting commanders and their ability to organize their troops. How can you coordinate an attack – or a defense – when you’re having to deal with soldiers deserting daily? By failing to stop the Kursk invasion, and then being slow to respond to it, Putin has placed even greater strain on a collective Russian military morale that was already close to the breaking point. So, Russia’s military crumbling may end up being less a direct result of it being 16:02 further stretched by the Ukrainian advance and more a result of its soldiers simply losing their appetite for a fight that was never meant to last this long in the first place. Psychologically, Russia’s military can no longer view itself as one of the world’s strongest. It’s failed to take Ukraine after over two and a half years of trying. Any advances it makes in Ukraine are slow and come at the cost of thousands of lives. And now, Russian civilians are having to deal with the war being brought to their doorstep. Add to all of this the points Petraeus made about Ukraine using its troops in Russia to cut off vital supply lines and the region itself, and you have a collection of issues that ruin the Russian psyche. Putin can no longer position himself as the “strongman” defender of Russia. And with the loss of that positioning may come the loss of the support of the Russian military, along with the country’s people and any of Russia’s elite who may come sniffing around Putin’s seat of power. Let’s come back to Petraeus’ comments about Russian military inadequacy. The general made those comments in the context of Russia’s internal defenses, pointing out that the use of inexperienced conscripts as border guards and defensive lines within Russia 17:03 played a large part in Ukraine’s Kursk successes. Those inexperienced soldiers couldn’t stand up to the far more combat-hardened Ukrainians they came up against, leading to the massive volume of surrenders we’re seeing during this incursion. That inadequacy is the result of a larger problem in Russia’s military that is causing it to crumble from the inside – terrible training. In May 2023, Newsweek reported on a British intelligence assessment, which said that Russia’s ground forces in Ukraine mostly consisted of “poorly trained mobilized reservists,” who were becoming “increasingly reliant on antiquated equipment.” The situation was so bad, according to the report, that Russia’s Combined Grouping of Forces – which numbered 200,000 at the time – was only capable of completing “Very simple, infantry-based operations.” We’ve seen that throughout the war. Every Russian gain has come as a result of Putin throwing people at a Ukrainian position, sacrificing thousands in the process, while he fails to bring Russia’s superior aerial might to bear. Joint operations are limited and usually reduced to launching bombs and artillery at a position, followed up by soldiers, which is an antiquated tactic. CNA points out that 18:04 these training problems have long existed in Russia’s military. It says these issues exist for many reasons, ranging from procedural rigidity and, as the British pointed out, a lack of access to proper equipment. However, it also notes a lack of standardization, a result, it says, of an “emphasis on in-house training within units.” In other words, much of a Russian soldier’s training takes place once they have already been deployed. That’s fine in a peaceful scenario, as the new soldier has time to learn the ropes. But when Russia is in an active war, this focus on in-unit training inevitably leads to barely-trained conscripts being put into positions they’re nowhere near ready enough to handle. That’s what happened in Kursk. But it’s happening in Ukraine as well, with this poor training playing a huge role in Russia experiencing as many losses as it has. Think about what this means for Russia’s military in the future. Putin has already lost over 600,000 soldiers if Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance has accurate figures, which likely means he’s already lost most of the more experienced troops he initially sent into Ukraine. 19:02 Those experienced soldiers are being followed up by poorly-trained infantry who don’t have the time to learn the ropes in the traditional Russian way, resulting in even more losses. Internally, Russia is defending itself with conscripts as young as 19 years old who have no chance of contending with a Ukraine that is capable of far more complex combat operations. Perhaps that inexperience is part of the reason why the coherent Russian response to the Kursk Petraeus mentions hasn’t come yet – Putin can’t trust his poorly trained soldiers to put up an adequate defense. Before the Kursk invasion, Putin was getting away with this poor training. Russia faced no threat on its soil, so Putin could conscript, contract, and cajole people into being fed into the Ukraine war meatgrinder because his tactic was to destroy morale with a constant flood of manpower. Now, the situation is different. Russia is having to defend itself while it attacks. And, as Petraeus points out, we’re already seeing signs of a Russian collapse. Mass surrenders in the face of Ukrainian invaders. The pushing of troops from other locations into Russia to mount a response weakened the Russian frontline elsewhere. Combine this stretching of manpower with prominent 20:04 training issues and quickly declining Russian morale and you have all of the ingredients of an incoming military collapse. That collapse may come as a result of Ukraine’s pressure in Kursk. It may even come because Putin’s people no longer trust him to be the “strongman” they need to defend them. But make no mistake about it – the collapse is coming. At least, that’s according to General Petraeus. What do you think about the state of Russia’s military today and what the future may hold for Putin’s forces? Is talk about a collapse a touch ambitious or is Russia heading toward a fall? Share your thoughts in the comments and thank you for watching this video. Now go check out Soviet Collapse 2.0 - Putin’s Empire CRUMBLES or click this other video instead!

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